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ABSTRACT 
        
 
A Rhetoric of Moral Imagination: The Persuasions of Russell Kirk. (December 2009) 
 
Jonathan Leamon Jones; B.S., Texas A&M University; M.P.A., University of North  
 
Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Aune 
 
 
This rhetorical analysis of a contemporary and historical social movement, 
American conservatism, through a prominent intellectual figure, Russell Kirk, begins 
with a description of the author’s work. Ideologies, arguments, and sentiments are 
considered as implicit rhetoric, where social relations are defined by persuasion, ideas, 
historical appeal, persona, and various invitations to shared assumptions. First, a 
descriptive historical context is the foundation to explore the beliefs, communicative 
strategies, and internal tensions of the conservative movement through the development 
of various identities and communities during its rise as a formidable political power. 
Second, an analysis of the author and the author’s texts clarifies argumentative and 
stylistic choices, providing a framework for his communicative choices.   
The thesis of this discussion is that the discourses implicit and explicit in the 
author’s writing and conduct of life were imaginative and literary products of what he 
termed “moral imagination.” How this imagination developed, and its impact upon his 
persuasion, was a unique approach not only to an emergent intellectual tradition but also 
to the disciplines of history, fiction, policy, and audience. This work argues there were 
two components to Kirk’s rhetoric of moral imagination. First, his choosing of historical 
 iv 
subjects, in biographical sketch and literary content, was an indication of his own 
interest in rhetorical efficacy. Second, he attempted to live out the sort of life he claimed 
to value. I argue he taught observers by an ethos, an endeavor to live a rhetorical 
demonstration of what he genuinely believed was good. As demonstrated by what many 
who knew Kirk identified as an inner strength of character and conduct, his rhetorical 
behavior was motivated by a love for and a curiosity toward wonder and mystery. By an 
imaginative reading of history, his exemplars of more properly ordered sentiments of a 
moral order sought to build communities of associational, relational persons that found 
identity in relation to other persons. His ambition was to explore and communicate what 
it meant to be human – in limitation, in promise, and in the traditions and customs that 
provide a framework for “human” in a culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
DEDICATION 
 
 
This work is dedicated to my parents, Clyde and Nancy Jones.  
 
 
“Until the day breaks and the shadows flee…” 
- Song of Solomon 2:17 
 
“Pray for us scribbling sinners now and at the hour of our death.” 
- Russell Kirk, “A Cautionary Note on the Ghostly Tale” 
 
“They say that his accomplishments are few, that it is only the rhetoric that is conservative. But the 
rhetoric is the principal thing. It precedes all action. All thoughtful action.” 
- William F. Buckley, Jr. on Ronald Reagan in the November 28, 1967 edition of National Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 Words cannot express my deep gratitude. I begin by acknowledging my parents, 
whose love and support consistently placed me in a place of great comfort and blessing. 
They gifted a faith and selflessness I can only hope to emulate.  
James Aune, since my time as an undergraduate, has demonstrated a formidable 
intellect and a charity that all scholars should take as their example. I am grateful to him, 
to the members of my committee, and to those professors that have, as mentors, guided 
and challenged my development. Those deserving special mention include R.J.Q. 
Adams, Elias Barajas, Douglas Brooks, William Clark, Edward Funkhouser, Roy 
Joseph, Jennifer Mercieca, Stjepan Meštrović, and Christopher Swift. Further, I am 
honored to participate in the arguments, through involvement with First Things 
magazine and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, of “postmodern conservatism.” Those 
who do much of the arguing, particularly Bruce Frohnen, Paul Gottfried, George Nash, 
Peter Lawler, James Poulos, and Gerald Russello, have provoked much thought.  
 This project would not have been possible without the kind assistance of Annette 
Kirk. Her encouragement and generosity surpassed all my expectations. And, most of 
all, I am continuously blessed by family and friends. It is to them that I will remain, 
happily, in debt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
 
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………... iii 
 
DEDICATION……………………………………………………………………... v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…………………………………………………………..vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………... vii 
 
CHAPTER 
 
      I INTRODUCTIONS…………………………………........... 1 
 
 Restoration of True Significance: Imaginative Context and Definition…… 1  
 Unbought Grace: Kirk in Influence and Review…………………………... 46 
 
      II FIGURES............................................................................... 73 
 
 Dissent in Moral Imagination: The Goals of a Conservatism……………… 73 
 Amid the Ideologies: Sourcing Kirk’s Political Thought………………….. 103 
Against the Idols: Kirk and the Agrarian Rebuke………………………….. 160 
 
      III PHILOSOPHY……………………………………………... 188 
 
 A Smaller Sphere: Kirk’s Critique of Modernity…………………………...188 
 Creation in Imagination: Postmodern Rhetorical Constructions…………....216 
 The Moral Life: Rhetoric and Association in Conservative Community…...246 
 
      IV    CONCLUSIONS…………………………………………...... 271 
 
 Promise and Error: Kirk’s Concepts of Home……………………………... 271 
 Strategies of Representation: The Associational in Conservatism………….301 
 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………...333 
 
VITA……………………………………………………………………………….. 355 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTIONS 
 
Restoration of True Significance: Imaginative Context and Definition 
 
 Much like the elusive subject of Russell Kirk the writer and thinker, there is no 
easy way to define the term that often defined him: “conservative.” In this dissertation, 
“conservatism” is not an ideology or a firm set of doctrines. It is presented as Kirk 
tended to present it – as a disposition, an approach, and a sentiment.1 An author or editor 
of forty-one books, founder of two journals of culture and politics, and frequent 
contributor to newspapers, magazines, and academic journals, Kirk wrote and lectured 
widely in the four decades since the appearance of his most famous work, The 
Conservative Mind, in 1953. This book was his doctoral dissertation from St. Andrews 
University in Scotland, and it appeared at a time when the title seemed to many a 
puzzling paradox. Conservatism, he insisted over the course of his career, was “the 
negation of ideology.” Further, “a conservative impulse, if denied intelligent leadership 
and moral imagination, may be diverted banefully into ideological fanaticism.”2
__________________ 
 I argue 
Kirk’s “conservative impulse” was literary, imaginative, and reconstructive, political 
insofar as the impulses of disposition, approach, and sentiment opposed his perceptions 
of technocratic solutions and an accompanying hubris. And this impulse, even as it was 
influential and important to aspects of American public discourse, has little endured. 
Kirk, however, was an insightful and ceaseless critic. His “reconstructions” offered a 
unique perspective of content and persuasion.  
The journal model for this dissertation is Rhetoric & Public Affairs. 
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The contribution of this project to rhetorical studies is the communication of the 
“negation of ideology” – reconstruction of “conservative” political language in particular 
and political community in general. 
 The problem of defining conservatism stems from the great variety of figures, 
ideologies, and movements that have claimed the label. Infused with a strong market- 
based liberalism and noisy populism, much of contemporary American “conservatism” 
might appear depressingly strange to those, such as Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio,3 that 
were instinctively suspicious of “free trade” and foreign entanglements. This might be 
characterized as “America first” – foreign policy, for example, should aim only at 
“preventing invasion and threats of attack.”4 Yet little more than five decades later, well-
known, self-identified conservatives such as David Frum were proclaiming the moral 
obligation to “end evil” by overthrowing dictatorships aggressive to their neighbors and 
hostile to the United States.5 This view has struck many other conservatives, as it would 
have Kirk, as an absurd vision of the world, one in which historical nations are replaced 
by a collection of “individuals” supposedly held together by a shared belief in abstracted 
concepts such as “equality” and “human rights.” In their strongly opposing view, one 
among the big, confusing, and occasionally contradictory collections of views of 
American conservatism, populations are not interchangeable.  Humans need rootedness, 
a sense of place and of history, a sense of self taken from forebears, kin, and culture – 
that is, an identity both collective and personal.6
 There continues to be significant rhetorical complexities to such arguments. It is 
useful to briefly outline the “types of conservatism” included in this dissertation. The 
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tapestry of American conservative responses, if expressed in a linear way from the end 
of the Second World War, would begin with the “southern agrarians” concerned with 
cultural matters and expanding federal power. These writers, including Richard Weaver 
and Allen Tate, were mutually sympathetic with non-regional “traditionalists” like Kirk,7 
although my subject did not share the sentiments that tended to haunt some southern 
agrarians, most notably race relations and the Civil War.8 Today, they tend to identify 
themselves as “paleo-conservatives” and are generally resentful of the socio-political 
influence of “free market” advocates and “neo-conservatives.”9 Also among the critics 
of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and its managerial continuation under 
President Dwight Eisenhower (and others until, one might argue, President Ronald 
Reagan) were the libertarian-minded. Many of them were influenced by ideological and 
actual refugees from communism such as Friedrich Hayek, Frank Meyer, and Ayn Rand. 
Meyer and William F. Buckley Jr., through personal persuasion and National Review 
magazine, espoused “fusionism,” the joining of traditionalism and libertarianism in the 
effort to counter Soviet expansionism and domestic collectivism. And so long as the 
Soviet Union existed, this awkward pairing was in fact willing to, wearily and somewhat 
distrustfully, work together.10 Into this framework was “neo-conservatism” born in the 
1960s. According to sociologist and “traditionalist” Robert Nisbet, this movement 
cannot be separated from the prior rise of the “New Left” of the same decade: “Irving 
Kristol, a central figure in the development, once described a Neo-conservative as a 
liberal mugged by the Revolution.”11 They were, by and large, skeptical of government 
programs, disillusioned with movements of leftism, familiar with the practices of social 
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science, and eager to confront global evils. Neo-conservatives were also viewed by some 
others in the uneasy coalitions of American conservatism as unwelcomed interlopers. 
Kirk was deeply skeptical of an ability to “end evil,” and of many enterprises carried out 
to that end that Frum and other neo-conservatives might advocate for. His avowals of the 
embeddings of culture and human nature amid an enduring and transcendent mystery, 
and his love of locality and family, lead me to identify him as a leader of “traditionalist” 
conservative sentiment, and as one firmly set against political systems or ideologies 
claiming a “scientific” basis. Over the decades from Roosevelt to the Bush presidencies, 
many competing persuasions (the rise of the “religious right” is also notable) within the 
movement of American conservatism struggled to have their influence exercised. And 
despite valuing rather different things, they were united for a time by two factors: scorn 
of communism and a willingness to work together.12
Preview of Arguments  
 Kirk’s persuasions advocated “order,” which began internally and extended first 
and most importantly to family and local community. He did not deny the existence of 
“absolutes” in a relativistic, secular, increasingly irreligious society, but I argue that his 
rhetoric was infused with a skepticism that could be characterized as “postmodern.” As a 
relentless critic of the “modern,” Kirk encouraged his readers to find value, wisdom, and 
truth, even as he declined to offer solutions or present a detailed understanding of such 
terminology. The empiricism of fact and measurement, in other words, he thought 
wholly inadequate when applied to the complexities and messiness of human beings. 
From this bias comes the relevance of “moral imagination,” which recurs throughout his 
    
  
5 
persuasions. It grants conservatives insight of ethical perception beyond the barriers of 
experience and physical moments. It is humanity’s power to perceive abiding law and 
truth in the chaos of life, beyond appetite and self-interest. The moral imagination, a 
combination of intuition, instinct, imagination, and experience, nudges humans to where 
and what they ought to be; it was for Kirk key to the recovery of order and harmony for 
the personal soul and ultimately for the whole of society.13
 In opposition to much of the currents of “modernity,” Kirk the traditionalist 
deployed a rhetoric of flourish and memorable phraseology aimed at strengthening the 
bonds of association at the level of the local, the familial, and the communal. The will 
that truly mattered was the supreme will of the Creator, only very partly and rather 
mysteriously revealed in fragments, not the soft or hard despotism of various temporal 
sovereigns. Modernization for its own sake, like power for its own sake, was a civil and 
social disorder. I argue that Kirk would nod in agreement with Jean-Francois Lyotard, 
who concluded his book The Postmodern Condition as follows:  
  As a “rhetorical popularizer” 
of an “Anglo-American” conservative tradition, his “recovery of rhetoric” was strongly 
against the systematic and the ideological. His concern was for a “natural” order, the 
creation of images through language, the importance of stories, and an elevation of 
“sentiment” in the public sphere. These were necessary to understand the relations 
between human beings in a dramatic, and not programmatic, paradigm. “Reconstructions 
were of politics in relation to ideology, America in relation to “modern prosperity,” and 
the “modern” in relation to a critique of liberal autonomy.  
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. We 
have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the 
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reconciliation of the concept for the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable 
experience. Under the general demand for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear 
the mutterings of the desire for a return to terror, for the realization of the fantasy to 
seize reality. The answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the 
unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.14
 
 
An affinity between Kirk’s persuasions and an understanding of “postmodernism” 
through the prism of “associational rhetoric” is the theme of this dissertation. More 
specifically, conservatism sourced in an unknowable order and set against ideology in 
favor of customs and conventions, a “humbled attitude” of cautious change, overlaps 
with a “postmodernist” distrust of legitimating knowledge through an overarching 
system of thought.15
I contend that Kirk, as a figure more concerned with culture than politics, 
attempted to negotiate his conservatism as a denial of the “autonomous self” and as an 
acceptance of the social construction of life (guided by, in his case, religious and socially 
traditionalist norms developed over extended periods of time). What is shared with 
Lyotard is that his postmodernism rejects the “grand narratives” of liberalism (such as 
“autonomy” and “progress”) as well as collectivism (such as fascism, socialism, and 
communism). Even so, Kirk is grounded in what might be termed a metaphysical master 
narrative, one of divine interaction with humanity. And because human beings are sinful 
and severely lacking in knowledge, their statements about the world can only be 
provisional, subject to revision and circumstance.
 And so the opinion “let us wage a war on totality,” following 
Lyotard’s definition of postmodernism as “incredulity toward metanarratives,” is a call 
of distrust to a totalizing series of propositions in the public sphere.  
16 Sentiments were more concerned 
with the power of imagery upon the human heart than the logical discourse of the mind, 
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and this led Kirk to conclude that rhetoric – image through language – was a critical art 
for the conduct of conservatism. The mind should not be deprived of high poetic images.  
Preview of Methodology 
A concern for the terms by which a social world is constituted and its values 
defined is the reason I value the rhetorical method of James Boyd White. Rhetorical 
persuasion in Kirk’s communication, being difficult to precisely define and easier to 
contextualize with an adoption or appreciation of his sentiments, was a dialogue with 
friends and mentors of ages past. An intuitive, literary, and imaginative mind, this is to 
say, took forthright positions but with a meandering and non-systematic method. Like 
the discipline of rhetoric itself, his writings were layered with meaning – particularly in 
fiction, where the stories were careful to convey a moral lesson. Rhetoric, a complex 
discipline with a long history, has a number of overlapping meanings. The meanings, 
according to The Rhetorical Tradition, can include the practice of oratory; the study of 
strategies of effective oratory; the use of written and spoken language to inform and 
persuade; the study of the persuasive effects of language; the study of the relation 
between language and knowledge; the classification and use of tropes and figures; and 
the use of propaganda.17 In his analysis of “rhetoric and community,” J. Michael Hogan 
wrote that social and political fragmentation was hardly unprecedented in the United 
States. Echoing a concern of Kirk’s, he believed “the signs of stress and fragmentation 
appear everywhere, not just in our national political and cultural dialogue but in all of 
the various communities that define our social lives – our families, our neighborhoods, 
our towns and cities, our professions, and our social and cultural associations.”18  
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If Russell Kirk was, first and foremost, a “literary” figure, then a reader should 
not expect to derive much political theory, philosophy, or electoral direction from him.19 
And so my methodological means toward a description of the author’s work through 
historical context and the stylistic and argumentative choices recurrent in the themes of 
his texts follows White, a legal and literary scholar. His book When Words Lose Their 
Meaning provides a way of reading that draws attention to the language of the text, the 
culture of which it is a part, and the relation the writer or speaker establishes when using 
the language. This way of reading is anthropological, linguistic, psychological, and 
literary, investigating a sub-group of society and its language as communities are 
created, dissolved, and recreated through the spoken and written word.20 In the 
considerations of complex, difficult to define terms – “liberalism,” “conservatism,” 
“rhetoric,” “modernism,” and “postmodernism” first among them – I employ and accept 
many of Weaver’s and Kirk’s biases. And, in following White’s method of reading, it is 
my contention that an unfolding of a political philosophy is impractical as a matter of 
history or politics. Raymond Williams has written that terms of political discourse such 
as “liberal” and “conservative” are murky, with each at various times used as pejorative 
terms. They came mainly into the public discourse of English from the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Liberal was used in the sense of “open-minded” and “unorthodox;” 
conservative in modern (post-French Revolution) political discussions was often used in 
the sense of “organic,” as in a contrast of the “organized modern state” with an “Old 
England” of the organic community.21  
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 My analysis of such terms follows these developments within the biases of Kirk 
and through the methods of White. Kirk’s biases of definition have several deficiencies, 
further analyzed in the last chapter. Yet his perspective is valuable because it is unique, 
because it is defensible, and because it sharply contrasts with much of the American 
conservative movement since the end of the Second World War (a movement, like many 
socio-political movements, with both significant successes and significant problems). 
Kirk’s strategy of community reconstruction was a linguistic and a bodily effort. It was a 
reconstruction of politics away from the negativities of “ideology;” a reconstruction of 
conservatism to a more British and “Burkean” character; and a reconstruction of “home” 
away from the ravages of “modernity.”22 White’s project is illuminative to the strategies 
of reconstruction. The preface to When Words Lose Their Meaning informs the reader 
that its subject is rhetoric, the study of the ways in which character and community (that 
which makes a culture) is defined and made real in the performances of language. White 
writes, “As the object of art is beauty and of philosophy truth, the object of rhetoric is 
justice: the constitution of a social world.”23
 According to Kirk’s unique and influential judgment, words and communities 
had indeed “lost their meanings.” They were in dire need of reconstruction. There should 
be a rediscovery of a “conservative” tradition. This tradition was drawn from Cicero and 
Edmund Burke, among others.
 
24 With this in mind, I argue that to read Kirk in the 
terminology and structure of White takes the reader to the past for the purposes of a lost 
reverence, to “identify” lost meanings. Second, to look toward the mysteriously 
transcendent through the sentiments and biases of Kirk was to “recover rhetoric” as an 
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alternative to the centralizing, homogenizing, hubristic tendencies of “modern” politics, 
which were infused with paternalism, statism, and the false human anthropology of 
“individualism.” Kirk sought to guide the reader to that place where he made his “home” 
– the small, local networks of associations that echo Burke’s well-known “little 
platoons” of society. Set against the “modern” in ways at once superficial and 
philosophical, such guidance was placement in an uncertain yet transcendently-grounded 
“postmodern” time and place.25 White has written that “beyond the individual person are 
the practices and activities that make up the life of the social world.” In application of 
that thought, I intend to demonstrate the social and political world and representations of 
reason, nature, and communicative conduct as complex sets of understandings, relations, 
and activities labor to summarize Kirk’s activity.26
 To better understand the possibilities he represented as a way to conjure up a 
“conservative past” so as to influence the present and future is to recognize persuasions 
with a life, a force, of their own. Against the triumphs of intellectual abstractions such as 
economic determinism and promoting “democracy” in places with no tradition of it, his 
messages might be described as a rejection of politics in favor of cultural literacy. The 
logics of the latest intellectual fashions cannot well begin to heal the wounds of the 
polis. The realities of the world (namely, sin) cannot be contained, he wrote, though 
things like mystery, asymmetry, history, poetry, and family can afford a good life. His 
retracing of the steps of “conservative” thought in the Anglo-American world helped to 
place those that embraced the label after the Second World War as a serious part of the 
national dialogue. Kirk found threads of what some might call “conservative thought” in 
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great figures of antiquity like Moses, Aristotle, and Cicero, as they were investigators of 
the mystifying truths of human nature: “Poetic, ethical, and political truths endure longer 
than do scientific theories.”27 In his conceptions, thought ceased to be conservative when 
it became rigid, harsh, intolerant, and adamant about utilizing political dominance to 
achieve policy ends. I characterize Kirk’s conservatism as saturated with skepticism, in 
its approach to society, idea of government, and political practice. Civil society was seen 
as a fragile achievement, its society antecedent to the persons of its composition and the 
product of historical conditions allied to its customs.28 Reconstructions against the 
perceived political fanaticisms of ideology (he defined the ideologue as one who “thinks 
of politics as a revolutionary instrument for transforming society and even transforming 
human nature”29
Purposes of Conservatism  
) was his “American cause.”  
Conservatism, Kirk repeatedly emphasized, was not an ideology. It does not 
“breed fanatics; and it does not “try to incite the enthusiasm of a secular religion.” He 
found human circumstances to be “almost infinitely variable.” Those who wished to 
“sacrifice their past and present and future to a set of abstract ideas” should seek solace 
in Fascism, Communism, or “Benthamism.” The “high-minded conservative,” on the 
other hand, believes in enduring norms ascertained through appreciation of the wisdom 
of previous generations, the study of history, and the reconciliation of authority with the 
altered circumstances of present life. Deep suspicion should be the disposition to the 
“cult of Reason – the abstract rationality which asserts that mundane planning is able to 
solve all our difficulties of spirit and community.”30 Kirk revised the “conservative 
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principles” that first garnered attention in The Conservative Mind throughout his life, but 
they can be summarized as follows: belief in an enduring moral order; adherence to 
custom, convention, and continuity; belief in the principles of prescription; guidance of 
principles by prudence; attention to the principle of variety; chastisement by the 
principle of imperfectability; persuasion that freedom and property are closely linked; 
the upholding of voluntary community and opposition to involuntary collectivism; the 
need for prudent restraint upon power and passion; the understanding that permanence 
and change must be recognized and reconciled in a vigorous society.31
 As there are many definitions of conservatism, there are many conceptions of 
rhetoric. The sentiments of persuasion of this rhetorical analysis follow Richard Weaver, 
a rhetorician, friend of Kirk,
 These principles 
form the basis of his outlook of “conservatism” and of the ensuing critiques.  
32 and prominent conservative intellectual in the “southern 
agrarian” tradition. For him, rhetoric was that which created an informed appetite for the 
good. His book The Ethics of Rhetoric stated that rhetorical language, “for whatever 
purpose used, excites interest and with it either pleasure or alarm.” Rhetoric “moves the 
soul with a movement which cannot finally be justified logically.”33 This observation is 
not opposed to the rhetoricians of antiquity that Weaver admired – Plato’s view that 
rhetoric is the art of enchanting the soul and winning it by discourse, or Aristotle’s view 
that rhetoric is the faculty of discovering in a case the available means of persuasion, or 
Cicero’s view that rhetoric is speech designed to persuade.34 The assumptions of 
Weaver’s life and writings were that words and definitions mattered due to the realities, 
seen and unseen, which call humanity to a greater good, one more satisfying to self and 
  
13 
community than the pursuit of momentary pleasurable aims. In a letter to his academic 
dean at the University of Chicago, Weaver, reflecting on the seven years since the Ethics 
of Rhetoric was first published in 1953, wrote “the chief new conclusion I have come to 
is that all arguments are arguments from definition.” He continued, “But I insist on the 
point that the definition of the nature of the thing is the ultimate goal: we get to that the 
best we can, sometimes with many makeshifts and delays.” A religionist or a moralist is 
“duty bound to prefer the realm of essence, to keep putting it forward where he can;” and 
“the idea of a metaphysical certitude not subject to daily revision because of changing 
accidents is necessary to keep one out of the quicksand. That is why arguments from 
definition, expressive of the realm of essence, are higher in the ontological scale.”35 The 
great yearning of man to be something in the imaginative sense, Weaver wrote in Visions 
of Order, “to be more something more than he is in the simple existential way or in the 
reductionist formula of materialism is both universal and proper to him.” The urge to 
represent something higher is “an active ingredient of his specific humanity.” Evolved 
from the spiritual impulse, images are made of wishes and hopes, of things transfigured, 
and of imaginations and value ascriptions.36
Much like Weaver, Kirk possessed an “imaginative sense” concerned with 
supreme images, images that could be either tyrannizing or liberating. Because ideas and 
images and actions have consequences, bad ones have bad consequences. A doctrine of 
“progress,” heavily infecting social life, facilitated a dream of reconstituting human 
 Humans needed, he thought, a recovery of 
perspective in an age of incredible technological progress. Their intellect and ability did, 
in fact, have limits.  
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nature itself according to wants of modern, mechanized society. Kirk’s answer was the 
“moral imagination,” which could free humanity to discover fragments of their true 
purpose – to come “home” to communion with their loved ones and their creator. The 
phrase “moral imagination” comes from Edmund Burke.37 As Kirk took the term, it can 
be defined as a uniquely human ability to conceive of fellow humans as moral beings 
and as persons, not as objects whose value rests in utility or usefulness. An enduring 
source of inspiration that elevates and guides to “first principles,” it is also a process by 
which a self “creates” metaphor from images recorded by the senses and stored in 
memory, which are then occupied to find and suppose moral correspondences in 
experience. An intuitive ability to perceive ethical truths and abiding law in the midst of 
chaotic experience, for Kirk the moral imagination should be an aspiration to a proper 
ordering of the soul and, consequently, of the political order.38
To be fully human was to embrace the duties and obligations toward a purpose of 
security and endurance for the common good. Success was to be measured by the 
development of character, not the fleeting emotions of status. To ignite this view, Kirk 
 In these formations, to be 
a citizen is not to be an autonomous individual; it is a status granted by being born into a 
world defined by one’s relations to others. Even under the umbrella of an “imaginative 
sense,” however, there was some discord (as in the “traditionalist” disagreement about 
Weaver’s praise for President Lincoln). Kirk’s concepts, particularly his concern with 
“sentiments” as opposed to the “ideas” that could lead to ideology, do provide him a 
unique place in the language of conservative argument. One revealing example can be 
found in the concept of personhood.   
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wrote, was to rescue of normative consciousness from the clutches of ideology: “For it 
ought to be the moral imagination which creates political doctrines, and not political 
doctrines which seduce the moral imagination. Our first task here is the restoration of a 
proper vocabulary.”39 His vocabulary in the context of moral imagination and against 
ideology, a steady theme of his fiction, non-fiction, and advocacies, was that individual 
autonomy is a false and incomplete human anthropology, one that should be replaced by 
personhood. Thinking “sacramentally,” (meaning humans are connected with a 
sacramental order of creation, a configuration of the mind in communion with the divine 
and beyond the rational) Kirk sensed that nature was created in such a manner that 
humans can draw “true analogies,” wisdom inaccessible by scientific method. Lived 
experiences, registered in memory and conjured through other experiences, can be 
interpreted through imagination so that memories may become images, analogous to the 
experience.40
Opposition to Ideology 
 In “invitations” to “associations” of personhood, the rhetorical movement 
was to take readers back to the past so as to rediscover, in a “conservative tradition,” the 
lasting and fulfilling meanings to life, a “lost reverence.” His “rhetoric of moral 
imagination” was to move humanity toward a transcendent reality, an alternative to the 
direction of much of modern society. From this, there might develop a placement of a 
network of associations, fostered in smaller communities, enduring in their long and 
naturally developing customs and traditions. 
 Kirk defined ideology as “political fanaticism, a body of beliefs alleged to point 
the way to a perfect society.” Politics, it follows, is a revolutionary instrument for 
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transforming society and even human nature. He contrasts ideology with beliefs and 
sentiments to secure order, justice, and freedom.41 There was a rejection of nuance and 
circumstance. The ideologist, he wrote, is convinced that “rigid closet-philosophy” 
contains answers plainly to be discerned if only the program were to be implemented. If 
others were to be governed by these rules, betterment could follow, through force if so 
required: “He may be an a priori reasoner, or an a posteriori reasoner, but in his system 
no room is left for Providence, or chance, or free will, or prudence. He is the devotee, 
often, of what Burke called ‘an armed doctrine.’”42 The enemy of imagination, ideology 
“is an alleged science of politics, dogmatic and often utopian, closely allied with the 
interests of a particular social class of political sect.”43 From the nineteenth century, it 
has held considerable sway in the conduct of human affairs. Yet, particularly in light of 
the limited life experiences of most humans, Kirk believed literature, narratives, 
vocabulary, images, and the like served the most desirable formative purpose for the 
young. With words, a statesman participates in the creation of political reality. Changes 
in language could bring about real effects, but ideology negates the multiple cross-
currents and harms the compromises, customs, and structures that make up a culture. 
This critique Kirk applied across the political spectrum, to “liberal” and “leftist” 
centralizers as well as to “rightist” advocates for democracy building.44
Formation against ideology was to be accomplished by the enabling of an 
imaginative vision and a developed ability to absorb and involve it satisfactorily. Such 
actions were practiced, first and most important, at the level of family and neighborhood 
and in the valuing of a healthy vision. And while Kirk’s fiction does not feature in this 
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rhetorical analysis of traditionalist American intellectual conservatism, a more 
comprehensive understanding of his “conservative vision” should scrutinize his fiction. 
In those writings (his fiction mostly consisted of ghost stories, often directly drawn from 
the lives of his own family,45 and ended with a moral lesson) an imaginative mind 
“vividly casts the drama of the soul’s struggle with good and evil in relation to a 
transcendent realm of meaning of purpose.” Principles are put to the test in Kirk’s 
fiction. It is there that the belief in divine providence, a moral law, eternal life, and the 
duality of humanity as body and spirit permeate.46 In confronting cultural and social 
crisis, such were the sentiments put forward in the public sphere instead of ideology. In 
defining sentiment, I mean a response to events in the world somewhere between 
thought and feeling. Closely related to imagination and imagery, sentiments were 
thought quite capable of profoundly moving a person’s conviction. More than sensation 
or emotion and not a synonym to feeling, sentiments in his work were an ill-defined 
something that contained thought and exerted influence over the will.47
What unfolded, both in the lessons of his fiction and in his socio-political 
writings, was an imaginative, moral vision obtained and nurtured by disposition. I label 
this the “associational,” and, when applied to White, “associational rhetoric.” More 
specifically, the associational are persuasions – of persona and lived sentiment as well as 
speaking and writing – that establish a relationship between the author and a hearer 
through the harnessing of language in the formation of a community. The formation of 
kinship, the network of associations most powerfully felt at the local and familial level, 
is a product of dialogue, most attractive to those of a likeminded inclination. And when 
  
  
18 
articulated in the context of a struggle against decay and decadence, the course of 
conversation is capable of a durable, and even profound, societal impact. Kirk hoped that 
bits and pieces of his call for cultural renewal would be reflected in public life.48 A 
language “remade,” accepting and following his poetic imagery of moral imagination, 
was and is persuasive to those willing to adopt a spirit of heroism, adventure, and 
responsibility, drawn in part from great figures to be emulated like Cicero and Edmund 
Burke. Kirk’s texts offered these readers not a language of planning and theory, and 
certainly not a language of detailed definition and advice, but of thematic alternatives to 
the utility and cold rationality they professed to be far too dominant a societal energy.49
Alternatives to Ideology 
     
Among the inspirations for alternatives were literature and examples of history 
expressed so as to address present and future crisis in the contexts of their circumstance. 
The call for a cultural renewal to be reflected in public life was constituted from that 
which communicated civic virtue and moral conduct. In the Kirk household, his 
daughter Cecila wrote in a tribute, the stories of moral imagination were integral to the 
formation of the person:  
By sparking my imagination through fairy tales, and by providing perspective and reason 
through historical novels, my father imparted a cultural legacy to me. For through the 
printed word, the wisdom of generations transcends the ‘provincialism of time’ and 
speaks to us across the ages and the oceans. We acquire an understanding of tradition 
through the ‘eternal contract’ of the generations, of the immediate and the timeless. 
Historical literature in particular provides a continuity and order; humane letters truly is 
conducive to a balanced habit of mind. The record of our collective and real stories, 
history reveals the enduring qualities of human nature.50
 
 
Virtue and the enduring qualities of human nature were understood to be built by the 
concrete actions which facilitate community, such as raising a family. Social and 
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associational relations teach the person striving toward high moral virtue to exist 
peacefully among others. Looking back over history (and to Burke foremost given his 
attempts to explain the development of modern conservatism) Kirk emphasized figures 
and conditions he judged relevant to his projects, estimating their strength of association 
to more present trials.51
This moral imagination was the gift and the obsession of Plato and Vergil and Dante. 
Drawn from centuries of human consciousness, these concepts of the moral imagination 
– so powerfully if briefly put by Burke – are expressed afresh from age to age. So it is 
that the men of humane letters in our century whose work seems most likely to endure 
have not been neoterists, but rather bearers of an old standard, tossed by our modern 
winds of doctrine: the names of Eliot, Frost, Faulkner, Waugh, and Yeats may suffice to 
suggest the variety of this moral imagination in the twentieth century.
 The lessons of literature and history were ingredients in the 
moral imagination because they informed and instructed concerning the dignity of 
human nature, making it apparent “that we are more than naked apes.” Letters and 
learning he thought hollow if deprived of opportunities to apprehend a more decent order 
in the soul and in the commonwealth:   
52
 
 
Kirk wrote it is the event, not the fact, which should be the appropriate concern 
of historians. Due to an “obsession” with fact, “a nineteenth-century idol, most modern 
historians have forgotten that facts, too, are constructions – and meaningful only in 
association.” The restoration of a proper historical consciousness rests upon old insights, 
the feeding of the moral imagination and the appreciation of history. The elevation of 
human reason at the expense of redeeming character through them may lead a rising 
generation to “wander bewildered in cunning passages, contrived corridors and issues. 
And at the heart of such a labyrinth, we are told, there has lurked for ages the 
Minotaur.”53 A patrimony of culture and order cannot simply be inherited; it must also 
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be renewed. The thread binding Kirk’s persuasions across a variety of topics was 
concern that attention to material increase and passing pleasure distracted succeeding 
generations from renewing and fulfilling transcendent societal contracts. By faith in a 
mostly unguided social order and in an unseen God, he advanced incremental and non-
systemic improvement toward an ideal of human virtue, even as he fretted over the 
scarcity of virtuous actions. 
 For Kirk, improvement begins with the recognition that humans are inherently 
and indelibly social, always searching for group affiliation. By stressing the illusions of 
ideology, he framed his role in controversies as a defender of existence over rationalized 
possibility, a defense of a “conservative” social arrangement against “illusions.” From 
the days of Bentham and Mill, he wrote, liberals have too little “concerned themselves 
with the Heart.” By living in the belief that a “sweet reasonableness” can solve societal 
problems and alleviate private trouble, and by the inclination of “a neat Plan,” the 
natural search for one mystery, God, with another mystery, ourselves, is disordered. The 
result is internal and external improvement secured by “adjustment, positive legislation, 
and sensible goodwill.” Alternatively,  
The thinking conservative knows that the outward signs of disorder, personal or social, 
very often are no more than the symptoms of an inner ravaging sickness, not to be put 
down by ointments and cosmetics. He is inclined to look for the real causes of our 
troubles in the hearts of man – in our ancient proclivity toward sin, in a loneliness of 
spirit that conjures up devils, in twisted historical roots beneath the parched ground of 
modern existence, in venerable impulses of human nature which, when frustrated, make 
our life one long lingering death. He knows, moreover, that the task for the prudent 
counselor and the prudent statesman is to make life tolerable, not to make it perfect: 
there is something in the constitution of humanity that cannot be satisfied with the poor 
things of earth, and so we ought to teach ourselves in honorable resignation, not frantic 
indignation.54
 
  
  
21 
Conservatism in Community 
Conservatism as a general inclination influencing a prudential judgment was, he 
conveyed, a mentality, a human urgency toward truth. Because of God’s mystery placed 
in creation, the mind, created in God’s image, could never be fully understood. This 
restlessness and instability, transferred to politics, requires authority. As humans live 
best by prescription, by ancient custom and usage through the rights which usage and 
custom have established, the pillars of any tolerable social order require a just authority 
and a respected prescription.55 To avoid the “loneliness of spirit that conjures up devils” 
is to be a member of a social association nourished by the humane. Contrasting Bentham 
with Burke, Kirk held the “founder of conservatism” knew a principle that animated his 
writings – the “complexity of human interests and the subtlety of the Good.” The 
“greatest good” did not reside in efforts for political equality, in the “liberation” from 
prejudice and prescription, or “in obsession with economic objects.” Instead, the greatest 
good emanated from “conformity to the providential order of the universe: in piety, in 
duty, in enduring love. But Bentham swept Burke’s world of spirit and imagination 
contemptuously aside.”56 Conservatism as Kirk imagined it was a living organism, 
creatively constituted from history and example. Its guide as a sentiment was not a 
planned social order but an unknowable revelation of virtue. As humanity was complex 
and mysterious, no set of positive laws universally applied are sufficient for happiness 
and goodness. A flawed nature, lusting after power and aggrandizement, envious and 
violent, “must be restrained by custom, authority, and a balanced government which 
checks power with power.” Happiness comes through the fulfillment of duties in 
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purposeful work and by being part of a community of continuity, not by the satisfaction 
of material desire.57
 In the community of continuity, systems both ethical and political attain 
ascendancy through appeals to the imagination. And when the imagination ceases “to 
touch the chords of wonder and mystery and hope, their power is lost, and men look 
elsewhere for some set of principles by which they may be guided.”
 
58 Kirk, rejecting the 
concept of liberalism, which he criticized as too enamored with emancipation from 
obligation in favor of societal improvement by centralization, insisted that humanity 
always remains. By this I mean his sentiments were infused with another concept, one of 
always-present freedoms for evil. Rejecting the primacy of politics and economics as 
vehicles for earthly salvation, Kirk suggested that social, political, and economic 
difficulties were in the end questions of the nature of the human person. This notion fed 
his habit of converting a belief popular in one historical period into his contemplations 
of American conservatism. One critic wrote that Kirk’s overall approach to history was 
to draw a sketch of the true and good, and then assign selected individuals to complete 
the literary portrait.59 Kirk would, I believe, agree with this analysis. Respect for 
creation and the beings longing for order within creation, wrote his friend and publisher 
Henry Regnery, was the underpinning for his impressions of political and social order, 
an interest first brought together “imaginatively” by his admiration for Edmund Burke. 
For Kirk, the British parliamentarian in argument, temperament, and prejudice 
represented “a philosophy derived from a deep sense of piety and a profound 
understanding of the sources of order.” Private contentment and public peace, the 
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products of prudence and humility latent in classical philosophy and Christian discipline, 
defined the principle of order that conservatism should strive to attain.60 The appeals to 
the imagination took from literature and history in the effort to promote visions of 
virtues and ethics. They were transcendent and thus difficult to define, even though Kirk 
admired precise language. His literary biography, Eliot and His Age: T.S. Eliot’s Moral 
Imagination in the Twentieth Century, considered by the author and several friends to 
contain his best writing,61 approvingly cited the poet’s belief that a vision of 
conservatism was needed in “this grotesque civilization” to “transcend the expediency 
and the pragmatism and the corruption of parties.” Eliot’s images of moral imagination 
in opposition to diabolical imagination will endure because they portray the most 
passionate and perplexing element of humanity, which is love: “In the end, Eliot found 
his way to the intellectual love of God and to the love of created beings. All of us, or 
nearly all, are pilgrims still in the Waste Land.”62
 Thus my classification of Kirk as a primary, organizing supporter and as a 
rhetorical popularizer of a strand of American conservatism (labeled “traditionalist” for 
lack of a better term) places him as a literary figure engaged with history, poetry, and 
sociology far more than politics. Through a humanistic, “associational” disposition, he 
consistently – even repetitively – maintained that morality is necessary (in the case of 
markets most especially); and no amount of regulation could adequately replace it. A 
fostering of the good depended upon an ethical system itself sustained by religious 
conviction. His persuasions were in unwavering advocacy of such discipline. Robert 
Nisbet, a friend of the Kirk family and a sociologist perhaps best known for his book The 
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Quest for Community,63 was an insightful conductor of traditionalist conservative 
critiques to the emergent dominating modernity of the United States in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. The most momentous intellectual revolt against “rationalistic 
individualism” was not, he wrote, “the drive toward political collectivism,” but a 
conservative revolt, one “to be seen in those approaches to the study of man where the 
individual has been replaced by the social group as the central unit of theoretical inquiry 
and ameliorative action.”64 As humans are naturally social, the longing is not simply for 
order within creation. The desire to bond with particular times, places, and people – to 
be a part of a family, a locale, a community, an extended spiritual and cultural 
experience – is an inescapable form of association that belittles abstracted attempts of 
autonomy and “individualism.” Humans will always seek membership and belonging as 
a means of self-definition. Yet many developments in the wake of Enlightenment 
liberalism have successively destroyed established social contexts. The state, married to 
the principles of “progress,” is the apparatus of legitimate organization that persists and 
beckons. Nisbet asserted that the destruction of smaller associations and communities, 
and most notably within the arguments of conservatism the atomization and 
displacement of markets, assisted the rise of totalitarianisms. Deprived of memberships, 
humans mired in the complexities and confusions of modernism and liberalism sought 
belonging through more remote and abstract units of the state. The result was a 
membership tenuously tied to large, distant, and politicized entities incapable of 
intimately and directly addressing alienation, isolation, and loneliness.65 
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 In contrast, the “associational” in its formation of kinships rejected the individual 
as the fundamental unit of social life. Nisbet argued the theme of the individual 
uprooted, without status and seeking fellowship in some kind of moral community, was 
a recurrent one. The vision of one “lost” in modernity had become central, calling 
attention to the consequences of morality and economic conduct in modern life.66 
Centralized political power aimed at alleviating alienation, isolation, and loneliness he 
found to have appeared, unsurprisingly, after nearly two centuries of individualism in 
economic organization and private morality. There was a close relationship between 
individualism and state power due to the weakening of associations intermediate to 
human life and the state. The reason was to provide for the mass public, brought into 
existence by a “planned destruction” of old customs, associations, and other securities: 
“The liberal values of autonomy and freedom of personal choice are indispensable to a 
genuinely free society, but we shall achieve and maintain these only by vesting them in 
the conditions in which liberal democracy will thrive – diversity of culture, plurality of 
association, and division of authority.”67
The towering moral problem of our time, Nisbet reasons, is the problem of community 
lost and community regained. We long desperately for a sense of continuity in our 
 Praising Nisbet near the end of the The 
Conservative Mind, Kirk approved of the project to “restore to true significance such 
terms as ‘community,’ ‘liberalism,’ ‘individuality,’ and ‘democracy,’” to “rescue 
sociological speculation from its infatuation with Benthamite dogma and method.” 
Collectivism and individualism are both a hindrance to the struggle to build a “true 
community.” This representative passage of his sentiment of human anthropology is 
worth quoting at length:   
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existence, and a sense of direction; these are denied to most of us by the decay of family, 
the obliteration of the old-guild organization, the retreat of local spirit before the 
centralized state, and the forlorn condition of religious belief. The most conspicuous 
result of the revolutionary destruction of traditional society – a result, too, of mass 
industrialism – has been the creation of the Lonely Crowd: a mass of individuals without 
real community, aware that they matter to no one, and often convinced that nothing else 
matters. The assault on institutional religion, on old-fashioned economic methods, on 
family authority, and on small political communities has set the individual free from 
nearly everything, truly: but that freedom is a terrifying thing, the freedom of a baby 
deserted by his parents to do as he pleases. In reaction against these negative liberties, 
presently the confused and resentful masses incline toward any fanaticism that promises 
to assuage their loneliness – the Communist or Fascist parties, the lunatic dissidence of 
dissent, the totalist state with its delusions.68
 
   
In Kirk’s rendering, the language of liberalism too often centered upon “rights,” liberty,” 
and “freedom” without the necessary accompanying adjectives, namely “order,” 
“virtue,” and “duty.” An approach of “association” would recognize the importance of 
social context to an individual freedom, meaning that the socialized sources of a 
person’s individuality would not be neglected. A pre-existing culture, tradition, and 
custom encompass humanity’s relationship to a politicized state. The network of social 
relationships would discourage one to attempt define and impose one’s own concept of 
existence and meaning, as mystery, community norms, and the limits of reason provided 
a check to the hubris that he thought would lead to ideology. And “America needs 
nothing less than it needs ideology,” Kirk wrote.69
Restoration of Terms 
 
To restore terms to “true significance” was to conjure a language of conservatism 
through an imaginative, associational rendering of incremental and non-systemic 
personal reform. This, in turn, might inspire and revive communal reform. Citing 
Weaver’s project to create an informed appetite for the good, Kirk agreed that rhetoric 
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was a “great power in the world whether it be base or noble.” At its truest, it functions as 
something like an “intellectual love of God.” The writing of modern social scientists 
suffers from “a primary equivocation, is marred by pedantic empiricism, is weakened by 
a melioristic bias, loses by a distrust of metaphor, and is affected by a caste spirit; and all 
this is true because the sociologists have ignored the traditional rules of rhetoric.” Noble 
rhetoric, which shows humanity better versions of themselves, links in Weaver’s “chain” 
that extend up toward the ideal, is in decay.70 Although Kirk did not agree that Abraham 
Lincoln was a better guide for conservatives than Burke (for Weaver, Lincoln argued 
from “principle” instead of “circumstance”), he concurred that “we all are oppressed in 
some degree by the degradation of rhetoric which parallels the decline of ethical studies 
in our era.” Referring once again to the base role of a transcendent order, Kirk 
continued, “Thus, debasing the Word, we ignore ethical judgments” to justify atrocity as 
“Devil terms” are deployed to “take the place of temperate argument in our daily 
conversation.”71
Kirk, I argue, espoused this sentiment as part of a lived persona: the family and 
the varied associations of local community could not only be regarded as external 
products of thought and behavior. They were existent prior to the person and remained 
an indispensible support of proper conduct. The conservative must be personally attuned 
to the people and “places” of community. This was, in effect, sensitivity to the linked 
chains of the past, present, and future. History, and specifically modern history 
 Again praising The Quest for Community in an essay about ethical labor 
as the highest ordering of work, he described Nisbet’s efforts to restore words within the 
context of a towering moral problem: community lost.  
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chronicling the rise of the modern state, Kirk suggested was in no small part the account 
of the decline of community and of consequent ruin. A liberation from “the dead hand of 
the past was the object of the devotees of romantic emancipation,” but this expected 
freeing from tradition had become “a tyranny more thorough and inescapable than 
anything known to the despotisms of antiquity.”72 The idea that the “right” to define 
one’s own concept of existence is at the heart of liberty, of human meaning, and of the 
universe,73 is a foreign and dangerous one to Kirk. The state of mind that the 
“individual” (not the “person” born into a social setting of shared responsibility across 
time) is responsible to the self first, and inherently possessive of a right to pursue 
unrestrained freedom, he might classify as, in eventual outcome, a politicized temptation 
to the exercise of a centralizing compulsion, one often made more terrible by the 
resultant loneliness and alienation. Personhood, reduced to subjectivity at the whim of an 
individual right, would be ripe for manipulation by impersonal institutions following a 
distant, unmoored logic of rational utility. Kirk, in the desire to reconnect with an older, 
pre-Enlightenment Western tradition, perceived the influence of utilitarianism as 
strongly present in the currents of twentieth century American political discourse. To 
“escape” the structures of liberalism and modernism through the moral imagination was 
to avoid the trample of long-developing culture and tradition, the asymmetrically strange 
and odd, the nonconformist, and the mysteriously religious.74
 Given such a bias, the founders and heirs of modern thought seek the conquest of 
nature and the emancipation of worldly authority from moral restraint. For Kirk, 
utilitarianism, a universalizing, rationalist, secular enforcement of equality grounded in 
 
  
29 
the Enlightenment and the ideological fever of the French Revolution, lurked to the 
danger of the unity of a long-developed common law – even in an America influenced 
by a “natural law” rooted in “Christian ethics.”75 His persuasions wished to articulate 
things true for all people at all times, things gifted through an interpretation mediated by 
historical experience. From the understanding that man was made in the image of an 
ultimate person invisible to humanity now, ethical principles emerged that facilitated 
humans living in community so that they would not be as the beasts. This order of 
society, whatever its modern pretenses, he thought could shine through to grant ethical 
meaning to existence. Such “permanent things” were the measure of true societal 
progress. Upholding these produced higher social goods than utility: norms of courage, 
duty, justice, integrity, charity, and familial help – the standard for judging persons and 
institutions. Principles founded upon an understanding of the human condition were to 
be reinvigorated in an American manifestation of the civilization that “originated in a 
little cult of Galileans two thousand years ago.”76
Experience, the teacher of life, assisted in the search for the “good,” a virtue that 
was the end and the purpose of life to be passed forward. Looking to the past, the 
function of the teacher of moral imagination is to encourage better choices for these ends 
and purposes. In his forward to the contribution of historian John Lukacs to the “Library 
of Conservative Thought,” series editor Russell Kirk opined, “There is no man but 
 Appealing to and following an 
ultimate good, an appreciation of norms was acquired in the outgrowth of organic 
community unorganized by the mechanisms of the state, beginning with family and 
extending to the smaller spheres of community such as church and school.  
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historic man.” Applauding Lukacs as “the chief champion of the doctrine of free will,” 
he stated that the study of mankind must begin with a study of the self: “A fuller and 
more acute historical consciousness is one important instrument for our regeneration.” 
Such regeneration commences with an approach of ethical self-consciousness.77
 There are not only a multitude of definitions for conservatism and rhetoric. 
Reading Kirk, the reader will be struck by how terms like “liberalism,” “modernism,” 
and “postmodernism” were employed, directly and indirectly. His arguments, colored as 
they were by strong opinions in reference toward images of a greater good, were less 
concerned with definition and context than with imagery and poetics, so as to draw in 
readers as a fiction writer might. The rhetorical choices of invention and imagination 
dealt with over these chapters provide a description of Kirk’s work in historical context 
and textual analysis through the adoption of how the author’s worldview used broad, 
difficult terms. As a “rhetorical popularizer,” his “man of letters” persona was a 
sentiment of life, and he considered such sentiment as superior to a systematic program 
of writing and speaking. In this, and in following White’s concept of textual community 
built by a mind in language and culture to shape a reader’s life, one begins to discern the 
 This 
view of history, combined with the view of conservatism as a disposition, an approach, 
and a sentiment, are among my justifications for evaluating Kirk’s significance through a 
rhetorical analysis of “association,” as formations are created, dissolved, and recreated 
through the spoken and written word. And the formations begin with language in 
definition, a language inseparable from the biases of approach toward social and political 
thought in action.  
  
31 
ways in which an imaginative, moral vision was obtained, nurtured, and expressed. More 
specifically, imagery, historical selectivity, memorable phraseology, and a notable 
persona both challenge the effort for precise definition in Kirk’s writings and bring one 
to a conclusion that his “community of association” in rhetorical analysis was elusive 
and ever-changing.  
It is in this sense that I use the term “postmodern,” a period after the “modern 
order” in rejection of “modernity” following the insights of a certain “realism.”78 There 
is much to argue with in Kirk’s conceptions, but the important point is the ways in which 
they were his conceptions, and that they came to influence – as a way of learning to 
shape the formations of a reader. In a rejection of centralization, mass politics, and the 
elevation of reason and rationality (in the context of the economy, for example, a 
market-orientation devoid of a foundational humanism, as markets can be no better than 
the moral content of their participants), the critique of Kirk and the traditionalists was to 
be wary of detaching “progress” from the responsibility of its moral evaluation. True 
human progress, they articulated, must be subordinate to a human purpose of virtue in 
the natural existence and development of social settings, the home and those localized 
places where the kinships of association flourish. To idolize an individual, government 
planning, technical or scientific progress, or an abstract idea of human organization 
outside the context of custom and history was to defy a delicate common good. The big, 
the distant, and the militarized – either for war or for its politicized “moral equivalent” – 
were the enemies of order.79    
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 The formation, fostering, and protection of communitarian social capital 
inherited through a historical culture, either imaginatively constituted or in a “blood-and-
soil” context, was for Kirk a “defense” of “natural society.” A properly constituted order 
of civic health needs a grouping of persons and communities governed by moral laws. 
“If ignorant of history and political theory and the record of human nature, but well 
intentioned and philanthropic,” it is easy to fall victim “to the sentimental 
humanitarianism or, worse still, to the power-craving zealot for doctrinaire political 
alteration.” He liked to quote Burke’s estimation that the sound statesman combines a 
disposition to preserve with ability to reform.80 Thus a “sober” and “tested” 
conservatism respectful of its origin in morality is founded upon an understanding of 
history and human nature. Kirk wrote that conservative leaders since the time of 
Edmund Burke and John Adams have subscribed to certain “general ideas” distrustful of 
abstractions, that is, “absolute political dogmas divorced from practical experience and 
particular circumstances.” Instead, there are “certain abiding truths which govern the 
conduct of human society.” And from these principles American conservative thought 
arose. To take from Kirk’s essay “The Essence of Conservatism,” the principles are: 
governance by moral laws originated in divine justice; variety and diversity resistant of 
an enforced uniformity and equality; equal rights, not equal things, before the law; the 
connection of property and freedom; the checks of power, restricted by sound 
constitutions and customs; viewing the past as a great storehouse of wisdom, guided by 
moral traditions, social experience, and a complex body of knowledge bequeathed by 
ancestors; the urgency of true community in modern society, which is governed by 
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charity and love; America setting an example for the world, not remaking the world in 
its own image; the knowledge that men, women, and institutions are not perfectible, and 
that progress is achieved through a prudent recognition of the limitations of human 
nature; a recognition that political and moral innovation can be destructive, especially if 
undertaken in a spirit of presumption and enthusiasm.81
Such a list, similar yet distinct from the well-known “canons of conservative 
thought” first articulated in 1953’s The Conservative Mind and updated for the last time 
in 1993’s The Politics of Prudence, reveals the foundations of his persuasions. The 
canons were an expression of how to achieve a stable world of enduring and beneficial 
values through the arguments of “association.” Such arguments took “traditionalist” 
biases and sentiments expressed in a poetic, literary, imaginative language and historical 
rendering and called others toward reconciliation. And to reconcile the growth and 
alteration that is essential to life with the strength of social and moral traditions required 
the family, religious and voluntary groups, local governments, and a variety of 
institutions that keep community alive. Inside a “stable world” of “enduring values” was 
contentment best discovered by the bonds that united the living with the past and future, 
and with particular times, places, and people. A quote from T.S. Eliot, featured in the 
program of Kirk’s memorial service and also engraved on his headstone, summarizes 
this approach of persuasion. Further, this quote is an indication of how his historical 
consciousness and “traditionalism” impacted his political writing and the ghost stories 
that were a majority of his fiction: “The communication of the dead is tongued with fire 
beyond the language of the living.”
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Arguments for Community Preservation 
That the very fabric of society had begun to unravel was a leading theme of 
traditionalist conservative arguments, both before and after Kirk’s rise to prominence in 
the 1950s. Through the arguments of “moral imagination,” problems were addressed not 
in political terms but in moral and religious ones. The meaning of the rhetoric was not an 
elaborate system for understanding language practice but one aspect of a crusade for 
recognizing the complexity of the human experience in opposition to all forms of 
reductionism. Russell Kirk’s America was presented as an attitude, a style, a persona, 
and as a community worth preserving. The image, the mask, that he found as a means of 
preservation was “conservatism.” Yet for Kirk rhetoric was not just a mask, something 
covering up a “true” state of affairs with vivid and distracting language. Argument had a 
central role in creating tradition; it could be “constitutive” of a true state of affairs. The 
moral in reference to ancient wisdom was for him less definable than it was imaginative. 
In setting out to “play” the sage of conservatism through the self-described vocation of 
“man of letters,”83 earning a living by writing and lecturing was a creative enterprise. 
And such creativity did not only come through the content of his most popular output, 
fiction. His style, I contend, was to “adopt” the past – as with Burke and Cicero – and to 
discuss the issues and problems of his day in a language originated from traditions 
eventually “made” his own through imagery and poetics. It was, in effect, “myth” as 
“truth.” His vocabulary, pace, rhythm, and historical renderings invited reflection while 
reading, drawing in those inclined to his sentiments especially.  
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 This “community” of “associational rhetoric” was more than what might be 
denoted by the word “local.” As in Nisbet’s definition, the word community meant 
relationships among individuals characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy, of 
social cohesion and moral commitment, and of continuity. The basis may be kinship, 
ethnicity, religion, power, revolution, or any number of activities, beliefs, or functions. 
What is essential to the definition is a basis of “sufficient appeal and of sufficient 
durability to enlist numbers of human beings, to arouse loyalties, and to stimulate an 
overriding sense of distinctive identity.”84 The performance of duties in community, 
Kirk wrote, teaches “prudence and efficiency and charity.” A nation could be “no 
stronger than the numerous little communities of which it is composed.” Regardless of 
how well intentioned or trained a centralized administration of managers might be, they 
could not “confer justice and prosperity and tranquility upon a mass of men and women 
deprived of their old responsibilities.”85
Politics as a professional pursuit, or as a dominating habit of mind, was an 
erosion of place and association, subordination to the desires of status. It was to partake 
of the “diabolic imagination,” to participate in a lust for violence, destruction, cruelty, 
sensational disorder, and a “delight in the perverse and subhuman.”
 The possibilities of violence from a reductionist, 
a rationalist, and a systematic thinker were strongest in those places and times where a 
crowd – one subject to the articulations of the self-imposed elite – was gathered. These 
sorts of thinkers were for Kirk all articulation, with too little concern for history and 
morality. But an imaginative affirmation of the wisdom of the past allowed for humans 
to judge with prudence.  
86 The diabolic enters 
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into society with a fascination for freedom as an end unto itself, an affirmation of a 
power always tempting yet inferior to the divine. In sharp distinction to the varieties of 
libertarians also a part of the “American conservative” allied response to domestic and 
foreign efforts for greater centralization, Kirk and the traditionalists held in contempt the 
notion of the individual as the fundamental unit of society. Institutions designed for the 
pursuit of personal happiness and actions designed first and foremost for a “fulfilling” 
personal psychological and physical experience – such as intimacy divorced from 
procreation – he thought overly enamored with “self-fulfillment.” The language of the 
individual impedes the revival of localisms. It was “the new industrialism and the 
destruction of traditional institutions” that brought about the emergence of the “political 
masses.” As the old elements of true community faded, humans have sought “in the vast 
impersonal State a substitute for all the old associations that, dimly, they know they have 
lost.” He continued, “The leaders of liberalism assumed that a man is sufficient unto 
himself; and that assumption was fallacious, for man cannot subsist without 
community.”87 As a barrier against political totality, a more “genuine participation of the 
citizen in communal affairs” was required. Weaver and Nisbet, “two sane men in a 
frenzied time,” knew that language was “not a mere device for expression of sensations, 
but an instrument of divine origin, intended for the promulgation of Truth.”88
Therein is the heart of Kirk’s rhetoric of moral imagination. In approach of 
persuasion, the associative unions of family and place across the generations, the 
communication of the dead beyond the language of the living, he disputed his 
perceptions of the currents of modernity: individualism, collectivism, institutions and 
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plans large, overly abstract, and unaccountable, as well as a therapeutic deism reducing 
faith to pleasant experience and little concerned with the wisdoms of history. In a culture 
descending into darkness, Kirk intended to popularize truth, to reflect light. His rhetoric 
was a literary, imaginative creation of images and “true myths.” This was reinforced by 
a lived persona that served as an inspiration to an intellectual conservative movement in 
America once exhausted and confused. Like Cicero, as a rhetorician he took from 
sources outside the domain of rhetoric, accessed through philosophy, history, law, 
literature.89 His project was awkward in the context of the United States, a country 
founded on strong principles of liberal and Enlightenment thought, and a place long-
enamored more with the concepts of progress than roots. Even so, in his writings across 
the decades, imagination still ruled the world. In the quest for a moral imagination, in the 
search for principles of enduring order, one must always strive to distinguish “god-terms 
from the true meanings of words.” In the modern world, “fallacious first principles have 
debased rhetoric and ravaged community for more than a century and a half.”90
The Rhetoric of Moral Imagination 
 To avoid 
the turning of these causes lost due to the fallen nature of humanity into ideological 
programs was to appreciate the “permanent things” of truth, the good, beauty, love, and 
incompleteness. Until full communion with the transcendent from whom they came, 
humans would always be, on some level, lonely.   
This work argues there were two components to Kirk’s rhetoric of moral 
imagination. First, his choosing of historical subjects, in biographical sketch and literary 
content, was an indication of his own interest in rhetorical efficacy. Although not 
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explicitly stated, this interest was a regular feature of his work. John Adams, Edmund 
Burke, Cicero, John Randolph of Roanoke, and Robert Taft, among others, were among 
the greatest rhetoricians of their time. Their ability to lead through persuasion, example, 
and content of argument was highly esteemed by traditionalist conservatives distrustful 
of the “progress” of a technocratic modernity. And in valuing their works and 
highlighting their example, Kirk’s persuasive project was to bring the “wonders of life” 
out from the “iron cages of rationality.”91 Second, these figures attempted to live out the 
sort of life they claimed to value. Kirk’s autobiography, The Sword of Imagination, lists 
“three ends” of his nearly eight decades: to conserve a patrimony order and an 
inheritance of culture, “reminding people that truth was not born yesterday;” to live a life 
of “decent independence, living much as his ancestors had lived, on their land, in 
circumstances that would enable him to utter the truth and make his voice heard;” and to 
“marry for love and to rear children who would come to know that the service of God is 
perfect freedom.” 92
As a matter of rhetorical analysis, I argue he “taught” observers by ethos, an 
endeavor to live a “rhetorical demonstration” of what he genuinely believed was good. 
As demonstrated by what some who knew him identified as an inner strength of 
character and conduct, his rhetorical behavior was motivated by a love for and a 
curiosity toward wonder and mystery.
 I find that he mostly accomplished these ends, despite a limited 
influence in the public spheres of politics and social trends. 
93 Plato, a dramatist before he was a philosopher, 
was an inspiration for Weaver and Kirk, each inclined to the sentiment of poetry and 
fiction – the stories of “true myth” – as something harmonious with a permanent form of 
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true order. Accordingly, his historical studies were biographies with a moral point. In the 
spirit of Plutarch, the founder of moral biography, this aspect of Kirk’s project likewise 
investigated “parallel lives,” retracing the path of thinking among British and American 
conservatives. In his dialogues with readers and students, the threads of what were 
termed “conservative” began with Moses, Aristotle, and Cicero, and then found their 
best modern pronunciation in Burke. By an “imaginative” reading of history, exemplars 
of properly ordered sentiments of moral order did not reduce the person to something 
other than a relational being who must find identity in relation to other persons. Kirk’s 
worry was for humanity to exist as a pilgrim alien in their own community, in some way 
isolated from the imaginative made vibrant by the literary, from the historical supported 
by memory, and from the philosophical sustained by reason. His ambition was to explore 
and communicate what it meant to be human – in limitation, in promise, and in the 
traditions and customs that provide a framework for “human” in a culture.  
Such an ambition was Kirk’s conservatism, and his communication of it is one 
important reason why he is relevant today. Philosophically, for “traditionalists” like the 
“Burkean” Kirk, the dispositions, approaches, and sentiments of conservatism tend to 
include: belief in a divine intent in history, an immutable law of morality to which 
humans have a duty to conform; the notion that order and stability are the first 
requirements of good government, best achieved by restraint, modesty of political and 
social ambition, and respect for tradition; the acceptance of variety as more desirable 
than uniformity and liberty as more desirable than equality; the pursuit of the good life, 
and not just the pleasurable life, as the proper human end, necessitating duty and honor 
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to take precedence over individual indulgence; and conviction that there are limits to the 
power of human reason, which should lead to skepticism of abstract principle neglectful 
of history and culture and distrust for grandiose plans of reform. In sum, without an 
enduring and stable order, there can be no accomplishment of justice, liberty, equality, or 
prosperity. Underlying these characteristics are modes of thought and approach that can 
be classified as empirical, rationalist, and intuitive.94
In Kirk’s time, as in ours, the many figures, arguments, and philosophical 
justifications of American conservatism elude easy characterization. Much of this is due, 
I believe, to the defense of a revolutionary achievement, the founding of a republic 
grown by the constant mixture of heterogeneous peoples and cultures. The terminologies 
of this dissertation, beginning with the word “conservative,” are not defined 
comprehensively but rather as defensible explanations of what cannot be easily defined – 
as, perhaps, it should be, given the goals of my subject. In the chapters that follow, my 
intention is to provide a descriptive context of history and textual conduct. Through an 
understanding of the argumentative and stylistic choices that Kirk made, it is my hope 
that a rhetorical analysis emerges, explaining his life and persuasions to a broader 
audience. In examining his philosophy of life, I contend his rhetorical choices persuaded 
inventively, imaginatively, and even poetically. These choices were flush with imagery, 
historical selectivity, and memorable phraseology. Therein is the challenge of precise 
definition as well as the importance of historical context. My intention is to evaluate the 
 Kirk’s mind, I contend, was 
intuitive, feeling heavily the weight of history and culture and keen to exist free from all 
dogmatic commitments save the transcendent and made manifest through the immediate.  
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content and significance of Kirk through rhetorical analysis. And finally, despite my 
criticisms, fundamentally I share many of his sentiments and admire his efforts. All 
definitions and analysis should be recognized in light of that association.  
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on education but was reluctant to share a masthead with those – doctrinaire libertarians – he thought just as 
ideological as communists. Meyer and Kirk eventually came to reconciliation, and Meyer converted to 
Catholicism shortly before his death. (Kirk was also a convert.) 
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Unbought Grace: Kirk in Influence and Review 
 
Among the chroniclers of the modern American conservative movement, there is 
a large body of writing pertaining to the life and work of Russell Kirk. These chroniclers 
include historians, employees of foundations and political organizations, as well as 
magazine, book, and popular writers with an interest in politics and mystery literature. 
To summarize and synthesize all the arguments would be a massive undertaking. 
Instead, the purpose of this chapter is to encapsulate those sources of wide-ranging and 
potentially lasting influence – those, in other words, who are likely to be read as future 
scholars examine the impact, direction, and many contradictions of the American 
conservative intellectual tradition.  
This review is a consideration of writers not only in the American conservative 
intellectual movement, but of those that have produced its histories, debates, and 
influences. To better combine summary and synthesis so as to determine conclusions 
about the rhetoric of Kirk and American conservatism (with an eye toward its future 
developments), this review is generally limited in its scope to popular and academic 
sources dating to the latter half of Kirk’s life and after his death. My goal is to articulate 
how those who knew him, worked with him, and were taught by him were influenced by 
his person and work. This will serve as a guide to his literary, social and political legacy 
within the framework of rhetorical communication. In this chapter, the organizational 
pattern is to gather published information about Kirk – such as responses to his letters, 
columns, essays, and books, as well as remembrances and obituaries – organized around 
the theme of persuasion.  
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A Professional Conservative 
William F. Buckley, Jr., in 1955 the founder of National Review magazine, set 
out to oppose the prevailing trends of public opinion and change the nation’s intellectual 
and political climate.1 He wrote of Kirk, his friend and longtime higher education 
columnist, that he was “elated by his spontaneous and generous willingness to associate 
his august name with that of a wizened ex-schoolboy known mostly for an iconoclastic 
screed directed at his alma mater.” Kirk, he continued, never missed a deadline in twenty 
five years, and in the ensuing fourteen years after he quit the column wrote “many books 
and a hundred essays, gave a thousand speeches, and influenced the lives of another 
half-generation. His last day, he rose, breakfasted, sat down in his armchair, exchanged 
words with his wife and two of his daughters, closed his eyes, and died. Few have repaid 
their debt to their family, their country, and their faith so extravagantly.”2 Buckley wrote 
that Kirk “may well be the best known ‘professional’ conservative in America, by which 
adjective is meant that he launched his extraordinary career by an act of conscious 
apostleship to a social and historical and philosophical order which is best described as 
‘conservative.’” He highlighted Kirk’s writing about an unseen social order, rooted in 
his religiosity and love of mystery, as the indispensible contribution to the conservative 
movement. That illuminated the “problem of ideological abstraction” and served as a 
useful, timely warning against “a neat seat of dreams” and “dogmatization.”3
Buckley’s longtime friend and pioneer of conservative publishing (including The 
Conservative Mind, which “far exceeded our most optimistic expectations”), Henry 
Regnery, wrote in his Memoirs of a Dissident Publisher that Kirk was a proponent of 
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“wisdom” in a consistent, accessible manner. It was he, in fact, who gave the 
conservative movement its name and coherence: “Kirk had two great advantages in the 
task of presenting conservatism as a tradition relevant to our time: skill in organizing a 
vast body of knowledge with which he was thoroughly familiar, and a distinguished 
literary style.”4 His son, Alfred Regnery, wrote that The Conservative Mind offered 
sudden intellectual respectability: “it made waves nationwide and was vastly important 
in solidifying conservatism into a movement.” Kirk presented conservatism as a 
“plausible and reasonable alternative to liberalism, along with reasonable and plausible 
criticisms of liberalism. He demonstrated to conservatives that it was possible to remain 
an intellectual while still acting and thinking constructively about politics.”5 In its 
obituary, The New York Times identified the book as an “intellectual bible for the 
conservative movement” that “established his reputation and lent intellectual weight to 
the budding conservative movement. Contrary to those who maintained that liberal ideas 
defined the American experience, Dr. Kirk offered a conservative hagiography that 
included Edmund Burke, John Adams, James Fenimore Cooper, Nathaniel Hawthorne, 
Herman Melville, T.S. Eliot and George Santayana.” Recounting its own review and 
noting the general positive reception, the obituary continued: “Writing in the New York 
Times Book Review in 1953, Gordon Keith Chalmers, then president of Kenyon College 
in Gambier, Ohio, called the book ‘very readable, brilliant and even eloquent.’ His 
assessment was typical of the book’s critical reception, drawing respectful reviews even 
from liberal commentators.”6 
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Edwin Feulner, president of the Heritage Foundation, one of the most prominent 
“think tanks” in American conservatism and the host of Kirk’s most well-known 
lectures, considered his friend to be “a contemplative man of action.” “From the 
ramparts of custom, tradition, and convention, he lobbed metaphorical bombs at the mad 
metaphysicians of libertarianism and the ‘squalid oligarchs’ of laissez-faire capitalism,” 
Feulner wrote. Kirk was a man of letters and of the world who christened himself a 
“bohemian Tory” but might be more accurately described as an “explorer and a pilgrim, 
a student of the human heart, who took the haunts of men as his text.”7 The Conservative 
Mind “broke the spell under which American conservatism had languished for more than 
a hundred years.” Once incoherent and isolated, the conservative movement benefited 
hugely from its publication; the book was a “landmark study” that showed “conclusively 
that conservatism had an illustrious lineage.” Before it, he summarized, “Derided by the 
intelligentsia, ignored by the media, and unsung even by its own adherents, conservatism 
was so ill-regarded that the very notion of a conservative mind was considered 
oxymoronic.” Defending “permanent things” was where Kirk cast his lot, alongside 
those he invited to be his comrades in arms, “manning the barricades.”8
Prominent academics of American conservatism have noted that the lack of a 
single definition was partly responsible for its factionalism. Through expounding his 
political philosophy at a time when there was a “gap” between pre-war and post-war 
conservatism, as well as a hunger for fresh ideas, he laid the foundation for the next 
generation of conservative intellectuals and politicians. Kirk’s “groundbreaking work” 
was “soon cited by all major American conservative thinkers as one of the most 
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influential books of their lives.”9
But like Buckley, Kirk was also a popularizer, one of a small yet growing group 
of thinkers who made their living lecturing and writing to mass audiences. According to 
his wife, he kept a hectic schedule.
 Further, after 1953, one could remain an intellectual 
and also think seriously about practical politics. According to Jonathan Schoenwald, 
“Kirk helped provide the intellectual content for conservative popularizers to 
disseminate, which eventually proved that Americans could understand and adopt ideas 
formerly considered too esoteric and formal to enter the political mainstream.” The 
Conservative Mind influenced generations of conservatives and “sparked a wave of 
interest among intellectuals;” and with academics including Leo Strauss and Robert 
Nisbet it formed a response of theories and methods to liberalism.  
10 This activity played a key role in disseminating 
information to skeptical and receptive audiences alike, although Kirk’s influence is still 
open to debate and interpretation. By the early 1960s, conservatism began to descend 
from the “ivory tower” as a more confident, coherent force.11 Lee Edwards, a 
conservative and popular historian, has summarized: “Still, no prominent philosopher, 
popularizer, or politician called himself a conservative, in part because no one agreed 
what ‘conservatism’ was.” Yet Kirk’s definition – a conservative hoped to reconcile 
what is most imperative in old customs and in the wisdom of his ancestors with the 
change that society must undergo if it is to endure – was politically and intellectually 
crucial. The reason was that debate and politically organized responses to the challenges 
of economy and modernity could occur with the foundation of fusionism and 
reconciliation, not the reactionary.12 In his assessment of Kirk and the Heritage 
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Foundation, host and disseminator of many of his speeches, Edwards concluded: 
“Because the Heritage Foundation rests securely on the ideas of Kirk, Hayek, Weaver, 
and a hundred other conservative thinkers, it has become the most influential think tank 
in the most important city in the most powerful nation in the world.”13
Launching a Movement 
 
Within the partnership against the “Left,” thinkers as diverse as Pat Buchanan (a 
leading “paleo-conservative” in the vein of southern agrarian writers) and David Frum (a 
well-known “neo-conservative”14
Yet if Kirk’s great work cannot be counted as history, exactly, it ought to be esteemed as 
something in some ways more important: a profound critique of contemporary mass 
society, and a vivid and poetic image – not a program, an image – of how that society 
might better itself. It is, in important respects, the twentieth century’s own version of the 
Reflections on the Revolution in France. If Kirk was not a historian, he was an artist, a 
visionary, almost a prophet. As long as he lived, by word and example he cautioned 
conservatives against over-indulging their fascination with economics. He taught that 
conservativism was above all a moral cause: one devoted to the preservation of the 
priceless heritage of Western civilization.
) share a high esteem of Kirk. Each, in fact, might be 
characterized as eager to claim him as a forefather to their own worldview. Frum, a 
thinker with a rather different outlook than Kirk concerning America’s role on the world 
stage, nevertheless eulogized the man he admired as an inspiration as follows:  
15
 
 
 Buchanan praised Kirk’s career as a man of letters determined to fight the “curse 
of ideological infatuation.” He was a “prophet” for calling for the development of 
conservatism as the antithesis of ideology, grounded in the past with principles derived 
from the Constitution, experience, history, tradition, custom, and the wisdom of 
generations previous. For him, Kirk was a vital articulator for the preservation of the 
true, the good, and the beautiful – viewing all ideologies with skepticism and the more 
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zealous and fanatic with hostility.16
I can testify from my own experience that as a visitor to campuses and lecturer to 
twentieth-century college students, Kirk was a marvel….a self-invent work of art, 
prodigiously learned: he came as a delight to the students and as a change from the 
banalities of their ordinary world of do-good deans and predictable professors. Kirk to 
them was a rebel, enacting the J’Accuse! Against the shopworm liberalism that met them 
from the moment they work up in the morning. He had read one hundred times as many, 
one thousand times as many, books as anyone they had ever met, including plenty of 
Latin, quotations from which, in the original, punctuated his talk.
 Another well-known “paleo-conservative,” 
Dartmouth English professor and former National Review book reviewer Jeffrey Hart, 
wrote in his history of the magazine that:  
17
 
 
Hart labeled The Conservative Mind a “founding document of the American 
conservative movement,” its assemblage or major thinkers beginning with Edmund 
Burke as a major statement that proved “that conservative thought in America existed, 
and even that such thought was highly intelligent – a demonstration very much needed at 
the time.”18 This view of Kirk’s most famous and influential book is also that of 
historian George Nash. His book The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America 
Since 1945, the standard history first published in 1976 and periodically updated, is a 
comprehensive guide to the origin and the many external and internal battles fought in 
the name of defending ideas and sentiments that composed the “Right” as America’s 
post-war economic and social boom transformed its society. Nash detailed the diverse 
authors and public figures influenced by Kirk and placed him in the “traditionalist” camp 
“evolved” (or, more specifically, less provincial and more accepting of debate) from the 
agrarian and isolationist writers of the pre-war era, loosely defined as the “Old Right.” 
He summarized: “With the advent of Russell Kirk, the new conservative or traditionalist 
segment of the renascent American Right reached full bloom. Clearly this was a 
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phenomenon of some status and importance, as the rising number of essays about it 
attested.”19 Another prominent “paleo-conservative,” humanities professor Paul 
Gottfried of Elizabethtown College, has written that Kirk exerted “profound influence” 
on postwar American thought. He recounted that William Rusher, the first publisher of 
National Review, considered The Conservative Mind one of the three most powerful, 
most enduring contributions to the conservative movement, alongside Whitaker 
Chambers’s Witness and Fredrick Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom.20
In 1957, Kirk founded the quarterly Modern Age and in 1960 The University 
Bookman, both of which still publish with the assistance of the Intercollegiate Studies 
Institute. For Nash, they are “indispensible for the traditionalist side of conservative 
thought, important sources of seriousness and maturity.
  
21 These publications have 
provided outlets for young writers to make a name for themselves by publishing articles 
related to literature, politics, and the life of the mind. Two of the most notable of these 
writers are James E. Person, author of Russell Kirk: A Critical Biography of a 
Conservative Mind and Gerald J. Russello, author of The Postmodern Imagination of 
Russell Kirk. Person, a Michigan native from near Kirk’s birthplace, was introduced to 
Kirk through his writings on education and gradually became interested in Kirk’s literary 
and social criticism, fiction, and writings on culture and politics. By comparison to other 
political writers and theorists, “he was not a ‘man with a message’ or any other such 
ideologue or sanctimonious bore.”22 These sympathetic books are valuable for their 
demonstration of the underlying worldview that informed Kirk’s writing, namely the 
importance of an unseen, historical social order. As “a comforter of the afflicted and 
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afflicter to the comfortable,” he was, in Person’s estimation, a tireless and eloquent 
advocate for the necessities of such an order.  
Particularly for his admirers, this brand of conservatism and its colorful, literary 
means of explanation served as a foundational perception for the difficult definitions of 
progress (an uneasy term for conservatives in the aftermath of the centralizations of the 
New Deal and Second World War). Kirk’s historical, imaginative conservatism allowed 
for a clearer discernment of the dangers of “mass appeals to envy masking as a concern 
for absolute social equality, the encroachments of an intrusive, omnicompetent 
government, the cult of the autonomous self, the decay of belief in the wisdom of the 
species, and the vaious abstractions that transformed American culture for the worse 
during his lifetime.”23 Firmly set against the “spirit of the age,” one of deception and 
cultural decay, Kirk’s enduring reputation as a major thinker of his time, according to 
American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia, is assured as a consequence of his 
“rediscovery and persuasive expression of a living conservative intellectual tradition,” 
one responsible for drawing conservatism away from utilitarian and individualistic 
premises toward one more grounded in “community-conserving norms and culture.” The 
enduring, unseen moral and social order of Western civilization was to be defended 
against ideology and the temptations of totality (be they of the Left or the Right). 
Toward the end of its survey of Kirk’s influence over the imaginations and political 
thought of younger authors such as Person, who benefitted from the graciousness and 
hospitality of those, most notably his widow Annette,24
Although his work helped to launch a political and intellectual movement, because of his 
singular lack of interest in hobnobbing with either power brokers or literary moguls Kirk 
  the encyclopedia stated: 
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was virtually snubbed by the intellectual and media establishment. His influence instead 
can be best measured by the scores of disciples who came to Piety Hill to study and live 
and went forth to careers in education, communication, publishing, the church, and 
government.25
 
 
Creating Political Reality 
Perhaps the most insightful work of recent Kirk scholarship is Gerald J. 
Russello’s The Postmodern Imagination of Russell Kirk. It contends that Kirk was one of 
the first conservative thinkers to perceive, within the vague and difficult definitions of 
postmodernism, an opportunity for conservatism to reassert itself amidst a collapse of 
modernity. The book emerged, in part, from several articles perceptive of previously 
unexplored aspects of Kirk’s thought. One article, “Russell Kirk and the Critics,” 
summarized early responses to Kirk and speculated about future critical reactions. These 
responses were generally positive among southern agrarian writers such as John Ransom 
and more negative among political scientists such as Gordon Lewis, who thought that 
contemporary issues did not require an “impassioned nostalgia for a dead society and a 
clever contempt for all the schools of political thought.” Many critics (especially those 
writing in the 1950s and 1960s) failed to detect Kirk’s high esteem for the imagination – 
a “something” outside the individual, embracing of feeling and a warm, family, and local 
based affection, not primarily rational, and existing in addition to the physical realities of 
a fallen, destitute nature.  
Russello suggests that underlying Kirk’s writings was this question: will this 
imagination be respected and properly employed (that is, attuned to and sensitive toward 
the more permanent things), or ignored?26 His rendering presents Kirk as a figure of 
imaginative attitude, style, and persona, and as a promoter of creative sentiments of 
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morality. When Kirk asks of the reader, “What are you and I?,” his answer is something 
like “What we imagine ourselves to be.”27 As will be explored further, this propensity 
for self-creation was an appreciation that humans are situated in time and place, and that 
whatever might be produced in such spaces cannot escape its temporality. Ideology, for 
example, was an idea opposed by both conservatism28
 Kirk and those perhaps sympathetic toward something of the “postmodern,” in 
working to establish influence against trends of political centralization, had to 
accomplish a difficult task: taking a disorganized collection of eccentrics, anti-
Communists, the libertarian-minded, and traditionalists and molding them into a 
coalition. (Within American conservative circles, this coalition came to be known as 
“fusionism.”
 and postmodernism. More 
specifically, there was opposition to attempts to bring into a temporal space the eternal 
(truth into Truth) and to the making of thought and practice (which are intimately rooted 
in time and place) into abstractions potentially disconnected from reality. In Russello’s 
telling, missing from the literature in response to Kirk were the ways in which his 
incredulity toward “meta-narratives,” that which is capable of a detrimental rendering 
into totality, animate his politics and fiction. If postmodernism has “reintroduced 
sentiment, contingency, locality and imagination into social discourse,” as Russello 
claims, then there is a rich vein of scholarship to be explored at this intersection. The 
Postmodern Imagination of Russell Kirk is a worthy first step.  
29) Without Kirk, modern American conservatism might well have taken a 
noticeably different form. In a review of the collection The Essential Russell Kirk, 
Russello argued that his major books – namely The Conservative Mind, Eliot and His 
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Age, America’s British Culture and The Roots of American Order – created the 
“intellectual latticework” from which the prevailing liberal order could be challenged. 
The coalitions in opposition to centralization were not fringe outcasts, but rather the 
representatives of a “living tradition.”30 And in the literature about Kirk, there is some 
acknowledgement that this living tradition, distaste for government-coerced “unity,” has 
developed into a response to the exhaustions of the liberal, Enlightenment-based order. 
Russello’s book, among others cited in this dissertation, is an investigation into the ways 
in which Kirk advocated for a political and social outlook consistently opposed to his 
concept of ideology, “religious dogmatism in a political context.” Indeed, much of 
“modernity” was seen by him and other “traditionalists” as inconsistent with a 
conservative outlook because ideology eliminates the “nuances and shades of gray that 
exist in actual or social life.”31
History, full of blind alleys and wrong turns, was not for traditionalists a linear 
progression always toward the better. The “ideology” of “progress” was the perceived to 
be the mortal enemy of a moral imagination. All overarching narratives were to be 
mistrusted: “Rousseauistic General Will, Hobbesian or Lockean states of nature, 
Benthamite calculus, Marxist class struggle, or the global marketplace.” Russello’s work 
is a noteworthy contribution to the literature of conservatism because it explores how 
Kirk made use of ideas, words, and imagination (all of which, a conservative might well 
argue, have consequences, many of them unforeseen) into a narrative. The images of the 
“imaginative” and the “literary” in a social and political context of anxiety were, in other 
words, capable of changing the ways in which humans experience reality, impacting 
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how they interacted with their families and communities. A fundamental aspect of Kirk’s 
project was to construct these imaginative entities from the “disintegrating fragments of 
what he conceived of as a coherent tradition.”32
Among scholars, popular writers, readers, and politicians, Kirk has received 
recognition as one of a select few figures responsible for reviving an intellectual, “living 
tradition” as an alternative to the anxiety and atomization of modernity and advanced 
economy. Senator Barry Goldwater credited him as giving conservative viewpoints an 
intellectual foundation and respectability few thought possible in modern society.
 In Kirk’s biases and persuasions, there 
existed more proper beliefs and behaviors (some of humanity’s presuppositions, such as 
family, that might be understood as a “narrative”) that should inspire confidence to not 
throw aside accumulated wisdom of society in times of confusion and technological 
advancement, particularly for the chasing of status and comfort.   
33 W. 
Wesley McDonald’s Russell Kirk and the Age of Ideology recounted President Ronald 
Reagan praising Kirk as an “intellectual leader” who by “having shaped so much of our 
thoughts,” helped to make his victory in 1980 possible.34 As with the work of George 
Nash, McDonald’s book is valuable for its overview of responses, positive and negative, 
to Kirk at the start of his career. A commonality of the criticisms – Arthur Schlesinger 
and William Newman are good examples – was that The Conservative Mind and similar 
works were against innovation and change. One reason they thought so was that 
sentiments such as prescription, tradition, authority, order, and prejudice restricted 
freedom and destroyed the possibilities of necessary reform. Kirk, later in his career, 
would more directly address these concerns, most notably in his book The Roots of 
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American Order, first published in 1974. By the late 1950s, though, academic 
conservatives were actively responding to these challenges. Peter Viereck of Mount 
Holyoke College, a historian and Pulitzer Prize-winning poet, listed some of these and 
named himself and Kirk as among the “New Conservatives” – “young American 
scholars” supportive of “Rightist” ideas in contemporary politics.35
While “strands” libertarian and traditionalist were united in their opposition to 
the collectivist tendencies of the “Left” broadly defined, McDonald highlights how the 
libertarian-minded, in Kirk’s view, failed to properly appreciate the importance of 
placing ethical norms above utility and subjective interests. The book is an informative 
summary of Kirk and his critics inside and outside of his movement. In particular, its 
author fills a gap that should receive more attention as the Cold War fades from the 
American collective memory: the many disagreements within the “Right” broadly 
defined. McDonald characterizes Kirk’s view of libertarians (or “individualists” in 
 In later decades, 
academics such as Walter Berns, James Ceaser, Patrick Deneen, Paul Gottfried, Jeffrey 
Hart, Willmoore Kendall, Peter Lawler, Robert Nisbet, and Richard Weaver would 
publicly embrace (and argue over)  ideas and policies set against the “liberal” order. 
McDonald’s evaluation of Kirk’s social and moral thought concludes that scholars 
should take more seriously the ethical and philosophical aspects of Kirk’s work. 
Whatever the case, I believe that one lasting influence will be Kirk’s role in moving 
American conservatism away from a “freedom” and “liberty” -centric libertarianism and 
toward an understanding of society as an organic organism responsive to social and 
communitarian capital.  
  
60 
Kirk’s more common terminology) as those willing to assault, in the name of their 
highest good, freedom, “a higher freedom, solidly grounded in a stable community, that 
would liberate people to achieve their ultimate spiritual and cultural goals,” unstrapped 
of their local association by social atomism and large-scale economic impersonalities.36
Defying Categorization 
 
Critics do tend to recognize that Kirk believed humans were beings of belonging and 
begetting, in the image of the transcendent and in need of association with other persons. 
As social creations, this is to say, the greatest human happiness came from following 
these innate tendencies, a posture respectful of the past and altruistic first to those who 
need and benefit from it the most – the family and thus the local community. Yet a 
rhetorical analysis of his lifestyle and persuasions informs of the ways in which Kirk’s 
biases and beliefs related to the conservative intellectual movement in America, and why 
he remains relevant today.  
Among libertarian-influenced American conservatives, Kirk remains a 
complicated, albeit respected, figure. National Review published a memoriam shortly 
after his death in 1994. Gerhart Niemeyer, professor of government at Notre Dame, 
wrote that categorization37 does not fit Kirk’s life work, and the place in the public 
sphere he occupied was “the ground of common sense, of sobriety, of ultimate verity. It 
was the ground where prevailed love of being, love of country, love of God. It was the 
ground of historical continuity, of public loyalty, of personal integrity. It was the ground 
on which conservative persons could put down roots, from which their minds drew 
nourishment.”38 John Engler, Governor of Michigan and a longtime friend of the Kirk 
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family, gave tribute to the man he once represented as a state legislator by hailing him as 
a defender of traditional values “in a culture enamored of the shock of the new. Through 
numerous writings and lectures, conversations and seminars, he taught Americans about 
America – about its deeply conservative habits, about the roots of its constitutional 
order, about the Burkean influence on our Founders.”39
More than a decade later, George Nash told the Heritage Foundation that Kirk’s 
“place in the galaxy” was secure because of the character of the messenger and also 
because of the content and tone of the message: “More than any other conservative 
writer of his era, he elevated the tone and substance of conservative discourse.” As a 
bridge-builder to the “classics of culture,” Nash insisted that Kirk’s legacy as a 
popularizer, author, and sentimental moralist would endure because he elevated the 
discourse, which facilitated in his followers a renewed hope for their vision.
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 Mark C. Henrie, editor of the Intercollegiate Review,
 Through 
reviewing the literature from those in the coalitions of the “Right” – in these and other 
tributes or considerations during and after his life – two themes are present: the writer 
acknowledges the debt that is owed to Kirk, and professes that they are, in some 
capacity, sharing in his legacy. Sharp divisions certainly still persist, and libertarians and 
foreign policy “hawks” tend to ignore his work, but it remains that Kirk is consistently 
praised as a wise oracle.  
41 wrote that the divisions of 
American conservatism, many of them rooted in different readings of history, caused 
some to suspect Kirk’s “traditionalism” as “un-American.” If the American tradition of 
political thought, in other words, proceeded through the terminology of the U.S. 
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Constitution and the Federalist Papers (“liberal,” rights-based documents), then America 
was a “Lockean” country, with an original position resembling John Locke’s state of 
nature and a founding compact reflective of his principles. As such, Kirk’s assertion of a 
genuinely conservative American tradition made little sense, and his “recovery” of a 
preexisting Burkean tradition in its social and political thought contained a large element 
of invention.42 One noteworthy academic response to the “New Conservatives” of the 
1950s43
Conservatism is an autonomous system of ideas which are generally valid. It is defined 
in terms of universal values such as order, balance, moderation. Whether or not a 
particular individual holds these values high depends not on his social affiliations but 
upon his personal capacity to see their inherent truth and desirability. Conservatism, in 
this sense, is, as Russell Kirk says, simply a matter of “will and intelligence”; the 
principles of conservatism may be drawn from “all classes and occupations…” This 
theory of conservatism is obviously popular among the “New Conservatives.” It implies 
not only that conservatism is relevant and desirable in contemporary America, but that it 
is the preferable political philosophy under and historical circumstances.
 was a 1957 article in the American Political Science Review by Samuel 
Huntington. He thought the ideas, historical figures, and final judgments of The 
Conservative Mind were too diverse to form a consistent philosophy – thus Kirk’s book 
was not a challenge to more academically respectable ideologies. There was little to be 
gained in arguments over definitions of conservatism, a discussion which in the light of 
its relatively recent emergency would be overly arbitrary. Huntington’s attempt to locate 
the strands of its emergence – the aristocratic, the autonomous, and the situational – did, 
however, lead him to this positive characterization: 
44
 
 
Henrie contended that “traditionalists” could be understood as “un-American” 
only when the country was understood as the abstract embodiment of a “liberal” theory. 
And it is by placing Kirk in contrast to the pre-Second World War conservatives – 
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generally more sympathetic to libertarian-oriented solutions45 – that “there are several 
ways in which he was actually quite close to the values and aspirations of common 
Americans untutored in political theory.” The affinity between “traditionalist 
conservatives” and “many ordinary Americans” would be especially pronounced on 
religious and moral matters.46 Sociologist and “New Conservative” Robert Nisbet, who 
wrote extensively about the “quest for community” and the atomizing effects of valuing 
liberty as a high virtue, appraised Kirk’s impact as a “traditionalist” in terms of building 
intellectual creditability and popularizing Edmund Burke: “Russell Kirk’s The 
Conservative Mind gave scholarly and timely pedigree to conservatism in England and 
the United States, demonstrating the key role of Burke in both countries.”47 Kirk’s work 
on the British statesman and philosopher would be continuously cited by academics, 
most predominately by those generally classified as of the “Right,” such as political 
theorist Walter Berns.48
  As “intellectual conservatism” enjoyed increasing political success, the 
anthologies and collections devoted to it tended to grant Kirk generous credit. A 
Dictionary of American Conservatism credits his writing with providing “common 
ground for numerous persons dissatisfied with what they saw and felt in American life;” 
it also noted “Kirk’s Michigan home drew a constant stream of visitors, many of 
distinction, many others whose distinction lay in their variety.”
 
49
Kirk’s enduring reputation as a major thinker of the twentieth century is assured as a 
consequence of his rediscovery and persuasive expression of a living conservative 
 In its entry for his 
name and longer consideration of the conflicts within intellectual conservatism after the 
Second World War, American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia praised him thusly:  
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intellectual tradition. He was responsible for drawing conservatism away from utilitarian 
and individualistic premises, toward which it had veered in the 1950s, to a position 
rooted in community-conserving norms and culture. More broadly, he contended with 
considerable effect against the challenges of ideologies of both the Left and Right to the 
enduring moral and social order of Western civilization.50
 
 
Denouncing Assumptions of Progress 
As a coherent body of political thought, Kirk regarded “conservatism” as a recent 
development, even as its roots extended “deep into the history of ideas and of social 
institutions.” Although escaping easy definition, he wrote that the term might still be 
“apprehended reasonably well by attention to what leading writers and politicians, 
generally called conservative, have said and done.”51 Since the defeat of Sen. Goldwater, 
they had been saying and doing quite a lot. And by the early 1970s, less than a decade 
after that landslide and consequential defeat,52 selections from “conservative” American 
and British writers, including the reissue of work extending back centuries, were being 
produced by large, mainstream publishing operations and not just niche, politically-
oriented ones like Regnery, ISI, and Arlington House.53
A collection from “neo-conservative” writers labeled Kirk a “prominent” and 
“exceptional thinker” committed to adapting a traditionalist, “Burkean” strain of thought 
into American public life. The typical American “conservative” in the pre-Second World 
War period was a nineteenth-century liberal, believing in laissez-faire, scientific 
improvement, and progress more generally. Yet this Burke revival, according to Adam 
Wolfson, was a spark in the 1950s that lent to American conservatism a very different 
voice: no longer willing to apologize for big industry, these traditionalists joined Burke 
in the lament that the “age of chivalry is gone” and concurred with the British 
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statesman’s denunciations of the “new conquering empire of light and reason.”54 The 
expression of unease with the transition to a more modern, mass society during the mid-
twentieth century, with Kirk at the forefront, did not offer detailed solutions to public 
policy problems. Instead, I argue that he utilized his knowledge and rhetorical ability for 
a more philosophic definition and general cultural recovery. With Burke as a touchstone, 
Kirk explained what it meant to exist and think a “conservative,” as one in succession 
with a variety of great historical figures that defended a more proper vision of civic and 
personal life. Americans, including those well-disposed to the rightist politics, had 
tended to not take the figures lionized in his writing and lecturing very seriously. But 
“Kirk’s prolific writings changed the face of American conservatism,” and his influence 
is still felt in defenses of the traditional family and in rejoinders that the federal 
government has usurped the prerogatives of localities.55
 A notable recognition of this legacy came from the political figure many 
conservatives deemed the culmination of those efforts begun in the 1950s, and whose 
origins might be traced to the resounding defeat of an earlier seminal movement figure 
in 1964: President Ronald Reagan, who entered the national political stage campaigning 
for Goldwater. In conferring the Presidential Citizens Medal, he stated: “As the prophet 
of American conservatism, Russell Kirk has taught, nurtured, and inspired a generation. 
From his lofty perch on Piety Hill, he reached deep into the roots of American values, 
writing and editing central works of political philosophy. His intellectual contribution 
has been a profound act of patriotism.”
  
56 “Leftist” journalist and critic John Judis agreed 
with the “prophetic” characterization, writing in his biography of William F. Buckley, Jr. 
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that to claim to be a right-wing intellectual was to “court ridicule” before the publication 
of The Conservative Mind (originally titled, he noted, The Conservative Rout in response 
to the low esteem of which such sentiments were then held). For Judis, the book was a 
“pathbreaking history” that, in combination with the efforts of Buckley to bring together 
disparate and depressed conservatives, provided a significant boost to the fortunes of the 
conservative movement, laying a solid and necessary foundation for future victories.57 
The book stimulated the development of a self-conscious conservative intellectual 
movement in the early years of the Cold War, according to George Nash, and “it is not 
too much to say that without this book we, the conservative intellectual community, 
would not exist today.”58
I argue a similar viewpoint of Kirk’s importance (in terms of lifting intellectual 
creditability) exists across the spectrum of those, either of the Left or the Right, that have 
engaged his work. This would include the period and climate in which he wrote. Under 
the umbrella of intellectual conservatism, political philosopher Willmoore Kendall, who 
had contentious relationships with several institutions including Yale University and 
National Review, acknowledged Kirk’s contributions before he attacked them with 
vigor. Kendall’s populism and admiration of Rousseau and Leo Strauss was in sharp 
contrast to many “traditionalists.” The polemics against Kirk’s brand of conservatism 
eschewed any attempt to locate a “divine” or “mysterious” element in the American 
polity, as “Burkean” thought could not address the problems of modernity.
  
59 When 
Kendall and leading libertarians like Frank Meyer accused Kirk of following Burke too 
closely at the expense of the American Constitution – meaning a casting aside the 
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indelible impression of documents such as the Federalist Papers upon the currents of 
contemporary political life – it was a declaration of “war” to determine what would be 
the most beneficial “resistance” to the march of domestic collectivization, of expanding 
government. In his article “Collectivism Rebaptized,” as elsewhere, Meyer took direct 
aim at Kirk, writing that he was “at best equivocal” with regard to the “fundamental 
political issue,” the struggle against “collectivism and statism which merge gradually 
into totalitarianism.” Yet even in forceful advocacy of “individualism” (the principles of 
the primacy of the individual, the division of power, the limitation of government, the 
freedom of the economy), which Meyer understood as a difference not of temperament 
but of principle, he praised Kirk as “undoubtedly the most significant” of his critics, 
devoting lengthy sections to detailing his points against him and the “traditionalist” 
sentiments of society.60
An Advocate of Ordered Liberty 
 
The literature also points to Kirk’s literary and political legacy as grounded in the 
notion, one present in his political writing and fiction, of “order” as a precondition of 
“liberty.” And it is here that his influence wanes. In a colloquy sponsored by The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, McDonald stated that his desire for a liberty 
accompanied by discipline over selfish and antisocial passions was a provocative, but 
not a popular, stance to take. Despite the boldness and rhetorical flourish with which he 
made the claims for an intellectual heritage to be taken seriously (drawing a grudging 
respect from many on the Left and securing a place of influence from within the Right), I 
think it is fair to state that since the end of the Reagan era and fall of the Soviet Union 
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Kirk’s stature has faded. Some traditionalist conservatives believe his books and articles 
receive scant attention outside conservative circles; and even in those circles he is 
something of a neglected figure.61 Further, Kirk’s ideas puzzle and trouble some activists 
in the world of “professional conservatism,” especially those inclined to an aggressive 
foreign policy and sympathetic to market-based economic reforms. Kirk could be as 
harsh in his criticism of business as he was of government or organized labor. He was, 
throughout his life, skeptical of American military adventures. And on more than one 
occasion, he protested the possibilities of environmental destruction.62 Many of his 
writings featured long deceased and forgotten political thinkers and literary figures that 
might seem irrelevant to contemporary concerns. Two British writers, observers 
sympathetic to critiques of American statist policy solutions, dismissively labeled him 
“the dean of nostalgia.”63 And in fact, it has been noted that his “anti-modernist 
traditionalism” does seem out of place to many current conservative activists, especially 
those seeking power and status.64
Kirk’s “literary and imaginative” conservatism, infused with the notion of a 
noble yet losing battle against modernity, was at one end of the polarity between the 
thought that freedom is the highest political good. At the other was a traditionalist 
instruction concerning proper choices.
 Even so, a review of the literature, of the large body of 
writing pertaining to the life and work, confirms Kirk’s central place amid the arguments 
of these and other conflicts within American politics. Interestingly, it is likely that the 
most comprehensive of responses to his life and work are from self-described 
conservatives, either to quarrel with or follow his ideas and sentiments.  
65 The debates were characteristic of a larger point 
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about his wide-ranging lasting influence upon American conservatism: those who forged 
its direction, leading its arguments out of the political wilderness, highly respected Kirk. 
A variety of them were compelled to praise, associate, criticize, and respond. In an “age 
of ideology,” he was one for whom personal ideology was not a matter of great concern. 
He was, in my conception of him, a literary philosopher of the “moral imagination.” And 
a review of the political, popular, and academic literature reveals that his explication of 
historical thinkers prompted much discussion, particularly of the “moral imagination.” 
This helped to grant American conservatives intellectual respectability during a time 
when it was severely lacking. I also believe, in sum, this “reconstituted” conservatism 
was very much a part of the modern age, even as it sought the wisdoms of generations 
past. In their responses to the new development of a challenge to the prevailing liberal 
order in the wake of the New Deal, worldwide war, and unprecedented economic 
expansion, Kirk’s critics and admirers grappled with what it meant to recover a more 
“true” resonance of conservative thought.66 This was, frequently, at the direct prompt of 
his writings and persona – his challenge to embrace the “unbought grace of life,” an 
“eternal chain of right and duty which links great and obscure, living and dead.”67
 
 The 
effort to make sense of him, and of his challenges to the “modern” order, will continue 
for some time to come.  
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CHAPTER II 
FIGURES  
 
Dissent in Moral Imagination: The Goals of a Conservatism 
 
The American conservative movement in the aftermath of the landslide defeat of 
Senator Barry Goldwater by President Lyndon Johnson has enjoyed successes few 
would have predicted in 1964. Russell Kirk, a conservative thinker whose lectures, 
books, articles, and essays afforded him the ear of figures such as Goldwater and 
President Ronald Reagan, helped give intellectual heft to the politicized fights against 
statist solutions, particularly the New Deal and the Great Society. This effort, not yet 
either a respectable undertaking or a formidable answer to America’s problems as he 
published his landmark work The Conservative Mind in 19531, was marred by factious 
infighting, bigotry, extremism, and reckless high-profile figures, including members of 
the John Birch Society and Senator Joseph McCarthy. But the ideas of what I term 
“traditionalist” conservatism did enter the mainstream of American politics, provoked in 
part by the societal turmoil of the late 1960s and the sense of cultural and economic 
malaise of the 1970s. The persuasions and philosophical foundations set by Kirk, and by 
some of his “contemporaries of sentiment”2
These contemporaries were among the practitioners of what some political 
scientists have termed “moral conservatism.” They are distinguished by the honoring of 
community integrity in custom and institution, pessimism about utopian ideas, and 
opposition to “abstract, computational morality.”
 (many of whom were ideological refugees 
from variations of leftism) can be distinguished as a “dissent” from their perceptions of 
the present and future course of modern America.   
3 Kirk was not a philosopher, even as 
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he engaged philosophy, and he was not a rhetorician, even as he forcefully and 
frequently employed rhetoric. Kirk, a thinker in favor of the view that conservatism 
ought to be inherently anti-ideological, is more accurately characterized as a “rhetorical 
popularizer” of a “traditionalist” branch of conservatism, one tinged with a creative and 
literary flare. A rhetorical analysis of the birth of the modern American conservative 
movement illuminates the communicative strategies of this writer, a person for over four 
decades essential to its significant policy impact as New Deal and the Great Society 
came under greater suspicion. And perhaps Kirk will become significant once again, as 
conservatives discuss how to again rise to political prominence in the wake of electoral 
defeat. But first, it is useful to consider in more detail what inspired his goals and beliefs.  
Following Edmund Burke 
The man he most championed was Edmund Burke. It is evident Kirk was a great 
admirer of the Whig statesman. The Conservative Mind advocated for a conservatism 
that was not a “system” but an approach, a style, a sentiment, a bias: against efforts of 
utopianism, against ideology, and against the promise of a bright new future casting 
aside considerations of human nature. High status was to be given to customs, norms, 
traditions, and institutions in concord with the “natural rights” from God, for these were 
the received wisdoms worthy of commitment against movements that would seek to alter 
them so as to pursue ideological aims. There should be no state organized “unity,” which 
Kirk viewed as a calling card of foreign adventurism and of the various collectivisms of 
recent memory, including American progressivism, socialism, and the totalitarian 
socialisms national and international.4 Kirk Although  engaged in furious intellectual 
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battles with his allies over the meaning of American conservatism, a coalescing force 
was hostility toward anything resembling a “transformative” or “unifying” government. 
For Kirk, conservatism was opposition to all forms of political religion and a 
rejection of the idea that politics could be redemptive. It was conviction that a properly 
ordered republic has a government of limited ambition, even as government may be used 
to influence behavior (such as the end to “no fault divorce” so as to fortify the nuclear 
family). Following Burke, whom he labeled the “founder of philosophical 
conservatism,” he believed that good governance, part of a more purposeful moral 
universe, was embodied by a cultivated humility and prudence. The “true” natural rights, 
the purposes for which God willed the state, were equal justice, security of labor and 
property, the amenities of civilized institutions, and the benefits of orderly society. These 
were the rights which contrast with the delusory “rights of man” fiercely pursued over 
the course of the French Revolution.5 He scorned those who “worshiped” at the alters of 
science and rationality, seeking to build a heaven on earth and pining for the authority to 
order societal problems, and the persons that constitute them, according to their image of 
economics or politics – anything other than in the image of God.6
In his mind, such “ideology” was always wrong because it edited actuality. And a 
simplified actuality then prepared persons to accept “systematic” solutions. According to 
Jeffrey Hart, an academic and conservative “traditionalist,” the best arrangement for any 
 In his rhetoric, a 
consciousness deliberately separated from a living reality was an “ideological mind” 
building systems of thought around concepts of utopia, primed to manipulate humans 
with an attractive, false hope.  
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discussion in the self-governing of human affairs was for opinion to be filtered through 
accumulated experience. Embodied in habits, assumptions, and institutions, opinion 
could be cautiously subject to change as change was necessary.7 Similarly, against what 
he viewed as the devolution of the term “natural rights” used in Thomas Paine’s Rights 
of Man, sprung from the radicalism begun at the end of the eighteenth century, Kirk 
believed the notion of “inalienable natural rights” has been embraced by the masses in a 
vague and belligerent manner. Rights, which have practically evolved as a synonym for 
desires, have become a confusion that plagues society. The lengthy catalogue of “rights” 
that have grown through the generations since the American founding ignore the 
“essential conditions which are attached to all true rights; first, the capacity of 
individuals to claim and exercise the alleged right; second, the correspondent duty that is 
married to every right.”8
This was an awkward argument to make in America, as its political reality stems 
from an eighteenth-century liberal republic. Yet for the imaginative Kirk, a nation 
founded not on ethnicity, language, or culture, but rather upon the primacy of individual 
rights was one that would allow the currents of “traditional” society and its trans-
generational wisdom to be swept away in the current of the new. The elevation of 
individual rights was, he thought, chaotic and harmful for the development of a 
discernible order, a tapestry of the familiar that makes life coherent and comfortably 
predictable. Such coherence in places and times where tradition was elevated, by 
contrast, imposes a structure upon life. Contempt for tradition, Burke wrote, was an 
unfortunate characteristic of the Enlightenment, and of the French Revolution most 
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notably, as its leaders had no respect for the wisdom of others but a full measure of 
confidence in their own. With an eagerness to systematically destroy an old scheme, for 
the revolutionaries all things which give perpetuity were mischievous and deserving of 
suspicion. Burke thought that government should not vary as a mode of dress, and that 
attachment to country only so far as it agrees with the “fleeting projects” of the moment 
is an accomplishment of destruction. A casting aside of received wisdom, especially of 
the Christian religion once a powerful boast and comfort, Burke memorably labeled “a 
drunken delirium from the hot spirit drawn out of the alembic of hell.”9
This, however, is not to suggest that either Burke or Kirk wished for a stifling 
rigidity of structure that might trap tradition-bound societies. The British parliamentarian 
was a long-standing and forceful advocate for change and reform, with the protection of 
what he considered change and reform cautious and respectful of cultivating norms. 
Debates over the construction of social order, Burke contended, should be informed by 
prudence and a spirit of piety. Kirk followed his intellectual mentor in viewing the “Age 
of Reason” as an age of ignorance and excessive, unearned pride. He perceived the same 
spirit that animated the French revolutionaries as alive and well in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. It was, he wrote, the abstractions of the “equalitarians” that reluctantly 
turned Burke away from British domestic concerns and toward political philosophy as 
his career in public service drew to a close.
 And Kirk was 
determined to apply such insights to his homeland.  
10 And not long after becoming the first 
American to earn a doctorate at Scotland’s ancient St. Andrews University, Kirk began 
to follow a similar path, one prophetic for those inclined to his sentiments.   
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Biographical Note 
He grew up in rural Michigan, the son of a railroad engineer who dropped out of 
school as a child. Like his father, Kirk grew to distrust mentalities that admired the 
assembly-line precision made prevalent by mechanical pioneer Henry Ford, processes he 
witnessed firsthand during a brief stint as an automobile factory employee. After 
graduation from Michigan State, Duke, and St. Andrews, he steadily worked as a 
freelance writer and lecturer. Already an Anglophile in literary tastes, he developed an 
attachment to his ancestral homeland of Scotland. In exploring its castles, country 
estates, and architectural grandeur, Kirk’s affection grew for the metaphysical principle 
of continuity given visible reality. In his writings, he conveyed the motorized harmony 
of regularity as more inhuman and uninviting than the spontaneous yet persistent 
mysteries of life. Hart, in his history of National Review magazine, which published 
Kirk’s column “From the Academy,” wrote of the sensibility rooted in the rural poverty 
of his early youth. Alongside the “small town” conservatism of Ohio’s Robert Taft was 
an admiration of the localism, constructionism, and agrarian economy of the southern 
states. Kirk’s first book, Randolph of Roanoke (published in 1951 when he was 33) was 
a revised Master’s thesis that Hart cited as an example of the “imaginative strength to his 
criticism, often valid, of the huge university, big labor, big business, big bureaucracy, 
and big crowds.”11
As a writer of fiction and non-fiction, Kirk was prolific. His writings, mostly 
histories and criticisms of various forms, included the founding of two journals, Modern 
Age and The University Bookman, and the publication of twenty-six nonfiction books 
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(and editor of several more), nine volumes of novels and collected short stories, nearly 
three hundred book reviews and seventy introductions and forwards, over eight hundred 
essays and short pieces published in periodicals, and thousands of newspaper columns.12 
Works of fiction, and particularly the ghost stories, usually contained a moral lesson in 
accord with his non-fiction. Friends and students would speak of an “imaginative mind” 
not of the Enlightenment but “gothic and medieval” in its temperament and structure.13 
Yet it is The Conservative Mind for which Kirk will be most remembered. More than 
half a century after its publication in, the book endures as a founding document of 
contemporary American conservative thought. This work was also an intellectual 
inspiration to many who wanted to gain political influence through countering the 
expansive state. Finally, and perhaps most consequentially, it popularized Burke as a 
thinker essential for American conservatives – a point not lost on influential writers 
unidentified with his sentiments.14
An Imaginative Language of Tradition 
 
The language he created for elaborating “conservative sentiments” was infused 
with contingency, locality, imagination, and the transcendent. Kirk thought that when a 
generation ceases to link spiritually with another generation, civilization shrivels. The 
“infection” of modern social confusion onto the public consciousness was, it followed, a 
consequence of confounding the sphere of private morality with the sphere of public 
activity.15 He argued that generational prejudice and prescription, due to their great age, 
are delicate growths, “slow to rise, easy to injure, hardly possible to resuscitate. The 
abstract metaphysician and fanatic reformer, intending to cleanse society, may find he 
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has scrubbed it clean away.”16
Instead, conservatism was a community set against the solitude and emptiness of 
rational man standing alone. It was not a systematic program; firm definitions were 
elusive. Perhaps there is a hint of the ironic, then, given that the “canons of 
conservatism” remain among his most well known pieces of writing. These were an 
attempt to codify a philosophic foundation for the conservative sentiments. Although 
Kirk did not renounce either the content or the idea of canons, they did change over 
time. In later editions of The Conservative Mind he warned that a surer, sounding 
grounding for definition were certain thinkers that he highlighted.
 Kirk’s language was of a mood and temperament, which 
he presented as cautious and respectful of human limitations. This “true conservatism” – 
Burke’s conservatism – was hostile to a “deification” of the “free market” and an 
exporting of American-style democracy and individualism, which could give way to 
egotism and hubris among public servants.  
17
(1) Belief in a transcendent order, or body of natural law, which rules society as well as 
conscience. Political problems, at bottom, are religious and moral problems. A narrow 
rationality, what Coleridge called Understanding, cannot of itself satisfy human needs. 
“Every Tory is a realist,” says Keith Feiling: “he knows that there are great forces in 
heaven and earth that man’s philosophy cannot plumb or fathom.” True politics is the art 
of apprehending and applying the Justice which ought to prevail in a community of 
souls. (2) Affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of human existence, as 
opposed to the narrowing uniformity, egalitarianism, and utilitarian aims of most radical 
systems; conservatives resist what Robert Graves calls “Logicalism” in society. This 
prejudice has been called “the conservatism of enjoyment” – a sense that life is worth 
living, according to Walter Bagehot “the proper source of an animated Conservatism.” 
(3) Conviction that civilized society requires orders and classes, as against the notion of 
a “classless society.” With reason, conservatives often have been called “the party of 
order.” If natural distinctions are effaced among men, oligarchs fill the vacuum. Ultimate 
equality in the judgment of God, and equality before courts of law, are recognized by 
conservatives; but equality of condition, they think, means equality in servitude and 
 The Seventh 
Revised Edition (1995) listed the canons as follows:  
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boredom. (4) Persuasion that freedom and property are closely linked: separate property 
from private possession, and Leviathan becomes master of all. Economic leveling, they 
maintain, is not economic progress. (5) Faith in prescription and distrust of “sophisters, 
calculators, and economists” who would reconstruct society upon abstract designs. 
Custom, convention, and old prescription are checks both upon man’s anarchic impulse 
and upon the innovator’s lust for power. (6) Recognition that change may not be salutary 
reform: hasty innovation may be a devouring conflagration, rather than a torch of 
progress. Society must alter, for prudent change is the means of social preservation; but 
a statesman must take Providence into his calculations, and a statesman’s chief virtue, 
according to Plato and Burke, is prudence. 18
 
 
As a rhetorical popularizer against projects of state-organized unity, of 
rationalism and utopia, Kirk would likely lament much of the impressive political 
triumphs of the “American Right” since 1994, the year of his death. Aside from 
individualism and free market idealism, there has been an ideological turn and a 
hardening of policy positions, principally in the area of foreign policy. The notion of 
bringing freedom to peoples through military imposition, with the aims of greater 
democratization – even if such notions are alien to the local history and culture – was for 
Kirk a natural outcome of the elevation of “rights” sentiment, rhetoric, and action. By 
these policies, he perceived liberalism as consumed with the spread of an abstracted 
concept of liberty and self-governance. Kirk believed that good intentions will often 
overshadow considerations of prudence, a “statesman’s chief virtue.” His appreciation of 
variety, mystery, tradition, and the venerable is a clumsy fit with the notion of 
“spreading democracy” through force. In 1944, anxious to leave military service and 
worried about a looming domestic collectivism and overly active foreign policy, Kirk 
voted for the Socialist candidate for president, Norman Thomas, as a reward for the 
candidate’s anti-imperialist speeches.19 In Kirk’s view, the liberalism that infected both 
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parties – while professing to be a promoter of liberty – was instead too often movement 
for control over a wide array of human functions.  
The natural progression of “unchecked” liberalism was a transition, pleasant to 
the ears, away from Christendom, the natural aristocracy, and the bonds of generations 
to a desolate utilitarian collectivism. The Conservative Mind was something of a treatise 
warning that tradition, prudence, and prescription were suspect in most of the 
governmental marches forward toward greater “reform” and “revision.” Taken to their 
logical conclusion, in Kirk’s view these state efforts tended to create conditions that 
were insecure, forlorn, disjointed, and ripe for the will to power, particularly when the 
intention was greater union toward ideological goals. Kirk’s goals and beliefs, and the 
rhetorical strategies he employed to advance them, were motivated by a defense of the 
tendencies, practices, and institutions he admired in the American founding and in 
Americans themselves. The perspectives of The Conservative Mind borrowed heavily 
from Europe and Burke, and it was the author’s argument that the American tradition 
was fundamentally “Burkean.”20 This tradition should stand against socioeconomic 
trends and governmental efforts that threatened to undermine the generational wisdom 
necessary for a properly functioning social order. Many of his books could be taken as a 
warning against political movements that sought quick change so as to pursue what Kirk 
found to be certain ideological goals, a disdain for high culture and elevation of statist 
solutions first among them.21
Such a “conservative sentiment” was provisional and tactical in that the inherent 
diversity of humanity that for Kirk dictated the fronts of the battle was not stationary. 
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There could not be a “final victory” for conservatives because the toil was not to achieve 
a vision but to sustain what was worthy within it.22 Resolutions will not be grand 
flourishes but instead short-term responses to the persistent challenges of sinful 
humanity. Kirk wrote that “the good society” was marked by a high degree of order, 
justice, and freedom. Among these, order had primacy, as justice could be enforced until 
“a tolerable civil social order is attained,” less “freedom be anything better than violence 
until order gives us laws.” “Absolute tolerance” was seen as the end of society because 
its inhabitants had, essentially, become indifferent to one another within a community. 
What followed was the “inverted religion” of ideology. A “democracy of the dead,” in 
contrast, recognized the judgments of those proceeded as well as the opinions of those in 
the moment. This kind of order was founded upon the practical experience of humans 
over many centuries and upon the judgments of vision and the intellect of predecessors. 
Against these sentiments was an age of various ideologies – “fanatic political creeds, 
often advanced by violence. By definition, ‘ideology’ means servitude to political 
dogmas, abstract ideas not founded upon historical experience.”23 No order, abstract or 
otherwise, could approach perfection because humans are always imperfect. That a 
people could never make their way to utopia was a consistent theme of his writings. 
Even so, for Kirk the “roots” of an order could be made healthier; they could be 
reinvigorated and improved. Similar to Burke’s calls for measured reform, Kirk believed 
that permanence and progression could be complimentary, but only if the foundation was 
solid and continuously “renewed.” In rhetoric, the suitable past of generational prejudice 
and prudence was nearly always presented as fragile.     
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Still, the traditions organically passed forward in time could partake of societal 
invention naturally. Through these, in no small measure, humans may participate in their 
natural rights. An embrace of feeling, affection, and sentiment was an appreciation for 
human dynamism and continuation in all its messiness. Kirk abhorred a “rationalist” 
mode of thought writ large, such as one capable of supporting giant public-works 
policies prepared by leaders for the sake of “their” people, complete with military-like 
rhetoric and organization, conducted in a time of crisis for the purposes of “improving 
the physical fitness of potential soldiers and stimulating public commitment to national 
service in the emergency.”24 He stated often that ideology was a motivation for 
government action, and in troubled times especially. Kirk saw these to be falsely 
founded upon claims of a systematic uncovering of certain “facts” of human nature. And 
these facts were not the unique or sole properties of early Enlightenment era liberalism. 
More modern incarnations such as socialism could assert itself to be a truer adaptation 
than liberalism to the “equality of humanity.” In Kirk’s biases, Marxist revolutionaries 
understood themselves to be upholding a “natural science” of the movements of human 
history. These movements were preceded by a rationalist reduction of actual human 
beings to an ideological construction of an abstract human nature. This construct was 
then brought together, disastrously from Kirk’s perspective, with various institutions 
deemed appropriate to the abstraction. He responded with the claim that conservatism, as 
the negation of ideology, was a genuine and necessary alternative to the modern age.25 
People, he taught, were not things. They could not be ordered and reorganized as things 
could be ordered and reorganized.    
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A Rooted Imagination 
 Of noteworthy absence in Kirk’s writings, and in the canons that serve as a useful 
summation, were expressions of support for “market values.” He saw no contradiction in 
a loathing of both socialism and of a “free market” mindset. In his conceptions, each was 
a compliment to coarse mass culture, promoting a disloyalty to place and family. 
Conservatives after Kirk tended to disagree with him about the social consequences of 
unconstrained markets. Identification with the “conservative” party shaped abstract 
beliefs about the composition of a good and just society, socializing toward a market-
orientation.26 Within conservative alliances, arguments about the morality of markets has 
tended to be fierce and irresolvable, but with points of common ground. For example, 
although they disagreed about the contemporary value of historical figures, including 
Burke and Rousseau, Kirk shared such a sentiment against unrestrained markets with 
conservative political theorist and personal friend Willmoore Kendall. Both authors 
sought in their writings an objective moral order above the fluxes of history. That all 
societies are grounded in such orders, and that every society does and ought to adhere to 
fundamental truths, was for them a view in opposition to “liberal” notions of an open 
society made freer by market forces.27 And what was absolutely necessary to perceive 
and generalize about the moral order, Kirk thought, was the “moral imagination,” which 
I find to be the phrase that best sums up his persuasions.28
This imagination, and not calculating reason, was what separated man from 
“beasts.” Further, the principle conflict of the modern age was, according to Kirk, not 
between competing programs for the material betterment of mankind, but between 
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opposing types of imagination. Thus opposition to utilitarian market values would be 
due to a failure to acknowledge the existence of an ethical standard beyond mere self-
interest. Industrialization and urbanization, potent expressions of the market economy, 
were a primary cause for the decline of tradition. He concluded the impulse to radical, 
quick change came largely from cities, as many people there were uprooted and 
detached from community, from the fellowship of those with whom they shared bonds 
of kinship and common community experience. Conservatism, rather, best prospers in 
smaller, more stable, places where humans were slow to break the ways that bind them 
to past generations.29 And so the moral imagination of the conservative “aspires to the 
apprehending of right order in the soul and right order in the commonwealth.”30
In its fidelity to the past, at the core of Kirk’s thought was an apprehension about 
rootlessness. This was a sense of place and history, a sense of self derived from prior 
generations and culture, an identity collective and personalized. Following Burke, he 
thought a system of government organized for the living only disallowed generations to 
link together in a partnership necessary to caution against the fancies of the moment. The 
“higher” order, a shelter for true freedom and justice, declared the intrinsic dignity of 
man, not the contracts of secular authorities. This moral order worked upon the various 
political orders, as religious concepts of justice, charity, community, and duty transform 
a society without the abrupt alteration of governmental framework.
 
31 It was, therefore, 
loyalty to persons as opposed to allegiance to the nexus of economic and political 
payments that constituted the good society. Writing that reason with a “capital R” – pure 
rationality as the guide to morals and politics – dominated the first half of the eighteenth 
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century, Kirk stated his opinion of the dangerous attractions of sovereign rationality: 
“philosophical systems last a long while, in the public consciousness, after they have 
been mortally wounded, so that journalists like Thomas Paine were crying up the Age of 
Reason well into the nineteenth century, and Reason has its worshippers still.”32 Kirk’s 
admiration for the evolutionary conservatism of Burke was especially prominent in those 
writings concerning order, and he agreed that “a disposition to preserve and an ability to 
improve” were the standard of a statesman. For the “Kirkian” traditionalist conservative, 
a moral order in the midst of revolutions of theoretic dogma required those, like Burke, 
with no fear to attack the powerful, defend the weak, or oppose the established interests 
through the power of imagination and forceful argument.33
 Reading Burke’s “anti-ideological” philosophy through the lens of Kirk, one 
necessity to incorporate natural rights into the political current was neither a deductive 
rationalism nor some manner of instinct-exalting romanticism. A moral order was 
needed. Following this, Kirk wrote in an essay titled “What is Conservatism?” that 
conservatives believe general principles should always be tempered by experience, or 
prudence. And as circumstances vary, the products of human organization should 
observe its own traditions and historical experience, which take precedence over 
principals drawn up as “a priori notions divorced from a nation’s history and 
 The guide to this higher 
moral order, the bulwark against the rootless, circulating fictions inevitable in creeping 
liberalism, was a concept of associational natural right. In Kirk’s writing, a transcendent 
understanding of a mysterious but discernable moral order was a universal “code” 
inherent to the human heart and unshakable by any other constitution.  
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necessities.” A true and valuable principle is an idea derived from knowledge of human 
nature and of the past. These are necessary for the statesman, but they must be applied 
discreetly and with unceasing caution. Conservatives must remain restrained, chastened 
by their principle of imperfectability. To aim for utopia in the immovable face of 
imperfect nature and social order was to end in disaster or boredom. Those who live in 
tradition, as a poet tends to do, realize that a culture cannot long survive if starved from 
the evolving culture of a larger group or class.34
The Importance of Prudence and Continuity    
 His persuasions of “moral imagination,” 
in other words, were meant to be “poetic,” formulated by the past. 
In his treatment of Burke, Kirk found the symptom of a badly conceived state to 
be the propensity to make theories disrespectful of the foundations of current or 
historical developments. The lines of human morality were unlike those of mathematics, 
to take an example, because there were exceptions and modifications made not by the 
processes of logic but by the rule of prudence. Further, prudence was not simply among 
the first rank of political and moral virtues, but was in fact their conductor, a necessary 
guide to any large body rightly constituted.35 The diversity of conservative thought after 
the Second World War included, clumsily and distrustfully under one banner and 
existing in opposition to collectivism and state-organized unity, two opposing sides: an 
efficient modernism, cash-nexus selfishness, and atomistic vision of society friendly to 
plutocracy; and an inefficient, organic, historical, medievalism. Yet both generalized 
usages of the descriptive “conservative” possessed, as a unifying common denominator, 
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a distrust of the masses, preference for an established elitist authority, and disapproval 
toward the plans of utopians and statists.36
Kirk’s deployed his rhetoric primarily in dissent against cultural disintegration, 
liberal economies, foreign intervention, and the “deformed order” they assisted. “Only a 
civil order which retains some understanding of consecration, ordination, and reverence 
can withstand fanatic ideologues and squalid oligarchs,” he wrote. Conservatism 
required imagination, but also something even rarer and nobler – “consecration.”
 
37 (He 
personally followed this viewpoint to a religious conclusion, converting to a sacramental 
Christian understanding of human connection to the divine, Catholicism, at age 46.38) 
Motivated to defend what he termed the “Anglo-American” tradition of skepticism 
toward a utilitarian, contractual view of government, Kirk began The Conservatism Mind 
with a robust opening salvo: “‘The stupid party’: this is John Stuart Mill’s description of 
conservatives. Like certain other summary dicta which nineteenth-century liberalism 
thought to be forever triumphant, his judgment needs review in our age of disintegrating 
liberal and radical philosophies.”39
In vivid, confident language, he described the descent of liberalism in the United 
States, where obedience to positive law and regulation was less habitual than in Britain, 
as the kind of descent that “slides down to dusty death.” The lasting strength of the 
“antithesis of true community,” collectivism coerced by the state, meant that “true 
individuality is desperately needed in our age.” These individuals are participants not in 
a unitary democracy but in “the democracy that means genuine participation of the 
citizen in communal affairs.” The object of the “devotees of romantic emancipation” is 
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“liberation from the dead hand of the past.” The total state, “which flourishes upon 
rootlessness among the masses,” he thought was never wholly unpopular. This state 
“employs flattery and bribery to retain the support of the masses” yet it also “detests and 
endeavors to obliterate knowledge of the past.”40
The rhetoric of the American conservative movement from the mid-twentieth 
century forward worked to facilitate bridging the gap between ideas in the public sphere 
and the translation of those ideas into laws that might diminish the influence and reach 
of government. Kirk’s life as a leading intellectual figure of this movement indicates his 
view that rhetoric is insufficient. The memorable phrases and clarity of opinion found 
throughout his prolific writings were accompanied, for decades, by an active lecturing 
schedule. He also involved himself (as Burke did, albeit on a much more limited scale) 
with the messiness of actual politics, writing speeches for Sen. Barry Goldwater and 
supporting various local candidates. For conservatives who advocate “evolutionary” 
reform, as I argue Kirk and many “traditionalists” did, ideas were not self-implementing 
and self-sustaining. They must be associated with direct action, beginning with the 
family and extending outward into the polis. And situations can certainly change when 
 Its necessary opposition, the veritable 
conservative, was not a “dull, boorish, bigoted and avaricious being,” but a resolute and 
independent-minded member of certain associations who preferred the tried and tested to 
the novel and was committed to safeguarding the institutions of the past – not in any way 
reactionary and inflexible, but prudently and carefully. In my view, this rhetoric stands 
in contrast to much of the populism and reactionary power-grabbing that passes for 
“American conservatism,” particularly in recent decades.  
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ideas propagated by determined, outstanding rhetorical figures are finally accepted and 
codified into law. Concerning the “skepticism” of conservatism, one can believe in the 
power of ideas and rhetorical display while also believing in the possibility – or even the 
likelihood, given the view of human nature – of failure.  
The Persuasion of a Type of Liberty 
In the struggle to “resist Leviathan as master,” Kirk included the imperative to 
persuade in his canons of conservatism. Persuasion and action were, however, daunting 
and frustrating tasks. Richard Weaver wrote in Ideas Have Consequences that the moral 
dissolution of Western nations could be traced to the advancement of nominalism, 
rationalism, and materialism throughout the Enlightenment period. But words have the 
power to define and to compel, and by persuasive speech in the service of truth “the 
community of language gives one access to significances at which he cannot otherwise 
arrive.”41 Kirk, although he recognized the power of words, parted with Weaver in the 
usefulness of Burke and natural law (not to be confused the natural rights of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau) to the basics of conservative philosophical sentiment. The Whig 
statesman was not only a foe to metaphysics and the applications of inquisitive reason to 
the political process; Kirk believed him to be among the most eloquent and profound 
defenders of “natural” law, morality, and politics in Western civilization. And so, in 
thinking about the persuasions of “moral imagination,” the parliamentarian was relevant 
to postwar America because he was a defender not merely of defensible interests in 
some way under siege. Burke was also an example to be emulated by conservatives 
because he articulated a body of principles and sought to put them into action. He was, 
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in the summary of George Nash and the opinion of Kirk, both a traditionalist and a truly 
rational man, in rhetoric and in deed.42
As such, the principle of prescriptive liberty, accompanied by a skeptical 
temperament and the understanding that there are limits to human understanding, was 
superior to abstract liberty. Coined by the dictator Burke anticipated in Reflections on 
the Revolution in France, Napoleon,
  
43 the word ‘ideology’ was used by Kirk as a term of 
action with no check upon its excesses. Warning against the pitfalls of democracy, Kirk 
wrote that “passion, deluded sentiment, and a destructive yearning for simplicity” are the 
characteristics of those suffering from the “intoxication of self-expression and the 
negation of discipline.” The destruction of moral habits was the worst of all the “terrors 
of democracy” (especially when democracy is presented in a simplified form). No 
constitution, however “artfully designed,” can “suffice to restrain men who have 
embraced the doctrines of complete equality and an inalienable popular right to 
power.”44 Abstract ideas, however, cannot be wholly dismissed by themselves. To do so 
would be to dismiss principles which may be reasonably discovered in politics. It was, 
rather, the abstraction of ideology assembled without a guide to knowledge and history 
that must be resisted. This guide was principle served by experience, informed by the 
natural law and developed over the generations. There must be reverence – a received 
custom – or there is, eventually, a self-destruction. History – “often shadowy and subtle 
to our eyes” – was the gradual revelation of a “Supreme design,” which helped to know 
nature: a “human nature, the revelation of universal and permanent principles through 
the study of mind and soul – not the Romantics’ half-pantheistic nature.” Kirk wrote that 
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humans collect and condense the wisdom of experience, the written part of it made 
known by the means of history, chiefly through tradition, custom, prejudice, and 
prescription. These are “surer guides to conscience and conduct than books or 
speculation. Habit and custom may be the wisdom of unlettered men, but they come 
from the sound old heart of humanity.”45
Kirk’s written and spoken rhetoric, on these and other philosophic matters, brings 
together a confident and quotable phraseology with an intellectual foundation arriving at 
an opportune moment. This is what I have meant by the term “rhetorical popularizer.” 
He developed a polemical approach to fundamental conservative anxieties about the 
direction of American social order. This approach, in turn, was a cohesive, organizing 
strand for sentiments skeptical of the big, the militarized, and the centralized in the 
public sphere of a late twentieth century America undergoing explosive growth. Against 
the trends of the time, Kirk refused to accept both collectivism and the extreme yet 
attractive response to those allied against it, a libertarian-influenced “individualism.” 
Recognizing insecurity about America’s shallow place in the history of ideas and 
practice by comparison to Europe, he made the British statesman perhaps most 
sympathetic to its revolution, Edmund Burke, more famous in his homeland.
 
46 And in 
taking from history to conjure parallels of conservatism, he offered, particularly to those 
inclined to agree with his biases and assumptions, a potent, if overly imaginative in the 
context of America, criticism of the impulse to organize humanity into some manner of a 
systematic and centralized formation.     
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Uneasy with the voracious appetite of government, Kirk articulated a vision of 
organic, collective, and immemorial wisdom so as to stem the tide a larger, more 
bureaucratic state. There are “permanent things,” well beyond the clumsy reach of the 
state he wrote, that give life meaning: truth, goodness, beauty, and the transcendent. The 
order which holds all things in place “is made for us, and we are made for it. The 
thinking conservative, far from denying the existence of this eternal order, endeavors to 
ascertain its nature and to conform to that order, which is the source of the Permanent 
Things.”47
His approach was a willingness to make value judgments, complete with a 
conviction of message confident that history and the permanent things would vindicate 
the useful truthfulness of that message. Kirk agreed with Weaver that ideas have 
consequences, but he also thought there existed words and sentiment before ideas. It was 
through the vigorous popularization of terms and arguments, combined with a lived 
example, that Kirk conveyed sentiments could enter the public consciousness. These 
sentiments and dispositions then await their awakening as political and social climates 
change, and as figures capable of articulating them to the masses emerge. In a 
democratic constitutional republic, where the people are themselves responsible for the 
methods and outcomes of governing organization, words were for Kirk significant.
 There are those of the post-Enlightenment “right” and “left,” he suggested, 
that adhere to a system of ideological dogma when they should instead value a body of 
enduring sentiments. Thus the challenge of Kirk’s rhetoric: how to communicate the 
negation of ideology? How to convey a state of mind, a character, a guarded approach to 
civil social order?  
48 In 
  
95 
an essay contemplating rhetoric, Kirk wrote that political principles and the methods of 
persuasion cannot be dissociated because “some genuine connection subsists between 
the order of rhetoric and the order of society; false phrases open the way for false 
measures.”49
When speaking and writing of conservatism, Kirk used the word as an adjective, 
not as a noun. Sustained by a body of sentiments, flexible so as to accommodate a 
diversity of views on a wide range of subjects, this “negation of ideology” was a state of 
mind, a type of character, a way of looking at the civil social order.
 He found it important to recognize that an abuse of language was of vital 
help to the abuses of power – and the truly conservative person was one who discovered 
the permanent things more pleasing than the worldly and temporary.  
50 The ancient truth 
of considerable limits to what humans know and may know indicated, for the 
conservative, that the best actions in the selfish arena of politics were incremental, 
informed by accumulated prejudice acclimated to circumstance. The sudden construction 
of universal law, prone to the whimsical and superficial casting aside of human nature 
and history, was inflamed by the desire to be freed of duties. In his essay “The 
Dissolution of Liberalism,” Kirk wrote that all systems, ethical or political, attained 
ascendancy over the minds of men through their appeal to the imagination. Nevertheless, 
“when they cease to touch the chords of wonder and mystery and hope, their power is 
lost, and men look elsewhere for some set of principles by which they may be guided.”51
Rhetorically, Kirk imitated an unfolding performance of myth – a persuasive 
performance not of falsehood but directed toward a concept of wisdom. These were 
represented in ways particular to time and place; they were not simply an entertaining 
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fancy. A myth might grow out of an actual event lost in the remote past, but it eventually 
transcended the particular circumstance of its origin to assume significance universal and 
abiding. These were the products of the moral experience of people, stumbling toward 
the divine love and wisdom implanted in the consciousness from before the dawn of 
existence by a power and a means knowledge can never describe.52
 To see how this vision has endured, one may turn to the strategic choices of The 
Conservative Mind. Kirk’s persuasion was embedded in the practical unfolding of his 
political philosophy. For the first half of the twentieth century, an intellectual 
“movement” of “conservatism” made little sense. This is not to say that disparate and 
directly ancestral arguments were not being made – libertarianism, for example, found a 
voice in writers like Albert Jay Nock and Frank Chodorov, polemicists furiously 
scribbling against centralization; and southern agrarians declared that traditions help 
guide humanity’s higher nature, advancing a life defined by the structuring of will in 
accordance with perceptions of a transcendent good. There was a shared distrust of the 
 In popularizing the 
perceived wisdom of Burke and other figures, he updated for an American audience in a 
time of intellectual uncertainty (insofar as American conservatism was concerned) a 
manner of discernment surpassing the private reason of the supposedly ingenious. This 
was unique. The argument that humans created in the image of God, were part of a 
“moral” imagination seeking the “abiding” amid the “chaos” was attractive at the time of 
his arrival on the national scene in the 1950s. It remains, for some, an attractive vision – 
especially for those open to the arguments of “Anglo-American” political thought and 
willing to accept the notion of an unseen moral order.   
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state and of politics, but little agreement concerning methods and solutions.53 There was, 
until the “fusionism” of William F. Buckley Jr. and Frank Meyer, no indication of a 
cohesive whole as a movement, and little efforts of coordination or coalition. Kirk, 
especially in his seminal work, relayed the goals of his conservatism as a defense against 
the chaos of collectivism and individualism. Many other figures – including Meyer and 
Kendall – would likely have rejected such goals out of hand. In Kirk’s persuasions, 
humans were not autonomous individuals as if there no relation to community in which 
one was embedded. His rhetoric of moral imagination, an imagination presented to his 
readers as a healing relief, placed little faith in the political process other conservatives 
eagerly sought to join. Kirk, distinctive in persona and persuasion, was according to 
Nash a “self-invented work of art, prodigiously learned.”54
 The defense of an imaginative, prudent, “traditionalist” sentiment against the 
ravages of modern times suggested that humans were not capable of recognizing a truly 
human, humane community by an elevation of rationality or materialism in the public 
sphere. Persons were more than the collection of material parts. The conduct of moral 
principles was essential and foundational to a moral and just political and social system. 
In Kirk’s writing, the cause of suffering was moral evil, for “ours is a moral order.” 
Further, human laws were derived from immortality. Quoting Burke’s statement that 
“the higher happiness is moral happiness,” he continued: “Pride, ambition, avarice, 
revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, disorderly appetites – these vices are 
the actual causes of the storms that trouble life.”
   
55 Taken with the many other similar 
quotations, I believe such a passage does suggest one of the chief characteristics of 
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American conservatism: close partnership with a confessional label, namely Christianity. 
Yet Kirk’s conservatism was more secularly ecumenical than it might at first appear, as 
his praise in The Conservative Mind for non-religious figures like Paul More and George 
Santayana might attest. This leads, at least in part, to my later characterizations of a 
“postmodern” and “imaginative” construction. Conservatism, this is to say, was and is 
subject to a continuous “reimagining,” one of paradoxes and puzzling alliances.     
 Regardless of theological grounding, in its rhetoric a typical assumption of Kirk 
and those associated with his sentiments was that fallible man could never be perfectible. 
To preserve a true meaning to human existence, the inclinations for hubris and totality 
(especially among political leaders) should be kept in check by a something resembling a 
“theological vision.” Guided by customs and traditions developed over long periods of 
time, a meaningful vision of the “good” life was ordained by the transcendent, an unseen 
reality that drew creation into communal association. Without reverence, veneration, and 
contemplation toward a “good” end, life was for Kirk little more than a pointless 
rebellion.56
 Kirk’s rhetoric of moral imagination lamented the human relationships of the 
present, past, and future was too often active as a convenient distraction. “Greatness,” no 
 To negate the hubris of earthly power and ideology was to, correspondingly, 
be open to “reality” in all of its mystery and complexity. The “transformational” 
occurred after death, not in politics. Kirk’s persuasions of morality and imagination, I 
intend to demonstrate, both refused ignorance of the revelation he thought to animate 
society and drew in those already inclined to believe the traditions of their ancestors, 
tested over time, deserved continuation.  
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birthright, was fragile; it had to be fearlessly forged. The arguments that one “invents,” 
according to some rhetorical scholars, should appeal to reason, emotion about the subject 
under discussion, and trust in the speaker’s character.57 I argue the persuasiveness of 
Kirk’s polemics, especially those directly inspired by Burke, did broadly follow these 
three outlines. Reflections on the Revolution in France, “a sustained polemic against the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man,” took the ideology of that revolution quite seriously. 
And the “counterrevolutionary discourse” against the revolutionaries and their 
intellectual heirs, real and perceived, became a fundamental intellectual current in laying 
the groundwork for much of intellectual conservatism.58 For Burke, and I believe for 
Kirk as well, the French Revolution was an “astonishing” and “cataclysmic” event, 
playing a key role in shaping the modern world.59 It has been argued that the production 
of an “imaginative vision” in rhetoric, a consequence of the language between people, is 
a conduit for citizen participation in representative governments.60 Kirk’s rhetoric put 
such a notion to practice, as when he belittled an increasingly prominent grouping of 
American “conservatives”: “I had thought that the Neoconservatives might become the 
champions of diversity in the world; instead, they aspire to bring about a world of 
uniformity and dull standardization, Americanized, industrialized, democratized, 
logicalized, boring. They are cultural and economic imperialists, many of them.”61
 In Kirk’s structures of argument, many public debates of his time were among 
various strains of liberalism. The political fanaticism of ideology – a sort of selfish 
utilitarianism coyly suggesting that the “institutions of freedom” were good
  
62 – was still 
at hand, no matter if the liberalism was “conservative,” “liberal,” or “radical.” In arguing 
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against politics as a “substitute” for religion, Kirk foresaw his purpose in laws set by 
nature and universally valid. The language symbols that conveyed existence, such as 
literature and stories to express a moral lesson, reconstituted for some of his readers a 
reality outside of the more empirical and everyday experiences. To assert one’s own 
human dignity was to recognize the revelation of limits to any transformative experience 
before death. If a mastery of craft or language begins with awareness of how much 
humans were themselves mastered, as Kirk suggested, then his dissent from modernity 
could be thought to embrace the liberty of the “moral imagination.” 
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Amid the Ideologies: Sourcing Kirk’s Political Thought 
 Conservatism as it is understood in modern societies arose out of a reaction, first 
to the French Revolution, and second to the impulses of its hugely influential 
consequences, the seeking large-scale social transformations as a remedy for human 
restlessness and unhappiness.1 Within the American post-World War II context of which 
Russell Kirk loomed so large, James Aune has identified four strands: a traditionalist 
wing represented by Kirk, southern regionalists such as Richard Weaver and M.E. 
Bradford; libertarianism, defined by an emphasis on solutions orientated around markets; 
a “fusionist” wing, so labeled by the effort to fuse capitalism and cultural conservatism; 
and the “neo-conservatives,” distinguished by a social-scientific focus, secularism, 
internationalism, and a willingness to accept the principle of the welfare state.2 In 
examining the persuasions of Kirk and what I term traditionalist conservatism,3
 First, to anchor this analysis, I take Edmund Burke, a relentless scourge of the 
rapid, large-scale social transformations of the French Revolution, as an organizing 
explanation for both the fruitfulness and the instability of American conservatism after 
the Second World War. Kirk’s most famous work stated: “conscious conservatism, in 
the modern sense, did not manifest itself until 1790, with the publication of Reflections 
 the 
historical background of this work is a story of how American intellectual conservatism, 
its varied and occasionally contradictory strands made stronger and more cohesive by 
the landmark publication of The Conservative Mind in 1953, was overwhelmed by the 
politicization of a movement that, particularly in 1980, was forced to confront the 
challenges of governing.   
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on the Revolution in France. In that year the prophetic powers of Burke fixed in the 
public consciousness, for the first time, the opposing poles of conservation and 
innovation.”4 The tensions of instability within American conservatism I characterize as 
inflexible ideology against the arguments of caution, prudence, circumstance, and 
mystery. In this generalization, libertarianism and “neoconservatism” contain ideology 
and rigidity, while traditionalism is guided by the cautious, circumstantial prudence 
thought by Kirk to be exemplified by Burke. And “fusionism” is the attempt to merge 
such varied strands into an electoral coalition. Second, so as to inform the rhetorical 
analysis of Kirk’s persuasions, I highlight the Roman rhetorician Cicero, a figure Kirk 
also highly praised. This was due to the appeals of reason of the moral “natural law” 
combined with the “natural” affections implanted by the divine, so as to guide human 
action by ethical norms.5
The aim of this section is to analyze the “Ciceronian” and “Burkean” relationship 
between rhetorical prudence and public effect. I contend that Kirk’s persuasive goal was 
to present a civic republican version of the orator as an ethical representative of the 
community. He was not as “great” or as consequential a figure as Cicero or Burke; but I 
will argue that he followed their example. This is to say that Kirk occupied space as a 
publicly political figure somehow “set apart” from politics, and as an advocate of a 
natural law tradition reverent of the wisdoms of past generations amid the ideologies and 
the hubristic confusions of modernity. My argument, then, is for the distinctiveness of 
Burke and Cicero (but Burke especially, given that his writings were the beginning of 
 Cicero, Kirk, and Burke “thought” as a poet does in prose: 
through metaphor, story, and historical appeal. 
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modern conservatism6
Defining Traditionalist Conservative Sentiment 
) and, in following that distinctiveness, for the labeling of Kirk’s 
persuasive goals, inspired by certain historical example and thought, as “associational,” 
“imaginative,” and a variant of the “postmodern.” While more comprehensively 
considered in other sections, it is beneficial at this point to offer a definition of the 
“traditionalist conservative” sentiment.  
In my view, this sentiment of conservatism may be defined as the negation of 
ideology, the secularization of the doctrine of original sin, the cautious sentiment 
tempered by prudence, the product of organic, local human organization observing and 
reforming its customs, the distaste for a priori principle disassociated from historical 
experience, the partaking of the mysteries of free will, divine guidance, and human 
agency by existing in but not of the confusions of modern society, and the understanding 
that there is no framework of action, no tenet, no theory, and no article of faith that may 
be applied to human problems. Culture is more important than politics; and family, 
generational wisdom, and local community serve as better guides to problem solving 
than theory and systematic application. By this view, much of modernity and its stylistic 
descendents are biased as the defiance of common experience, as seemingly endless 
experiments based in theory and speculation. Instead, traditions – practices based in 
experience – are perceived as more likely to succeed and as more likely to correspond 
with an innate desire for beauty and order.7
Without echoes and remembrance of our human experiences, the traditionalist 
conservative might ask, where is eternal life? Much of the modern human is a tourist, a 
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sampler, a “chooser” of taste and fashion consistently and fundamentally unnourished. 
The convolutions of the human experience will defy the reductionisms of modernism, 
from the many varieties of Marxism to utilitarianism to architectural “cleansing,” if 
allowed to do so. A reality beyond our experience, a welcome of mystery and shunning 
of totalizing propositions, is for Kirk revealed in historical circumstances. He wrote in a 
letter to Jerry Pournelle, a political theorist, essayist, and intellectual protégée, “There 
remains in this country a large body of support for an imaginative conservatism. Though 
the odds are against us, we may succeed in saving a good deal from the wreck of the 
modern world…Surely we have a hard row to hoe. And we may fail. But we are put into 
this world to do battle…I suspect, indeed, that the modern age will come to smash; and 
then we will have to build afresh, upon old principles.”8
 Surveying a century he bemoaned as wrecked by ideology, Kirk urged “repair” to 
virtues so that the twenty first century “can become a time of renewal and recovery.” 
This would be accomplished by an end to “ideological fascination and return to politics 
as the art of the possible,” a spiritual reinvigoration that “may teach men and women 
afresh what it is to be fully human, a little lower than the angels.” This “recovery of 
order,” a turning away from “the destructive mind,” depended upon “our mentality and 
our sentiments, and our powers of persuasion.”
 Through the imagination, a 
healing begins to take place.  
9 As a self-styled “Bohemian Tory” and 
lifelong resident of his ancestral, rural Michigan home who never learned to drive, his 
sentiments resisted an uprooting of standards and norms. Kirk warned of embracing 
planning and shallow emotional appeal at the peril of an imaginative core that could 
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prompt truth to become gradually known. Through this embrace, the faddish freedoms 
that supposedly liberate from the past are, in effect, an absence of place. These reduce 
humans to the small, superficial, and unimportant, granting little more than the 
illusionary yet always tempting falsehood that life is a monologue and that one is 
capable of creating, or even directing, a destiny. What is needed, Kirk wrote, was greater 
skepticism of the apostles of progress and greater scorn to the notions that politics may 
be reduced to a set of problems that our rational intelligences may solve.10
He conveyed that no cold, synthetic creation such as government would ever 
accumulate sufficient knowledge or goodness to “solve” anything. But the better 
comprehension of place, of belonging, and of a more properly constituted order of the 
soul would help to build a more just social and political order. The “positive law” should 
be in communion with the “natural law,” its content set by an unchangeable nature. And 
the need for persons to be in association with each other and local attachments should be 
respected so that a flourishing human life could be built in mutual support with the 
community. It is not the person, this is to say, that must attempt to usher in the Kingdom 
of God. That is the charge of the supernatural community, not the task of the polis, the 
natural community that is represented by the organizations of governance. Such 
sentiments bring us, finally, to Kirk’s appreciation of the civic disposition and public 
conduct of Burke and Cicero.    
  
Imagination in Historical Reading   
 Kirk’s consideration of the “superior law” placed Burke and Cicero as 
enunciators of the jus naturale, the law of the universe of which the laws of humanity 
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could only imperfectly manifest. The “higher” happiness was moral happiness and the 
causes of suffering were moral evils.11 He connected Burke’s “natural right” to the 
Cicernonian jus naturale, reinforced by the developments of Christian dogma and 
English common law doctrine. Though he did not associate Cicero with any modern 
political thought, Kirk associated the two statesmen as “anti-rationalists” asserting that 
natural right was human custom conforming to divine intent.12 Burke’s accomplishment, 
he wrote in The Conservative Mind, was the expression of a principle of order, an 
“anticipatory refutation of utilitarianism, positivism, and pragmatism.” Citing a talent for 
social prediction, his Burke foresaw the revolutions of France as no culmination of an 
enlightenment but as the inception of a moral convulsion. And, like Cicero, “to check it, 
he adapted the reverential view of society.” Against the principle of utility, where the 
law was “treated like mathematics or physics, made a tool of convenience,” stood the 
“old illusions that law had a supernatural sanction, an origin superior to man, the 
Ciceronian and Scholastic notion that it was a human groping after divine enactment” 
that must not be “dismissed in the interest of efficiency in an industrial age.”13
I label such a historical reading as an enterprise of imagination – not necessarily 
incorrect, but a simplified explanation to suit a purpose seen as vital and moral. More 
specifically, Kirk claimed actual, historical performances (in the case of Cicero, 
rhetorical persuasion) for the purposes of a constituted meaning centered upon cultural 
inheritances he thought more properly ordered. And as with Burke, this rhetorical 
enterprise was made more “alive” and more memorable by the vitality of its language 
and by the power of its imagery. Kirk’s prudence and circumstance, rather than 
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inflexible principle, meant an effort to create and enrich a conservative intellectual 
tradition through the wisdom of ancestors. He was labeled “The American Cicero” by 
southern agrarian writer M.E. Bradford and historian Forrest McDonald, who wrote in 
National Review: “Every additional finding moves us closer toward a whole from which 
internal contradictions and tensions are entirely absent. We shall never get there, of 
course, for what Kirk is seeking, ultimately, is the Truth; and it is inherent in the 
conservative way of viewing things that the Truth is not for man to know.”14
Such an understanding of natural law recognized an unseen order protective of 
the “permanent things” and with the unchanging transcendent at its foundation. “When 
the time is out of joint,” the teachings of traditionalists such as Cicero and Aquinas about 
the “law of nature” might “diminish man’s inhumanity unto man.”
 Kirk’s 
arguments and phraseologies in advocacy of localism, civility, mystery, virtue, and the 
good did not advance specific solutions but were constructed to advance sentiment and 
“humility.” Such dispositions he connected with his understanding of natural law, as 
informed by historical example.  
15 Kirk’s extended 
deliberation of Cicero in The Roots of American Order commended him as a “man of 
brilliance” and a “model of republican virtue.” Each “weary” of empire, he believed that 
“with Cicero fell the Republic.”16 He articulated that Cicero’s works contained the most 
detailed of early discussions of natural law. Kirk defined the Ciceronian awareness of 
natural law as recourse to the laws of nature, that which kept Roman law from becoming 
archaic as Roman society changed. With its “harmonious character and facility for 
reasoned enlargement,” Rome’s natural law tradition outlasted its unstable political 
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structures. Human laws, he wrote, were only copies of natural laws. “Those eternal laws 
are peculiar to man, for only man, on earth, is a rational being. The test of validity for 
the state’s laws is their conformity to reason.” For Kirk, the “natural law” was the 
interpretation of the “customary” or “positive law” in the light of “general ethical 
principles.” Natural law was not a written code, but rather a means for doing justice by 
referring to the general norms for mankind.17
Kirk and Cicero 
  
In finding a kinship with Cicero, a man he wrote of as strongly attached to 
tradition, prudence, precedent, and constitutional order, and in highlighting the influence 
of his thought upon the American founders, Kirk was able to locate Cicero comfortably 
within his own notion of an American founding of British and “Burkean” character. The 
“principles” of Roman law forming elements of Anglo common law, a practice superior, 
for example, to the revolutionary zeal of France, was a common theme of his writings. In 
America’s British Culture, he wrote: “British and American jurisprudence was much 
influenced, formerly at least, by the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero; and British 
judges, reading Roman law surreptitiously despite repeated fulminations from the 
Crown, were not immune from the doctrines of Gaius, Ulpian, and the Corpus Juris. But 
obviously the juridical system of the United States is not copied directly from the Roman 
system of courts and procedures, any more that the Constitution of the United States is 
an embodiment of Greek political philosophy.”18
In Kirk’s rendering, Cicero was part of a group of “ten exemplary conservatives, 
with much diversity of talents among them.” While acknowledging that the descriptive 
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word “conservative” was not a term of politics in antiquity, he wrote that Cicero the 
philologist might not have objected to the description, as the English word was derived 
from the Latin “conservator,” signifying one who preserves from injury, violence, and 
infraction. And as one who died for the “old Roman constitution,” he continued, those 
defending constitutional order have looked toward Cicero as their exemplar. Kirk held 
him in esteem for his devotion to the “natural, moral law.” At the end, “the high old 
Roman virtue was his.”19 As such, Cicero might legitimately be cited in a “conservative” 
context because he lived in a “Burkean” moment when everything was “going to hell” 
and he was trying to preserve traditions under siege at the crashing of his own 
civilization. And so I classify the great Roman orator, the great Irish statesman, and Kirk 
as part of the broad, humanistic, and stoic (and, later, Christian) tradition of the West – 
one that valued basic natural rights and was incessantly called into question by variations 
of utilitarian and utopian thinking.20 For Burke, one of the most monstrous errors of the 
French Revolution was the reference of political theory to a hypothetical, abstract of 
physical nature, man’s supposedly original state. And to remodel civil society from a 
supposedly simple and uniform original state was to ignore organically and locally 
developed differences, preferences, and loyalties.21 “By their violent haste and their 
defiance of the process of nature, they are delivered over blindly to every projector and 
adventurer, to every alchemist and empiric,”22
Although Burke felt his opponents did not grasp the distinction between 
“traditional” natural law in following in the shadow of Cicero and “revolutionary natural 
 Burke scolded the French National 
Assembly in Reflections.  
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rights,” it has been argued by scholars that the parliamentarian understood this 
distinction from early efforts in France for large-scale revolution, and that the basis of 
his attacks on the revolutionists were the violations of the “natural law.” He believed that 
moral arguments should be drawn from “human nature,” not abstract reasoning; and civil 
society was only “natural” in being demanded by human nature toward a social ideal 
attached to an established order and virtue.23 In Kirk’s conceptions, Burke advocated for 
a moral law whose archetype is found in God, derived from an eternal and immutable 
law and not imposed but gifted by a giving of nature impressed by invariable law. 
Francis Canavan wrote this view of natural law, which Burke most explicitly stated in 
his speech opening the Warren Hastings trial, was “strongly reminiscent of Cicero’s, but 
differs significantly from the Roman orator’s in that Burke assumes the Christian 
doctrine of divine creation as the source of the moral order.”24
 To examine the “Ciceronian” and “Burkean” relationship between what I have 
termed “rhetorical prudence” and “traditionalist conservative” public effect is not to only 
argue for the distinctiveness of Burke and Cicero as an influencer of a strand of modern 
political and social sentiment. It is to also chronicle an idealization of political 
constitution and an ancestral method of social existence relevant for its consistent, 
pervasive inspiration of sentiment in Kirk’s writings. Michael Leff’s article “Cicero’s 
Pro Murena and the Strong Case for Rhetoric” is a piece of scholarship that usefully 
explains the possibility of connecting the Roman’s rhetorical practice with “current 
issues in the study of rhetoric and public policy.” He writes that “Cicero delivered the 
pro Murena in 63 B.C.E., the year of his consulship, and in response to an extraordinary 
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set of circumstances.” This speech was an articulation of a philosophical approach to 
practice. Cicero’s rhetorical challenge was sensitive and difficult in execution: defend a 
guilty party being prosecuted by friends and allies. According to Leff: “He needed to 
make a sufficiently plausible legal defense for the jurors to vote as their prudential 
interests inclined them to vote. In order to succeed in this effort, he had to highlight the 
political implications of the case without violating the decorum of legal argument, and 
he had to weaken the authority of the two leading prosecutors, while, for political and 
personal reasons, he could not offend them deeply or permanently.”25 Leff continues that 
readers “can attest to the rhetorical power of this blend,” of mixing “playful attacks 
against the professional and philosophical pursuits (but not the persons)” of the 
prosecutors, including the powerful Cato, “deadly serious emotional appeals,” and “deft 
maneuvering around the specific legal issues.” Even so, Cicero’s appeal need not be read 
as “pure, unalloyed examples of rhetorical manipulation.”26 The content and organizing 
principles of the speech were not ideologist but rather, in Leff’s conclusion, “a kind of 
judgment specifically connected with prudence, decorum, and action where rhetorical 
skills are seen not just as instruments of persuasion but as equipment for living.”27
And so a plausible case might be made, despite the absence in ancient Rome of 
direct resemblances of modern Western constitutional liberty, for a “Ciceronian” support 
of the idea, and of the lived sentiment, of values to be faithfully commemorated. These 
would include tradition, guidance by accumulated wisdom, constitutionalism, and a civic 
republican vision of the orator as an “ethical representative” in the formation and 
endurance of a beneficial community of persons in association. Through the undertaking 
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of an ancestral attachment to the generalizations of the uncertain, dangerous public 
spheres of Cicero and Burke, the persuasions and ethics of these two figures lead, I 
believe, down a similar path, facilitating Kirk’s imaginative, literary kinship of shared 
sentiments.28
Tradition and historical appeals, in other words, could serve as a sturdy 
foundation in a confusing world. In defending counsel-elect Murena against electoral 
malpuractice, Cicero’s task to neutralize the authority of Cato and Sulpicius without 
earning their antipathy was dependent not upon facts but upon character. According to 
James May, this source of argumentative material “comes closest of all Ciceronian 
speeches to the native Latin oratorical tradition that appears to have valued the character 
of the litigants more highly than the facts in establishing one’s case.” Further, his oratory 
continuously appealed to traditional Roman political and social contexts.
 This was a path of skepticism and uncertainty, a sense that there was core 
of mystery to the human experience, and a sense that story and imagery can persuade at 
least as well as logical, more strictly factual arguments.  
29 Connecting 
such rhetorical practice with contemporary issues in the study of rhetoric and public 
policy is a de-emphasis of “facts” and an emphasis of custom. The emphasis of ethos 
and custom positions the orator (even if indirectly given the absence of such a claim as a 
part of the speech) as an example to be emulated, as a living personification of a high 
value. From the first of the speech, Cicero seeks to establish his own claim to be the one 
who upholds and practices what is morally and properly Roman.30
Today I pray again to those same immortal gods that Murena’s acquittal may preserve 
him for his consulship, that your opinion given in your verdict may tally with the wishes 
 “Speaking a few 
words on my own behalf,” Cicero stated: 
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of the Roman people expressed in their votes, and that this agreement may bring peace, 
calm, and tranquility and harmony to yourselves and to the people of Rome. Believing 
that that customary election prayer, hallowed by the auspices taken by a counsel, has the 
force and religious weight that the majesty of the Republic demands, I prayed too that 
the election over which I presided should bring to the successful candidates all good 
fortune and prosperity. Accordingly, gentlemen, since the immortal gods have either 
transferred to you their whole power or at least have allowed you to share it, I now 
commend to your protection the counsel whom I previously entrusted to the immortal 
gods. He will thus be defended by the voice of the man who declared him consul and 
preserve along with the office conferred upon him by the Roman people the safety of 
yourselves and of the whole citizen body.31
 
 
The appeal to authority of Cicero’s defense, his own and that of the Republic, 
was a call for a precarious community of political and social process to remain united by 
commonly held, civic principles of justice. The appreciation of these principles was 
necessary to maintain order for the Roman commonwealth. Conceding the prestige of 
Cato, “the root and core of the whole prosecution,” his speech attacked a flaw that might 
assist prosecutorial abuse, a commitment to an austere version of Stoic philosophy that 
could, Leff writes, “manifest itself as inflexible, rigid adherence to principle that renders 
these men unable to exercise prudent judgment and adapt to changing circumstances.” 
The systematic contrast between his agility in handling circumstances and the more 
inflexible positions of his opponents suggests that his rhetorical sensibility is not just a 
means to win cases but a kind of political virtue as well.32
I do not like a prosecutor to come into court with overweening power, an excessive 
force, overwhelming influence or too much popularity. Let all these assets be used to 
deliver the innocent, protect the weak and help those in trouble; for the trail and 
destruction of fellow-citizens, let them be rejected. Yet it will perhaps be said that Cato 
would not have agreed to prosecute had he not first reached his decision upon the case. It 
will be creating an unjust precedent, gentlemen, and a wretched state of affairs for men 
on trial if the prosecutor’s judgment is to count against the defendant as presumption of 
guilt.
 Cicero stated that “wise and 
far-sighted jurors” have always resisted conduct similar to Cato’s condemnations: 
33 
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Cicero’s implicit warning was to watch what could become of the Republic. This 
manner of posturing, the presentation of guidelines for caution and pleas for good 
conduct as informed by history and tradition, inspired Kirk. The Roots of American 
Order in particular investigated alternatives, within the context of natural law and 
revelation, to the equation of right with human will, and justice with power. Kirk’s 
reliance on natural law and revelation was sourced in skepticism of the promises of rigid 
ideology and of the motives of a fallen humanity. Modernity, on the whole, was for him 
shoddy and shallow, hopelessly unmoored.34
Yet Kirk approved, in circumstances such as the American Declaration of 
Independence or an attempted German overthrow of their genocidal dictator, of a 
Ciceronian appeal to fight an entrenched order that has ceased to recognize “the moral 
law, the law of right reason, the law of man’s nature, the source of justice.”
 Faith in natural law, and in a revealed yet 
mysterious transcendence, upheld moral and social order. Cicero’s warning, Kirk wrote, 
must be on the minds of the modern American. His Cicero lamented beloved Rome and 
found it wanting due to a descent of morality and to the public corruption aided by 
unscrupulous laws. For Kirk, a good commonwealth requires virtuous citizens, which 
was an increasingly difficult calling during a time when the old morality was battered by 
political disorder and corruption. His reading of the famed orator claimed him as 
“anything but a revolutionary.”  
35 
Nonetheless, there is a difficulty and a reason why I term his historical and political 
writing “imaginative” and “literary” ahead of other characterizations. This is the lack of 
an in-depth, consistent treatment of how a person may discover, apprehend and obey the 
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dictates of natural law. It may be that Kirk for his purposes was satisfied to only state 
that moral principles embodied in the natural law tradition were worth pursuing 
personally and civically. If so, the epistemological complexities centered upon concepts 
of intuition and human reasoning were not as much of a concern.36
 In suggesting that the commonality of historical appeals, the valuation of 
transcendent “natural law” traditions,
 He confidently 
assumed, in The Roots of American Order as elsewhere, that natural law traditions 
beginning with Jewish revelation were of a supreme and divine origin, their moral 
precepts wholly consistent with “permanent things.” This confidence is unlikely to be 
matched by those not in accords with such sentiment, rendering his persuasions more 
limited than they might otherwise be.  
37 and skepticism of ideological-based power as 
“civilization collapses” placed Cicero and Burke in line with a directly similar set of 
sentiments of traditionalist conservatism, it is important to realize that Kirk “thought in 
images.” One critic argued that “it is not merely an obvious affection for Edmund Burke 
that links Russell Kirk with the eighteenth century;” there is also a literary and inventive 
style, a versatility of a “of a more leisurely age” that makes him an odd fit for the 
historians of his century.38
My ‘historicism’ (something of a devil-term), or my repairing to historical sources of 
understanding of the human condition, is not really produced by a belief that everything 
grows out of process; rather, I began to relish historical studies, particularly of a 
philosophical bent, quite early in life – and I write about what I know. I agree with John 
Lukacs, in his Historical Consciousness, that historical writing may become the chief 
mode of literary expression in the dawning age – and may work a renewal of our 
apprehension – of the inner order and the outer order. The future is unknowable, and the 
present escapes as I sit at this typewriter: so the past, including past revelation and the 
 His response, illuminative of his treatment of Cicero and 
Burke, is worth quoting from at length: 
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insights of dead men, is our principal source of wisdom. We work within our limitations, 
and I never have obtained the prophetic afflatus.39
 
 
To understand Kirk’s writing, I believe, it is necessary to understand his firm, 
consistent opposition to utilitarianism and reductionism. He professed Cicero to have 
lived in a “Burkean” moment, as the motifs of moral imagination and permanent things 
crumbled against enemies of a moral and constitutional civic republicanism. This is 
“what he knew” – threats to “inner order” and “outer order,” an opposition to the proper 
ordering of the soul that extended virtue out into the public sphere. Leff agrees that in 
Britain and the United States Cicero has been appropriated by some conservatives,40 and 
the legitimacy of doing so is not the point as much as a demonstration of how a 
constituted meaning was grounded in history for the sake of persuasive legitimacy. This, 
combined with Kirk’s imagery, memorable and vivacious language, poetic sense, and 
repetitive consistency, resulted in a contemplative analysis of “Ciceronian” idealism that 
a reader inclined to the same sort of traditionalist sentiment might find formidable. 
Utilitarianism and reductionism were not, he communicated across his four decades as a 
professional writer and “man of letters,” principled; they were coldly destructive to the 
human spirit which desired to follow an unseen moral and social order.41
 In thinking through Cicero as an inspiration for traditionalist conservatism, what 
it means for an orator to “serve ethically” begins with the setting of an example. Leff 
 The mysteries 
of existence guided toward skepticism of planners and abstractions for those who value 
principles of “enduring order”: following the threads of classical thought, knowledge 
and respect for tradition and generational wisdom as a leading requisite for public office, 
protections of constitutionalism, and an ethical conduct of public oratory.   
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characterizes Cato’s prosecution as a “systematic philosophy” and a “rigid, purified ethic 
that would suppress pleasure to the demands of reason.” By contrast, “Cicero retorted 
that Romans inhabit a different, more comfortable ethical world, one in which values 
oscillate, where pleasure and toil alternate, where duties are understood in relation to a 
realistic assessment of occasions and situations.” Such is a political ethic “conveyed 
through tradition and connected to a living culture.”42 In Kirk’s conceptions, traditions 
are living; and a means for change is a means for conservation. The means for change, 
however, were “Ciceronian” in the resistance of turning idealism to formula and 
ideology and in the long-lived embodiment of a rooted civic sentiment. Causes of public 
decay were directly related to a decline of moral virtue. I believe it makes sense that 
Kirk would model himself after Cicero and Burke, statesmen who lived by a conception 
of what the good citizen is (even to the edge of public disgrace) and defenders of public 
order amid the threats of chaos. This is how the popularizer and imaginative organizer of 
American traditionalist conservatism, the man who once signed a letter to a historian 
“Cordially, Marcus Tellius Kirk,”43 viewed his role as a public figure – his “virtue” was 
self-conscious and stoic, with an air of falsehood for those not inclined to share his 
assumptions and biases.44
Cicero’s passage of warning, full of rhetorical flourish, was reminiscent of Kirk 
in its attack on judgment and in its regretful bemoan for a deficit of cautionary prudence. 
Among the communicative points of Cicero was the presentation of a different example, 
one of necessity in the preservation of the community good, for “the Trojan horse is 
within our walls; yes, within our very walls; but never while I am counsel will you be 
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surprised in your sleep”: “You say that the public interest led you to start proceedings. I 
readily, accept, Cato, that you have been brought here by your well-known patriotism 
and by the belief that it was in the national interest, but you slip up because you did not 
stop to think. What I am doing, gentlemen, I am doing not only out of friendship with 
Lucius Murena and for his good name but also for the sake of peace, quite, unity, liberty, 
our preservation, in short the very lives of us all. This I publicly declare and I call upon 
you to bear witness to it.”45 A republican constitution as a living example of an ideal 
acclaimed by great minds, writes Thomas Mitchell, was for Cicero a guarantee of the 
rights and liberties inherent in the definition of resublica and necessary to satisfy the 
inherent political needs in the nature of man.46
For Cicero, the safeguards in the laws and traditions of the Roman Republic 
should be in accord with the higher aspects of human nature, that which differentiates 
man from other animals. An orderly regulation, as demanded by nature, granted an 
appreciation of beauty and harmony, impelling achievement in the world. Mitchell 
writes of Cicero’s idea of a “balanced regulation of the appetitive soul by reason:” 
“More specifically, it meant the presence in human actions of order, consistency, and 
moderation arising out of a state of soul in which the appetites and impulses were in 
harmony with each other and with the soul’s controlling power, reason.”
  
47 And it is by 
the espousal of a “moderated” wisdom as informed by custom and tradition (albeit for 
Kirk one infused by “Judeo-Christian” revelation) that some modern conservatives have 
claimed Cicero and Burke, just as any figure seen to “reason” from moral arguments 
drawn from human nature might be claimed by those seeking to ground their opinions in 
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history.48
 It might also be argued that Cicero’s rhetorical conduct developed arguments for 
a “natural sociability” that inspired Kirk’s “communitarian” and “traditionalist” mindset. 
Joy Connolly contends that Cicero is a “peculiarly communal vision of the body in 
action in the public view.” The reason is that a “Platonic concern with the internal state 
of the soul” was supplemented “with an emphasis on how the whole self appears to 
others.”
 Kirk’s building of a historical story as part of a larger persuasive effort (or, 
perhaps, as part of a claim to legitimacy) placed Burke as its foundation and was 
inclusive of Cicero through an admiration for his skepticism of governing powers and 
embrace of tradition within the context of an “anti-rationalist” sentiment that looked to 
the institutions of history for guidance.  
49 George H. Nash, a historian of American conservatism, has contended that 
Kirk’s persuasions originated from a lived persona embedded in his upbringing. Heavily 
influenced by classical literature and philosophy from adolescence, his fascination with 
“old things” was an inspirational element directly applied to the conduct of professional 
and personal life. Although some thought he was “too self-consciously anti-modern,” 
engaging in an antiquated posture and pose too far beyond the mainstream (which was a 
barrier to persuasion), Nash believes he genuinely “possessed the power to inhabit 
different parts of the past.”50
Surveying the course of Kirk’s writing career, one finds the constant call for 
prudence and historical guidance as sociable persons, born into an inescapable social 
 And although the parallels and inspiration drawn from 
Kirk’s conduct and writing are clearer with Burke, I still detect a self-conscious 
application of “classic” (that is, Ciceronian) rhetorical public effect.  
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world, seek association and engage in community action. Similarly, Connolly writes that 
key to Cicero’s views about republican citizenship and the relationship to ethical self-
formation was a view of citizenship, like eloquence, which “is the practice of spectacular 
virtue in the course of an active life in the setting of a political community.” This is to 
say that Cicero was not principally concerned in his rhetorical writings with the ethical 
formation of the private individual. He was also concerned with a civic ideal whose 
dynamic was reflective of the republican constitution.51
Though all would admit that the present is necessarily shaped by the past, attitudes 
toward the inherited vary, and those attitudes in turn govern behavior. Respect for 
ancestry, heritage, or tradition determines concretely the emphasis placed on the study of 
history, languages, and art, and on the observance of religious and civic ritual. Cicero, 
reflecting on qualifications for leadership in the commonwealth, made a knowledge of 
and respect for tradition a prime requisite for office. Such knowledge is required of those 
who would assume positions of leadership for without it they will have no framework 
from which to judge. For to judge is to measure, to compare, to assess. Judging requires 
a standard against which a measure is taken. For more than one generation Russell Kirk 
has been both a Livy and a Cicero leading his readers to an appreciation of the time-
transcendent.
 The reasoning of my association 
of such a sentiment with more modern thinkers (meaning thinkers of the liberal Western 
tradition claimed by conservatives, beginning with Burke) is scrutinized further in other 
chapters, but a quotation by philosopher Jude P. Dougherty contains an apt summation 
of how some sympathizers connected Kirk to the past:   
52
 
  
For historian Forrest McDonald and several others who paid tribute to Kirk 
shortly after his death, the mission of this “Bohemian Tory” was to enrich the American 
conservative tradition by seeking the wisdom of their intellectual ancestors. The 
inventiveness of this enterprise was to correlate and defend the circumstances and 
challenges of those figures to contemporary times. At the foundation of these 
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connections were the sentiments McDonald has summarized as follows: belief in a 
transcendent moral order, social continuity, the principle of prescription, prudential and 
natural change as opposed to coerced change on the basis of abstract theoretical systems, 
acceptance of variety and inequality following the imperfectability of humanity and a 
view of society as a living organism, rejection of the mechanistic model of society 
fashionable in the eighteenth century, and a distrust of social and political tampering as 
the communities of society work to heal ailments absent the heavy hand of government. 
Casting aside some views tempting to those weary of large government, Kirk was an 
articulate defender of society as a vibrant reflector of order.53
 For Kirk, who looked to Cicero as the exemplar defender of constitutional order, 
such were the models of virtue that should endure in the conservative’s consciousness. 
He urged the American conservative movement, ever tempted by ideology, to follow 
Cicero’s exhortation and example, referring to the defense of the “moral imagination” 
and the “permanent things.”
 
54 By this view, conservatism in modern societies as a 
reactionary force was not a reaction based on an overly nostalgic romance with the past 
and distrust for efforts of reform and change. It was, more precisely, an attitude toward 
social existence that encouraged acceptance of the realities and limitations of the human 
condition through a respect for the “passed down” orders, beginning with a transcendent 
one. Herein is Kirk’s claim to Cicero and Burke as “exemplary conservatives.” Leff 
distinguishes Cicero’s rhetorical conduct as one of complexity and multiple functions, 
and as a place “where prudence and rhetoric meet in action.”55 Kirk, I think, likewise 
recognized this as he sought to emulate “prudence” in his persuasive writing and 
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persona, and as he wrote about Cicero and Burke. The rhetoric of Burke, he wrote in his 
biography of T.S. Eliot, was permeated by a distinguishing of the savage from the 
civilized through a possession of the moral imagination; and drawn from centuries of 
human history and shared experience, “these ideas of the moral imagination are 
expressed afresh from age to age.”56
Kirk’s Ethical Perceptions 
  
An enduring source of inspiration that elevated to “first principles” as it guided 
towards virtue, wisdom, and ultimately redemption, this imagination was ultimately for 
Kirk an ethical perception. Given the aim of his “moral imagination” to apprehend the 
most enduring and proper order of the soul and of the community, as poet or an artist 
might exercise their talents – beyond the barriers of private experience and momentary 
events57 – it is not surprising he would take pieces of consequential historical figures for 
the purposes of persuasive application to the problems of contemporary times. It was 
Kirk’s view, after all, that few problems were truly new, given the inevitable 
disappointments of a fallen human nature. And remedies, just as in antiquity, required 
the articulation of words. Through, in part, the strength and attractiveness of language 
and argument were ideas and sentiments born. Political principles cannot be dissociated 
from the methods of persuasion, he wrote, and some genuine connection should subsist 
between the “order of rhetoric” and the “order of society.” Otherwise, “false phrases” 
open the way to “false measures.”58 The utilization of apt words in effective arrangement 
was Kirk’s imitation of Cicero and Burke, among other “conservative” leaders.  
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The “permanent things” of truth, goodness, beauty, and love endured because 
they moved the soul of a person deeply and inexpressibly, like a word of poetry or art. 
And the “good” rhetorician knew this, instinctively, weaving insight with effectiveness. 
In Kirk’s mind, he, Cicero, and Burke were like a lamp lighting the way for the “better 
angels” of human nature. And the act of speaking was an ethical enterprise, as rhetoric at 
its best seeks union with permanent things.59 Cicero often spoke to an audience 
knowledgeable of rhetoric. A large part of the orator’s audience shared with him an 
education in the art of persuasion.60 This point is relevant to Burke and Kirk in that their 
audiences were likewise narrow and educated; the former speaking most famously to 
constituent voters and parliamentarians and the latter communicating through speech and 
writing most effectively to those of “traditionalist temperament.”61 The shared sentiment 
and action Kirk might have described as transcendent was a public effect of ethical 
conduct and accomplishment advocating for wisdom. In his dialogue On the Character 
of the Orator, Cicero stated: “In my opinion, indeed, no man can be an orator possessed 
of every praiseworthy accomplishment, unless he has attained the knowledge of every 
thing important, and of all liberal arts, for his language must be ornate and copious from 
knowledge, since, unless there be beneath the surface matter understood and felt by the 
speaker, oratory becomes an empty and almost puerile flow of words.”62
The influence of Roman rhetoric upon the political traditions of Britain and the 
United States is a vast, fascinating topic. Scholars will continue to discuss how the 
 Kirk took from 
these famed orators a public function of character, one self-created and organized around 
his sentiments of order and decency.  
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rhetoricians of antiquity used rhetoric to think through public concerns in ways relevant 
to more “modern” claims that citizens possess the capacity to act as interpreters and 
enforcers of public morality and civic identity. The “speaking self” of Enlightenment 
liberalism included texts of rhetoric that speak, according to Connolly, “a language 
generated out of and generating communal and reciprocal truth; these texts insist on the 
importance of the style of the verbal connectives that construct us as political entities in 
a community.” The reason is that language gives the self possession of a critical self-
directedness, a command of cultural ideals, a capacity to conform to impersonal rules 
and moral norms, and a resolve to act on the basis of personal deliberation. Cicero’s 
narratives were with eloquence, and thus with community.63
In other words, Kirk’s outlook was an approach to civic affairs of a “conservative 
mentality.” This way of perceiving the social and political world, as Neal Wood has 
written of Cicero’s social and political thought, was the idealization of the ancestral 
constitution and ancestral life as fashioned by previous generations. “It is the sacred 
archetype of social truth and civic virtue, an awesome monad of morality and utility 
from which we deviate at our own peril. Our social and moral duty is to safeguard and 
adapt such a priceless inheritance to present circumstances, and ready it for passage to 
posterity.”
 I argue that Kirk, in 
following heroes such as Cicero and Burke, as in his own conjectures, similarly (even if 
inadvertently) articulated a philosophical and ethical approach to practice. This approach 
conveyed that to abuse language was to abuse reality and to harm the formation of an 
enduring, satisfying associational sociability.  
64 A purpose of the state was its people’s preservation in their traditions, in the 
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observation of values such as fidelity to family, friends, and country. Tradition, defined 
Jaroslav Pelikan, was the living faith of the dead, and traditionalism remains the dead 
faith of the living. Throughout human history it has provided the perennial themes and 
the key metaphors by which creative expression has been preserved from trivialization 
and banality.65 The American intellectual conservative tradition contained wide room for 
inclusion of an array of argument and practice, some of them (especially on foreign and 
monetary policy) directly in contradiction with one another. Others include intellectual 
and moral excellence, worry that democratic practices and egalitarian norms threaten 
individual liberty, the claims of religion and its ensuing role in citizen education, defense 
of market-orientations such as capitalism, and stinging critiques of the atomization and 
radicalism of capitalism to established orders.66
In light of these traditions, Kirk’s connection of principle to the methods of 
persuasion, and of rhetorical order to societal order, is difficult to generalize. This is due 
to the lack of an exhaustive, systematic approach. There were, instead, dispositions and 
sentiments, appeals to history, and poetic touches in the conjuring of imagery. And yet 
the word tradition is, I suggest, relevant to the Roman republicanism of antiquity when 
accepted on Kirk’s terms. Skepticism of planners and rationalists, then as now, takes one 
to the long-developed, continuous discussions of heritage and natural right, to the dead 
faiths of the living as a refuge from the hubristic confusions of the world. Engaged 
imaginatively, the informed rhetorician speaking to enduring truths and accumulated 
wisdom was a dominant, robust energy for the good. This was an aid to the progression 
of a more true liberty and economic freedom, for he thought that prescriptive freedom 
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cannot endure without a moral order. And therein, I believe, was Kirk’s admiration for 
the cautious constitutionalism of Cicero and Burke. In their persuasions, he discovered 
eloquence for a coherent and beneficial freedom, one sanctioned by and in conformity 
with a transcendent moral order. The pursuit of individual desire was to only gratify the 
temporary and fleeting, a servile to appetite.  
Intellect, art, and morals were not, for Kirk, distinct. Those eras in which 
humanity extended their devotion to excessive production and social planning were 
usually “punished by bad taste and bad morals.”67 Finding a “common patrimony” with 
Roman sources (and with Cicero especially) he placed in the public sphere the idea of a 
healthy tension between the claims of order and the claims of freedom, to be reconciled 
with an accumulated wisdom beginning with the Hebrew and Greek philosophers. He 
held that across time, intellectual communities formed by natural law doctrines and great 
works of humane literature formed an ethical cast that worked upon the imagination, 
teaching what it means to be human. This was the common faith, common system of law 
and politics, and common body of literature that made one civilization of normative and 
that built cultural bonds outlasting dynasties, empires, and philosophies. Naming Cicero 
and Burke as defenders of the “unbought grace of life, Kirk hailed them as thinkers 
forced in times of trouble to examine first principles as they attempted to avoid the 
imminent collapse of order and restore a measure of justice and security.68 And in 
assuming that man’s “most profound longings are for eternal verities and a high justice 
that governs all things,” he updated for his audience a “Christian and Ciceronian concept 
of Divine Justice.”69  
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Kirk’s positioning of Cicero was, throughout his writings, in the context of a 
“just society.” Cicero represented a “higher form of republicanism” – preserving the 
charitable aims of democratic ideals but talking of order, duty, and honor. As the forms 
of government suit the traditions and organic experiences of the people, he thought the 
freedom of Burke and Cicero does “not stoop to the degradation of the democratic 
dogma; it will not contest the sovereignty of God, which is absolute over us all.” 
Humanity, following natural law harmonious with proper order, need not be reduced to 
“the condition of equipollent units upon the dreary plain of absolute equality.” The 
making of “truly human persons,” something more than a “production-consumption 
equation,” required joining alongside the investigations into questions of moral worth of 
such figures – which schools are loath to do.70 Kirk applauded the Roman orator as one 
opposed to the troubling currents of his age that should inspire students to what Cicero, 
in On the Character of the Orator, termed “a judgment arising from a natural sense of 
what is right.”71
 To extract from Cicero judgments applicable to the arguments of American 
conservatism and to the concerns of modern societies is to employ the imagination. It 
makes more sense as a matter of substance and consistency when Kirk’s veneer – that is, 
his worldview, including his persona – is embraced. Roman men of rhetoric and 
philosophy, he wrote in his memoirs, found it their duty to “enter ardently into the 
politics of the commonwealth.” But as a man of letters possessing no political talent or 
administrative ability, Kirk followed their example through a refurbishment of 
imagination, so as to infuse into the era “some element of poetry.” His history was not 
  
  
130 
“historical” as a historian might approach the discipline. Surveying Kirk’s career 
(particularly his retelling of the past), the distinctiveness of Burke and Cicero is found in 
the frequency and consistency of his positive reference.72
His disdain for rational social and political planning and high regard for custom 
and tradition sought validation in many figures, but first and foremost, to judge from his 
output of socio-political writing, in Burke and Cicero. Secular venerations of such 
statesman might endeavor to rouse, Kirk wrote, the political and moral imagination 
among the shapers of public opinion, those who through force or argument influence by 
the strength of their convictions.
 The bearing of their “natural 
law” advocacy bore fruit for traditionalist conservatism through Kirk’s considerations of 
the sentiments, biases, and postures of locality, civility, caution, mystery, virtue, civic 
morality, and the common good.  
73 But for Kirk, rhetoric, like all exercises of the human 
imagination, must be tied to ethical ends. If a serious consideration of such ends were 
not present, he thought language could decay into an instrument of undue coercion. In a 
lament and of the upheavals of modernity, the cultural fracturing stemming from 
atomizing intensities like capitalism, he practiced a “rhetoric of imagination” fused with 
and responsive to current circumstance.74
 The rhetorical imagination of words and a lived persona, seeking to keep 
rationality from making materialists of humanity, instituted for readers and those 
sympathetic to its sentiments what might be termed a religious consecration of civic life 
because moral order and political order depended upon one another. In such a 
 To neglect an inheritance in such a manner, 
Kirk imparted, was to be a part of its dissolution.  
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persuasion, society was sustained by an ill-defined “natural order,” while the imperative 
was more unambiguous. Reacting to the ideologies, as well as to the perceived 
confusions and hubris of modernity, Kirk took history and molded what I termed a 
“poetic” fabric of literary imagery in his calls to action. He colorfully, and even 
cheerfully, praised and condemned, offering himself as a representative of a more ethical 
and enduring civic community, as a heir (insofar as there could be one) of great orators 
and statesman like Cicero and Burke. Read the speeches of antiquity and the writings of 
exemplary historical conservatives, he recommended, for their spurning of materialism 
and individualism was not a path to be deviated from. Those traditions of lasting benefit 
did not survive as inward, shallow, or temporary bursts of status; they were the voices of 
the past still alive and speaking truths consonant to the betterment of the human 
condition. In the arguments and rhetorical conduct of Cicero and Burke, he discovered a 
bond of duty and moral obligation. This bond was the determination to guard the fragile 
civic inheritances of the past through inventive arguments of rights and order.  
Kirk and Burke 
Despite writing about several figures of antiquity such as Cicero, Kirk’s 
“political thought,” the sentiments and postures of locality, civility, caution, mystery, 
virtue, morality, and the good, were sourced, first and foremost, in Edmund Burke. As a 
graduate student at St. Andrews University in Scotland, he developed a deeper 
understanding and greater admiration for Burke, which would last a lifetime. Reflections 
on the Revolution in France served as the foundation for the traditionalism and anti-
utopianism of Kirk’s conservative principles. A disposition to preserve wisdom, and a 
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careful consideration of the “how” of societal improvement, especially when state served 
as the organizing force, appealed to his anti-modern and rural sensibility. According to 
the British philosopher Roger Scruton, what distinguished Burke from the French 
revolutionaries was not his attachment to things past, but rather his desire to live fully in 
the concrete present, to understand the present in all its imperfections, and to accept the 
present as the only reality that is available. Kirk, seeing a straight line from Burke to 
T.S. Eliot, drew attention to a similarity he viewed as essential to conservative thought. 
Simple nostalgia, humans longingly and emotionally looking back in time, was often just 
one more form of modern sentimentality. But a genuine tradition, which granted the 
courage and the vision to live well in the modern world, was fragile and worthy of 
protection.75
In speeches to Parliament such as his call for conciliation with America, 
delivered in March 1775, Burke put forward his view that it was foolish to insist upon 
abstract rights divorced from history and practicality. He was an advocate of liberty as 
an inheritance and as a product of natural law, writing in Reflections: “I am not here 
going into the distinctions of rights, not attempting to mark their boundaries, I do not 
enter into these meta-physical distinctions. I hate the very sound of them. This is the true 
touchstone of all theories which regard man and the affairs of man: does it suit his nature 
in general? Does it suit his nature as modified by his habits?”
 As Kirk saw it, such was the charge of the “Burkean conservative.”  
76 The constitution of a 
state and the distribution of its coercive force required delicate and complicated skill – 
knowledge of human nature and the organization of human necessities. His treatment of 
rights assumed that if civil society was an offspring of custom and convention, such 
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conventions must appear in law and provide boundaries for the powers – legislative, 
judicial, or executive – that are in the end the offspring of a final judge. For Burke, “one 
of the first motives of civil society, and which becomes one of its fundamental rules, is 
that no man should be judge in his own cause.”77
The tradition-minded balance of individual rights with a social order respectful of 
long-standing community norms and institutions greatly appealed to Kirk. It was his 
sense that the traditions of a society were not easily reinvented and could be applied 
without unpredictable and possibly disastrous consequences. These traditions were made 
by a collective wisdom developed over long periods of time. They were prejudices 
difficult to understand and articulate in any comprehensive way, even as they existed for 
the sake of social stability. There was no perfected past or perfectible future; there was 
no lost cause because there were no gained causes. Change – always necessary given the 
evils lurking within the human condition – must occur cautiously and humbly. This 
notion does not exclude rapid change, especially in cases of clear infringements upon 
human dignity, but rather opposes change based on an abstracted theory. Likewise, 
tradition should not be maintained at all costs or for its own sake. But it should be 
accorded a high measure of deference and an assumption of validity. For Kirk, the man 
who served for three decades as a respected Member of Parliament was a statesman 
because he was a wise and prophetic “philosopher in action,” and although he was a 
chief architect of the modern political-party system, one who transcended partisanship. 
In one of his early books, Edmund Burke: A Genius Reconsidered, Kirk wrote: 
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“Suspicious through he was, from first to last, of abstract doctrine and theoretic dogma, 
Burke has obtained immortality not for what he did, but for what he perceived.”78
What was perceived and rhetorically defended was a “Ciceronian” and Christian 
doctrine of natural law. Kirk approvingly quoted from Burke’s denunciation of Warren 
Hastings, a powerful figure in the East India Company: “We are all born in subjection, 
all born equally, high and low, governours and governed, in subjection to one great, 
immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all our devices, and prior to all our contrivances, 
paramount to all out ideas, and all our sensations, antecedent to our very existence, by 
which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame of the Universe, out of which we 
cannot stir.”
  
79 Throughout the book, Kirk displayed his admiration that Burke “usually 
reasoned from circumstance to principle: that is, he saw the things and the men, and then 
sought for general principles to apply to present discontents…Detesting arbitrary 
exercise of political power, Burke was led into the four great struggles of his life – this 
effort to obtain conciliation with the American colonies, his participation in the 
Rockingham Whigs’ contest against the domestic power of George III, his prosecution 
of Warren Hastings, and his impassioned resistance against Jacobinism, the ‘armed 
doctrine.’”80 Reading the biography, one senses the aim for an intellectual kinship as 
Kirk covered the major controversies of his mentor’s long and influential political, 
literary, and philosophical career. The resistance of claims of abstract right upon 
metaphysical premises and governing by notions of perfectibility, the distaste for 
scientific materialism and romantic sentimentality, and the defense of a historical civil 
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order were among the themes of Burke highlighted by his biographer that would also 
appear recurrently in the drama of Kirk’s own life and work.  
Both authors found compelling the considerations of worthy and destructive 
revolutions. The Rockingham Whigs to which Burke devoted his political life were 
characterized by Kirk as opposed to arbitrary monarchical power, dubious of many of 
England’s overseas colonial adventures, and persistent in its advocacy of internal 
governmental reform. When Burke spoke of the Glorious Revolution as a “revolution 
not made, but prevented,” he meant that James II, the last Stuart king overthrown in a 
bloodless coup in 1688, was by his attempts to increase royal prerogatives the true 
revolutionary.81 The American Revolution, in contrast, was guided by prudence and 
prescription. The colonists sought to preserve and continue the English institutions of 
representative government and private rights, while fanaticism and vain expectations 
guided the French forward into the void of uncertainty and terror. Burke argued at the 
outbreak of trouble on the American continent that colonists were trying to conserve, not 
destroy, natural rights and liberties codified in law and custom over centuries. They did 
not seek to “claim fanciful liberties conjured up by closet philosophers; they were ‘not 
only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English principles,’ in Burke’s 
phrases. ‘Abstract liberty like other mere abstractions is not to be found. Liberty inheres 
in some sensible object.’”82
A “Burkean” philosophy of civil order, then, was not as devoted to particular 
policy outcomes as to the necessity of protection and a skeptical humility about the 
ability to effectuate change. A priori abstraction and reasoning were not to be trusted, 
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given the possibility of unintended, unpredictable, and unforeseen consequence. A 
distinguishing aspect of Burke’s variant of custom and constitutionalism was sensitivity 
to intermediary attachments between the individual and the state. According to 
philosopher and historian Richard Boyd, one treatment of Enlightenment civil society 
was largely synonymous with political society, where civil society is contractually 
formed by solitary individuals whose entry into the civil compact subsequently allows 
for the cultivation of nonpolitical attachments which can give life meaning. Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau were prominent examples of such a 
line of thought. A second meaning of civil society was more focused on attachments 
such as the family, the church, the political party, and commercial associations. These 
nonpolitical attachments were viewed as more fundamental than political unions to the 
cause of human fulfillment. Such intermediary attachments, formed organically over 
long periods of time, sought to be free from undue political interference.83
The conception of “reform conservatism” sought to solve problems in a way to 
avoid preventable harm and to prevent more radical reforms that might undermine the 
institutions, traditions, customs, norms, and practices developed in a free society. Such a 
society should be sustained, in other words, by responding to challenges with the aim of 
 Kirk would 
associate Burke with the second generalization, as his mentor combined a disposition to 
preserve with the ability to reform, and as he consistently advocated against the 
intolerant moral absolutism that can flow from political zeal and unmoored idealism. 
(Also in his popularization was the argument that Burke was a founding father of not 
only modern conservatism but the political party.)  
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cautious, measured reform in concert with the history of its people. Burke’s A Letter to a 
Noble Lord is worth quoting at length on this point. In explaining his purpose behind 
attempts at economic reform, he contends his aim was to solve a problem by responsible, 
modest means. He also wished to prevent others from using the existence of problems 
and the subsequent, understandable climate of reform to enact legislation he believed too 
mischievously vague. The French revolutionaries, Burke wrote, complained of 
everything and refused to reform anything. He suggested that government ministers 
abandoned wisdom and virtue, actual or presumptive. By contrast, responsible reform is 
“a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of:”  
I found a great distemper in the commonwealth; and, according to the nature of evil and 
of the object, I treated it. The malady was deep; it was complicated, in the causes and in 
the symptoms. Throughout it was full of contra-indicants. On one hand Government, 
daily growing more invidious for an apparent increase of the means of strength, was 
every day growing more contemptible by real weakness. Nor was this dissolution 
confined to Government commonly so called. It extended to Parliament; which was 
losing not a little in its dignity and estimation, by an opinion of its not acting on worthy 
motives. On the other hand, the desires of the People (partly natural and partly infused 
into them by art), appeared in so wild and inconsiderate a manner, with regard to the 
economical object (for I set aside for a moment the dreadful tampering with the body of 
the Constitution itself) that if their petitions had literally been complied with, the State 
would have been convulsed; and a gate would have been opened, through which all 
property might be sacked and ravaged. Nothing could have saved the Public from the 
mischiefs of the false reform but its absurdity; which would soon have brought itself, 
and with it all real reform, into discredit. This would have left a rankling wound in the 
hearts of the people who would know they had failed in the accomplishment of their 
wishes, but who, like the rest of mankind in all ages, would impute the blame to any 
thing rather than to their own proceedings. But there were then persons in the world, 
who nourished complaint; and would have been thoroughly disappointed if the people 
were ever satisfied. I was not of that humour. I wished that they should be satisfied. It 
was my aim to give to the People the substance of what I knew they desired, and what I 
thought was right whether they desired it or not, before it had been modified for them 
into senseless petitions. I knew that there is a manifest marked distinction, which ill men, 
with ill designs, or weak men incapable of any design, will constantly be confounding, 
that is, a marked distinction between Change and Reformation. The former alters the 
substance of the objects themselves; and gets rid of all their essential good, as well as of 
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all the accidental evil annexed to them. Change is novelty; and whether it is to operate 
any one of the effects of reformation at all, or whether it may not contradict the very 
principle upon which reformation is desired, cannot be certainly known beforehand. 
Reform is, not a change in the substance, or in the primary modification of the object, 
but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of. So far as that is 
removed, all is sure. It stops there; and if it fails, the substance which underwent the 
operation, at the very worst, is but where it was.84
 
 
By instituting radical, sweeping, quick reform, the French revolutionaries 
assaulted intermediary bodies standing between the individual and the state. For Burke, 
the most genuine construct of society was eternal, joining the dead, the living, and the 
unborn. Ordained by God, all participated in this spiritual and social partnership; social 
harmony came through a love of family and neighbor and a sense of duty. In his book on 
the American constitution, Rights and Duties, Kirk wrote of Burke’s declaration that 
society is a partnership, one unlike the commercialism for gain of private profit. “Human 
beings do have rights by virtue of their human nature; but those rights are not bloodless 
abstractions, nor are they limited to mere guarantees against government. To narrow 
natural rights to such neat slogans as ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ or ‘life, liberty, 
property,” Burke knew, was to ignore the complexity of public affairs and to leave out of 
consideration most moral relationships.”85 The evolved wisdom of society shaped the 
necessary ability to be restrained from actions destructive to themselves and their 
community – “the right to have some control put upon their appetites,” in the words of 
Kirk. One difference between the French Revolution and the Revolution of 1688, Burke 
wrote in Reflections, was that the latter was made to preserve “indisputable laws and 
liberties,” the ancient constitution of government which is the people’s security for law 
and liberty:  
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The very idea if the fabrication of a new government is enough to fill us with disgust and 
horror. We wished at the period of the Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all we 
possess as an inheritance from our forefathers. Upon that body and stock of inheritance 
we have taken care not to inoculate any scion alien to the nature of the original plant. All 
the reformations we have hitherto made, have proceeded upon the principle of reference 
to antiquity; and I hope, nay I am persuaded, that all those which possibly may be made 
hereafter, will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent, authority, and example.86
 
 
Burke’s disdain for the French attempt at a comprehensive break with the past 
and the building of a future based in part upon metaphysical ideas was seemingly a 
contrast with his sympathy to the cause of American separation from Britain. Even here, 
though, reform and efforts for compromise were his answer to colonist cries of 
independence, or to parliamentary and royalist belligerence. But Burke can ostensibly 
contradict himself when he discusses the American and the French revolutions, because, 
his writings suggest, he refers two different communities and two different traditions.87 
According to Kirk, although the framing of a philosophical system to refute the 
assumptions of egalitarianism was a “task uncongenial to Burke’s nature,” his lengthy 
argument articulating the difference of hostility and sympathy with two revolutions was 
a reply to three separate schools of thought embodied by the French Revolution: the 
rationalism of Enlightenment philosophers, the romantic sentimentalism of Rousseau 
and his disciples, and the utilitarianism of Bentham. The Conservative Mind argued that 
Burke knew himself to be contending against a “spirit of innovation possessed by of a 
recognizable general character.” The innovative spirits were: if a divine authority 
existed, it differs sharply in its nature from the Christian conception of an active, 
personal God; abstract reasoning or idyllic imagination may be employed to direct the 
course of social destiny; man is naturally benevolent and generous and yet corrupted by 
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institutions; the traditions of mankind are a tangled myth from which we can ascertain 
little; mankind, capable of constant improvement, should have be fixed upon the future; 
and the aim of a reformer, moral or political, is emancipation, a sort of liberation from 
old creeds, oaths, and establishments, while the citizen of the future is to rejoice in the 
possibilities of pure liberty and self-governance.88
 As a member of parliament and as a widely read writer, Burke wrote and spoke a 
frequently about constitutions. These words were focused upon the British and European 
constitutions; no record of his thoughts about the American Constitution of 1787 
survives. Kirk summarized Burke’s view of a “good constitution” as an organic, 
uncommon experience of a people over a considerable elapse of time – and that it is 
unwise to attempt to create an improved constitution out of whole cloth.
 Kirk viewed these glittering ideas as 
the powerful undercurrents of the “modernizational” government and social theory 
which Burke confronted – a politician nearly alone, as he saw it, as a prominent political 
and societal figure uneasy about the unintended, unforeseeable, but perhaps sadly 
predictable consequences.  
89 An enduring 
constitution was a product of the nation’s struggles, bringing about a need for religious 
faith so as to better maintain order: “We know, and, what is better, we feel inwardly, that 
religion is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good, and of all comfort.”90 A 
sound national constitution was the product of long, tested experience; and sweeping, 
sudden changes to the old may destroy ancient virtues instead of ending the inevitable 
vices. In surveying the landscape of France, Burke contended that a utopian, anti-
egalitarian movement might also destroy the natural aristocracies that serve, necessarily, 
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as an intermediary body between the individual and the state. Such an aristocracy, “the 
cheap defense of nations” provided for the leadership of the people. In An Appeal from 
the New to the Old Whigs, Burke wrote, “A true natural aristocracy is not a separate 
interest in the state, or separable from it. It is an essential integrant part of any large body 
rightly constituted. It is formed out of a class of legitimate presumptions, which, taken as 
generalities, must be admitted for actual truths.”91
Burke believed there must be the preservation of restraints upon the personal 
will. Explaining his belief that government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide 
for human wants, Burke wrote in Reflections:  
 An admirable constitution, then, 
maintains balance between the claims of freedom and the claims of order. From the 
natural law flow natural rights, even as government does not exist solely to defend the 
claims of personal liberty among its citizenry so that order may be maintained. 
Men have a right that these wants should be provide that these wants should be provided 
for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, 
of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the passions of 
individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the 
individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, 
and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be done by a power out of 
themselves, and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those 
passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense the restrains on men, as 
well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their very rights. But as the liberties and 
the restrictions vary with times and circumstances and admit to infinite modifications, 
they cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them 
upon that principle.92
 
 
Such a defense of the religious and community establishments which may stand in the 
way of politicizing the personal will places Burke at odds with the notion, present 
throughout the Enlightenment period, that a privatization of religious belief could work 
to eliminate the publicly ruinous consequences of a zealous secular or religious faith 
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(such as war). Despite this, Burke continuously defended the established Church of 
England and advocated on behalf of Catholics in Britain and Ireland. Many of his 
arguments, in fact, referenced and assumed the truth of Christian claims, particularly 
those against the “armed doctrine” of Revolutionary France. He set himself against 
“humanistic” ideologies that sought to regenerate humans after the fashion of their 
irreligious creators. In the section of Reflections defending the church as one of the 
foundations of the constitutional commonwealth, he wrote: 
We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious animal; 
that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot prevail 
long. But if, in the moment of riot and in a drunken delirium from the hot spirit drawn 
out of the alembic of hell, which in France is now so furiously boiling, we should 
uncover our nakedness by throwing off that Christian religion which has hitherto been 
our boast and comfort, and one great source of civilization amongst us and amongst 
many other nations, we are apprehensive (being well aware that the mind will not endure 
a void) that some uncouth, pernicious, and degrading superstition might take place of 
it.93
 
 
An uncompromising ideological worldview unmoored from the inheritance of 
Christian faith and civilization would have little patience for the sort of cautious but 
persistent calls for reform that animated Burke’s life and career. One reason to reject 
revolutionary change was because its pursued goals were unlikely to achieve the 
promised results, which could in turn facilitate uncompromising countermeasures of 
infighting and opposition. Without the restraints of the wisdoms and temperance of 
Christian faith, the passions of humanity in an environment of power and status struggle 
were a recipe for large-scale disorder. Burke believed that to consider man separate from 
the constraints of society was a mistake. Humans were made as social creatures; and the 
natural inclination was to live with others in settings where needs and wants are fulfilled. 
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Living a moral existence, however, was also an elusive and frail enterprise. But God-
given rights existed within a society, one preferably under the guidance of Christian 
mores. They were therefore existent within the circumstantial limitations of society. 
(This generalization of natural rights would divide some of the leading figures of the 
modern American conservative movement, most notably Kirk and Richard Weaver.) 
Burke’s conception of man in his natural state was to link individual rights and morality 
to the long development of society to which man belonged. The unavoidable rise of 
conflicts would lead man to draw upon his natural instincts for achieving those divinely 
inspired recognitions of mutual need which point to back morality as a check against 
hubris. In time, these developed into shared associations of wisdoms that afford a 
common perspective for the best methods of resolving conflict. The person became a 
part of the group by sharing in these perspectives and accordingly adapted behavior to fit 
with the community, accepting the manners, morals, and institutions (religious, social, 
political) that were the consequences of the shared beliefs of a society. This was a duty 
in the continuance of generational covenants, and necessary for wisdom to be passed 
forward in time.94
The “Enlightenment” attempt to remake a society “rationally” so as to forge a 
philosophical vision of equality or justice was, for the traditionalist conservative taking 
inspiration from Burke, deserving of skepticism and hostility. Kirk, following “British 
conservative” thought, discovered that mediating institutions have survived the trials of 
social life. They may serve as an adequate guide for those learning to be productive 
 Thus the proper end result of social life was not an idea of or attempt 
for equality, but rather a mosaic of societal stability. 
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citizens. They deserve deference. It would be presumptuous, suggested Burke, to think 
the accumulated wisdom of others struggling through similar problems should be 
carelessly cast into oblivion. Promises of change can be attractive but also overly 
optimistic – they might even be a highly organized matter of deception by elites so as to 
obtain governing authority. The best forms of justice come not in the science of 
constructing a commonwealth, accompanied by abstract, heated calls for equal access to 
power, but in preserving and reforming the good of inherited society and attempting to 
understand the role of each individual within it. In his public exchanges with advocates 
of the “rights of man” theory such as Thomas Paine, Burke warned against the taking of 
norms for individual liberty from an idyllic conception of a primitive or pre-civil state of 
nature, where the social contract might be revocable at the arbitrary will of a disaffected 
individual. He thought this to be anarchy, harmful not just toward the workability of 
representation but the very existence of civil institutions. In a 1771 speech to 
constituents, he said that a legislative act had no reference to any rule but original justice 
and discretionary application. There must be a constitutional guide of natural rights: “For 
if the judgment makes the law, and not the law directs the judgment, it is impossible 
there should be such thing as an illegal judgment given.”95
Kirk took from this a strong sense that justice should not be dispensed arbitrarily 
or a priori, as the effects are not always immediate or predictable. He admired Burke’s 
own sense of applied, practical justice when it at times compelled him to defend those 
whom he thought victims of such abuse, most notably the long and difficult undertaking 
of prosecuting Warren Hastings for mistreatment on the Indian subcontinent and the 
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advocacy for the religious and political rights of his fellow Irishmen. (Further, it could 
be surmised that Burke was philosophically skeptical of Britain’s imperial projects, 
given the radical imposition of one group forcing itself, and its collection of norms, 
practices, and customs, upon another.) In Kirk’s imaginative mind, the thread from 
Burke’s positions to prominent aspects of American conservative political thought was 
strong. Even so, internal disagreement among this movement abounded and continues to 
the present. “Burke’s conservatism” possessed a degree of variation by time and place. 
As a result, the writings of Kirk emphasized Burke’s political thought as a disposition, as 
an approach, and as a sentiment. This posture, found most famously in the denunciation 
of one revolution, was about the content of change. The definition of “change,” when it 
was valuable and when it was harmful, depended upon the structures of the existing 
order and the people that constituted it.  
Kirk portrayed Burke’s politics as a continual practice of prudence and 
prescription, guarding and preserving the long-developed, fragile institutions of his 
country. The disposition to preserve and the ability to reform as conditions demanded, 
passed into English politics during the 1820’s and into American political discussion 
during the 1840’s, were Kirk’s definition of the conservative statesman.96 In his 
particular circumstance, Burke’s conception of government was influenced by the social 
system of parliamentary representation. France, in her revolution, destroyed its 
framework; England, in 1688, returned to hers. The French should have build upon the 
old, formidable foundations of society instead of breaking, violently, the chains of its 
past. The British constitution was not simply a document or a general guide, but a 
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compact of preserving the necessary order to maintain society, based on the time-tested 
opinions of generations about how best to meet public needs and allow for the 
development of individuals. It mirrored the pattern of nature particular to its people, 
instilled through family, church, community organizations, and domestic obligations.97
Others within the early modern American conservative movement of the mid-
twentieth century, particularly Richard Weaver, took issue with this view. Since Burke 
argued from circumstance and not the “nature of things,” Weaver argued that the 
parliamentarian should not be seen as a sensible visionary because Burke took the 
principle of political prudence so admired by Kirk as an exercise in the calculated 
expediency of utilitarianism. By such arguing not from definition but from circumstance, 
he found little in common with an ethical standard of natural law in Burke’s work. 
Instead, Weaver found in the Reflections a philosophical explanation of the source in 
arguing from circumstance, a defining characteristic against conservatism. He believed 
that the method of argument was a more accurate index of belief than any explicit 
profession of principle. According to Weaver, Burke’s contention that one could 
discover false theory through comparison to practice was inductive of an unfortunate 
exercise: “he judged the badness of the principle by the pressure of the grievance; and 
hence we are compelled to suppose that he believed politics ought to be decided 
empirically and not dialectically. Yet a consequence of this position is that whoever says 
he is going to give equal consideration to circumstance and to ideals (or principles) 
almost inevitably finds himself following circumstances while preserving a mere 
decorous respect for ideals.”
  
98    
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The cultural and social shock provoked by the rise of industrial capitalism, 
science, and mass communication was in the early stages of formation when Burke 
wrote. That Kirk and Weaver would disagree about the foundations of Anglo-American 
conservatism did not prevent them from recognizing the necessity of history as a marker 
for renewal against the claims of expanded rights, with an enlarged government as an 
organizing instrument. In the forward to a new edition of Weaver’s last book, Visions of 
Order, Kirk shared in the assault on “presentism,” scientism, and democratism that 
subvert the “the high old order of our civilization and our human dignity.” He wrote that 
order was “Weaver’s austere passion: the inner order of the soul, the outer order or 
society.” A disordered rhetoric, in turn an anarchic rhetoric, undid humanity.99 And with 
regard to what must be opposed, these writers did find common cause. Conservatism 
against the ideology that flowed from the contractual, the scientific, or the rational 
principles of reason “inquired” for as complete a view of political reality as possible, 
capturing nuances and subtleties missed by a more systematic approach. In Kirk’s 
conceptions, Burke’s writings indicated such circumstances were far too complicated, 
far too messy and human, to be neatly summed up. This mistrust of abstract political 
systems, quasi-metaphysical principles founded upon reason, was shared by Kirk and 
Weaver, placing them both comfortably among the strand of the American conservatism 
mournful at what the “Enlightenment project” had wrought. A chief rationale, in fact, for 
Kirk’s claim that non-ideological conservatism began with Burke was the defense of 
traditionalist insight against the “scientific” construction of government.  
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 Generally, for those that might be labeled traditionalist conservatives, the good of 
society was good itself and not tradition for its own sake. The accumulated wisdom of 
society, its good to be passed down through the generations, was confirmed by trials of 
experience. Humans were hardly capable, Burke thought, of reaching during their 
lifetime a fullness of understanding required to summarily dismiss the customs and 
institutions of society – no matter how brilliant their capacity, words, and actions. Yet 
this prejudice should be coupled with the recognition that not every tradition, custom, or 
institution was worthy of preservation. Cautious reform was the cure for always 
imperfect human creations, not abandonment because of possible disharmony with an 
impulse of reason. And inconvenience, Burke warned in Reflections, will never fade. 
Ideas were not in perfect union with the disordered reality represented:  
The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating, or reforming, it, is, like 
every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience 
that can instruct us in that practical science, because the real effects of moral causes are 
not always immediate; but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent 
in its remoter operation, and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces 
in the beginning. The reverse also happens: and very plausible schemes, with very 
pleasing commencements, have often shameful and lamentable conclusions. In states 
there are often some obscure and almost latent causes, things which appear at first view 
of little moment, on which a very great part of its prosperity or adversity may most 
essentially depend. The science of government being therefore so practical in itself and 
intended for such practical purposes – a matter which requires experience, and even 
more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and 
observing he may be – it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon 
pulling down an edifice which has been answered in any tolerable degree for ages the 
common purposes of society, or on building it up again without having models and 
patters of approved utility before his eyes.100
 
 
Ideas were not wholly agreeable to the represented reality because the most 
useful forms of knowledge were based on experience rather than ideas. The articulation 
of knowledge was thus symbolic and incomplete, limiting the human ability to reason. 
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Burke, Kirk explained to his readers, could be classified as an ant-rationalist. Calling for 
Parliament in 1774 to “revert to your old principles” and leave America to “tax herself,” 
he said, “I am not here going into the distinctions of rights, nor attempting to mark their 
boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of 
them.”101 Weaver, sympathetic to the idea that a people’s ties to the past provide a better 
answer to its political problems than abstract reasoning, might add a warning about the 
potential for coarseness in the culture of self-governance fought for by Burke and his 
Whigs. He believed the greatest perversion of culture was a misconception of the role of 
democracy. The most pressing duty of the believer in culture was to define the notion of 
democracy and keep it within its place, so as to not only preserve it as a viable form but 
also to protect those other areas of activity which are essential to supply a different kind 
of need, the spiritual. Burke, Kirk, and Weaver would I think agree that the rhetoric of a 
culture and social order depended upon history. Weaver wrote all questions susceptible 
to rhetorical treatment arose out of history, and it is to history that the rhetorician turns 
for his means of persuasion. And so, given present developments, it was understandable 
to mourn the loss of humanity’s “historical consciousness.”102
Burke the politician declared that solutions to a crisis required more than the 
wisdom of an organic historical order and lessons from comparable times past. Present 
realities and the balance of interests in an actual situation weighed heavily on his mind 
as a man intimately immersed in the controversies of a globe-spanning superpower. He 
thought that a studied contemplation of immediate and practical advantages in the trade-
offs of public policy ranked high as a source of acceptable solutions. This would come to 
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be known in America more than a century later as “political realism” or “expedient 
compromise.” Burke labeled it “prudence.”103
 Ideas of pure rationality as the guide to morals and politics dominated the first 
half of Burke’s eighteenth century. Kirk wrote, critiquing Locke, Hume, and Kant, that 
“What we learn in this world we learn through custom, repeated experiences, rather than 
through pure Reason.” He continued, following Burke, “All religion is irrational; it is 
derived from Revelation and Faith; it cannot be sustained by logical argument, which 
only betrays Christianity to its enemies.”
 One example of imprudent rationalist 
Enlightenment action was to regard liberty as a political abstraction instead of a 
regulation under the traditions of common experience and law. The tyranny of the 
majority circumscribed in law was a triumph of the general will formalized into a 
founding document, such as Article Six of the French constitution. Viewing this article, 
Burke saw the state as inculcated with the authority, in the name of the general will, to 
deny natural rights beyond those which the state saw fit to allow. And so the French 
National Assembly could, in effect, be dominated by a group arbitrarily deciding which 
rights citizens were to be granted or denied. The prudence of Reflections and many of 
Burke’s other writings on revolution and constitution were a defense of the principles of 
constitutional sovereignty and an attack on the principles of popular sovereignty. In this, 
he was willing to be alienated from party, constituency, and many countrymen.   
104 Kirk contended that such views on 
sovereignty and the worth of accumulated knowledge meant “Burke never approved of 
any revolution, with the exception of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which he called a 
revolution not made but prevented, and therefore no revolution at all.” He suggested that 
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through timely concession and compromise the Rockingham Whigs hoped the loss of 
America might have been averted.105
Kirk’s efforts to popularize for an American audience the champion of 
parliament he discovered as a graduate student in Scotland were largely successful. The 
view that Burke was a modern conservative intellectual foundation, relevant to 
American politics, joined the argument about what conservatism was and the policy 
impact it might have. As the post Second World War economy boomed, President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society were 
frameworks under which lawmakers operated. On this point, Kirk quoted the literary 
critic Lionel Trilling. He wrote in 1950: “liberalism is not only the dominant but even 
the sole intellectual tradition.”
 Kirk pointed out that every revolution, as the 
parliamentarian stated in An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, contained in it 
something of “evil.” David Hume, another figure revered by many conservative thinkers 
and a fierce critic of rationalism, is remembered in part for statements about the 
illuminating light of reason bordering upon the darkness, dazzling yet confounding, and 
making assurance of any one object problematic. The ideology that drives revolution, the 
promise of rational thought and constant improvement, was the sort of systematic and 
autonomous initiative that struck fear into the heart of Burke. And, in conclusion, 
existing against the “age of ideology” would come to serve as a unifying force for later 
figures of disparate lives, judgments, and prejudices like Kirk and Weaver as they 
readied their pen to warn against ideologues immune to experience and insistent upon 
dogmatism toward creed.  
106 At that time, statist solutions also enjoyed a large 
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measure of public support. Burke’s American admirers swam upstream against a strong 
tide of government action. In sum, if a policy, a custom, a norm, a tradition, an 
institution did not violate the natural rights and has suited the past – if these belonged to 
the father and grandfather and great grandfather, for instance – it was in Kirk’s 
reconstructions and popularizations to be granted, across the generations, a high status of 
received wisdom worthy of commitment against movements that would seek to alter 
them so as to pursue ideological aims. There must be, in other words, no state organized 
“unity,” a calling card of foreign adventurism and domestic collectivism. And although 
Kirk engaged in some furious intellectual battles with his allies over the meaning of 
American conservatism, such a generalization skeptical of “transformative government” 
was present in the varied threads of thought in response to large-scale governmental 
action. This manner of conservatism, “Burkean” and “Kirkian,” was in opposition to 
“political religion.” It was a rejection of the idea that politics could be redemptive. It was 
the conviction that a properly ordered republic has a government of limited ambition.  
Burke, tradition-minded but eager for society and economy to progress, sought 
throughout his long career the balancing of individual rights and social order. How, and 
not if, a society should change was the question. The maintaining of a civil social order 
respectful of individual rights worked toward social stability:  
Good order is the foundation of all good things. To be enabled to acquire, the people, 
without being servile, must be tractable and obedient. The magistrate must have his 
reverence, the laws their authority. The body of the people must not find the principles 
of natural subordination by art rooted out of their minds. They must respect that property 
of which they cannot partake. They must labor to obtain what by labor can be obtained; 
and when they find, as they commonly do, the success disproportioned to the endeavor, 
they must be taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice.107 
  
153 
Utopian reformers, disdainful of constraints and confident of their own intelligence, did 
not in Burke’s estimation possess the disposition to preserve and the ability to improve 
which works for a good order. Yet humans could aspire to a natural standard of order 
and justice. This was a product of continuously encountering the constraints of human 
nature, and of the resulting developments of institutions and associations over the 
generations. Thus the practices of a good order could sit in judgment of newer ideas as 
the necessary and desirable changes followed an evolutionary model of “nature.” The 
natural standard of justice and good order, this is to say, could not be understood directly 
by abstract reasoning uprooted from historical constraint. Such a process would be 
dislocation from the wisdoms of continuous change, a basis of learning about justice and 
good order. Burke wrote:    
Your literary men and your politicians, and so do the whole clan of the enlightened 
among us, essentially differ in these points. They have no respect for the wisdom of 
others, but they pay it off by a very full measure of confidence in their own. With them it 
is a sufficient motive to destroy an old scheme of things because it is an old one. As to 
the new, they are in no sort of fear with regard to the duration of a building run up in 
haste, because duration is no object to those who think little or nothing has been done 
before their time, and who place all their hopes in discovery. They conceive, very 
systematically, that all things which give perpetuity mischievous, and therefore they are 
at inexpiable war with all establishments. They think that government may vary like 
modes of dress, and with as little ill effect; that there needs no principle of attachment, 
except a sense of present convenience, to any constitution of the state.108
 
 
From Burke’s writings against revolutionary fervor, Kirk updated for his time a 
sense of “natural justice” informed by the prejudices of generational knowledge. Both 
writers suggested that the realities of human nature, the continuation of difficult to 
articulate truths across various troubles, would shape institutions as long periods of time 
passed. The practices that work toward providing for society were the most natural, the 
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truest arbiter of ideas. When changes were necessary, as they would be given the 
variations of humanity and situation, the partisans of innovation should be opposed by a 
conservative sentiment. Kirk saw dangerous, attractive ideas as always flourishing, such 
as the a priori, revolutionary mind. His “conservative mind” grounded natural justice not 
through the distorted lens of abstract reasoning, but in the continuous, cautious values of 
prescription and skepticism. A claim founded in a supposedly systemic manner, the 
rationalist reduction of real human beings to the ideological “construction” of an abstract 
human nature, was the opposite of conservative. It was the negation of ideology that is 
conservative. This negation was in Kirk’s writings a genuine political alternative in the 
modern age. An organic, developed order supported a more genuine justice, freedom, 
prosperity, and civic health. An imaginative affirmation of the wisdoms of the past 
allowed for humans to judge with prudence. Against the view that what is human should 
be measured in terms of wealth or power, the sentiments Burke articulated and Kirk 
admired originated in an attitude to civil society and its foundational moral order. And it 
is from such a conception that thoughts and rhetoric might be derived. 
What he and other “traditionalists” admiring of British conservatism took from 
Burke was an approach against efforts of utopianism, against ideology, and against the 
promise of a bright new future casting aside considerations of human nature. The long-
term continuation and large policy impact of “Burkean conservatism,” however, is 
another matter entirely, given that America was founded as a liberal republic inspired by 
concepts of liberalism. In terms of relevance to the former colony, I think that a 
reconstruction of the British constitutional and monarchial society familiar to Burke and 
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defended in his works remains overly optimistic and overly imaginative. Nonetheless, it 
was necessary to summarize the philosophical underpinnings of this chapter. Kirk’s 
rhetoric of “moral imagination” was built on a foundation of “Ciceronian” and 
“Burkean” character.  
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Against the Idols: Kirk and the Agrarian Rebuke 
The rhetoric of Russell Kirk’s imaginative conservative sentiments, while 
historical, can also be tied to contemporary rhetors. The American revolution (an un-
conservative term for the “Burkean” and “Kirkian” conservative) was “conservative” in 
that its unprecedented mixture of Greco-Roman civic republicanism, therapeutic deism, 
and Enlightenment thinking came to be successfully at peace with a market liberalism 
advanced by many self-identified conservatives. And alongside traditionalism and 
religiosity, sympathy for this economic viewpoint is a workable model for what it means 
to be of the “right,” or in the terminology of the economic, political, and social 
hegemony of post-Second World War America, a conservative. Yet the distaste for 
centralized planning and love of history and place Kirk shared with the southern 
agrarians he sympathized with – even as he, as a Midwesterner, was something of a 
cultural stranger – was not widely shared among American voters, or among many 
sectors of the American conservative movement. The progressive promise of decent, 
rationalist governance, the shock of the Great Depression, and President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s corporatist, statist response in the form of the New Deal presented a 
formidable barrier to the advancement of ideas centered in localism and public restraint. 
The “traditional” society of agrarianism, in contrast, “old and true,” represented that 
which had not, from the traditionalist conservative perspective, “completely succumbed 
to science, aggressive technology, materialism, commercialism, and other evils of 
egotistic Northern modernism.”1  
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The connection to contemporary rhetors comes through the skepticism toward 
the “modern.” Kirk’s reconstitutions, through a vision of conservatism, of associational 
communion employed a view of rhetoric as an art, one circumstantial, designed to 
persuade, and admiring of skepticism and modesty in civic debate. To accurately speak 
to the future in a virtuous manner was to consider the past, the audience, and context, as 
the most effective rhetoricians drew from the wells of accumulated wisdom. Kirk 
recognized the cultural fracturing brought about by the political and economic upheavals 
of modernity and thought that the traditional rhetoric of great statesman like Cicero and 
Edmund Burke could be fused with new circumstances. He desired that what I have 
termed an “associational rhetoric” of language, a language constituted and reconstituted 
in community, facilitated an intuitive recognition. This recognition was a turn toward the 
assumptions of a “natural” order and human nature, regardless of the various opinions 
and laments in response to political and social crisis. 
Evoking a World 
Kirk, Weaver, and the writers of southern agrarianism evoked a different world 
of vice and virtue than one their readers might have been familiar with. The “evoking” 
of a different, “better” world necessitated good character when the relation between self 
and culture was not so much instrumental as “reciprocal.” To reciprocate “agrarian” and 
“traditionalist” sentiments was to partake of the “anti-modern,” the communal and 
associational “good.” Finally, there remained for the traditionalists and non-
traditionalists alike a familiarity in appeals to concepts few would spurn – community 
and family. Building on this, the imagination of Kirk and others was a vision in creation 
  
162 
of a “real world,” heavily borrowed from history and in opposition to much of their 
political leadership. These thinkers and writers conveyed a “metaphysical contract” of 
eternal society that must be preserved, a partnership between the living, the dead, and 
those yet to be born. 
The activism of self-identified “progressive” presidents like Woodrow Wilson 
and Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt was, for some critics including Weaver and Kirk, 
to be vigorously opposed. These actions – from the idealism of the League of Nations to 
the rapid building of armed forces and the consolidation of political authority – were 
seen as a commitment to a modernist building of heaven on earth, its rallying cry to a 
singular purpose served by the living organism of the state, the end manifestation of a 
more purified and perfected people. European theories of centralization and socialisms 
(national and international) were important influences upon the development of domestic 
policy in the United States, and anti-Great Depression policy in particular.2 Detractors, 
including Kirk, suggested that the state had no limits in principle if a centralizing 
mindset reigned, because the people and the government were “bound” to one another 
by the argument and application of constant political struggle, rather than by family, 
local association, or religious obligation. Fascism and socialism were considered a false 
and dangerous extremity of the tribal impulse. For Kirk and the agrarians, when citizens 
derived personal worth from their relation to the encroaching and holistic state, tyranny 
was sure to follow. Instead of prejudice, prescription, and natural rights, the intellectual, 
historically-aware conservative foresaw a doctrine of “perfectibility” and the unitary 
state.3 They were horrified, for instance, by the insistence of Italian dictator Benito 
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Mussolini that everything should be in the state and nothing outside the state, and that 
there could exist a “secular philosophy” with regard to all questions that might concern 
the human mind.4
The drive for unity among those with an interest in power, and with wielding it 
over others, was a common concern for southern agrarians, a loose collection of regional 
writers distrustful of human authority beyond their typically rural settings. Weaver 
believed that the strength of government-organized unity may first be exercised in the 
name of freedom, but once such power was (invariably) made monopolistic and 
unassailable, it would be used for other purposes. It was no surprise, he wrote, that the 
U.S. embarked upon an age of imperialism after the Civil War: “the new nationalism 
enabled Theodore Roosevelt, than whom there was no more staunch advocate of union, 
to strut and bluster and intimidate our weaker neighbors. Ultimately it launched America 
upon its career of world imperialism, whose results are now being seen in indefinite 
military conscription, mountainous debt, restriction of dissent, and other abridgements of 
classical liberty.”
  
5 George Nash, in his chronicle of the development of the agrarian 
sentiment within the conservative intellectual tradition, wrote that for Weaver, the south 
maintained a “system of sustaining forms” and a “complex of law, custom, and idiomatic 
behavior” that acted as a “powerful check against the sense of lostness, the restlessness, 
and the aimless competition which plague the modern masses and provoke the fantastic 
social eruptions.” Yet the south endured due to three “strong barriers to anomie:” a 
structural form of society, the idea of transcendence, and its preservation of history.6 
Concerned by the rise of mass plutocracy, big business, big labor, and big government, 
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unconstrained capitalism was likewise harmful to local community and its solidarity due 
to the reliance upon industrialism. These were forces of unsettlement – technology in 
union with the promise of innovation and unending progress.  
Weaver, a cultural southerner who spent most his academic career as a 
rhetorician in modernist and mechanized places such as the Agricultural and Mechanical 
College of Texas (now known as Texas A&M University) and the city of Chicago, 
stands out among the southern agrarians because of his praise for Lincoln. In The Ethics 
of Rhetoric, he wrote that rhetoric, like myth, was a means to convey what might 
otherwise remain inexpressible. But woven by power and status seeking humans, 
rhetoric is prone to error and misdirection. Good rhetoric, an incomplete expression of 
pre-existing beauty, love, and ethics, reflected a fragment of eternal and unknowable 
truth. Rhetoric, existing outside the reaches of human logic, “can only be valued 
analogically with reference to some supreme image…It is impossible to talk about 
rhetoric as effective expression without having as a term giving intelligibility to the 
whole discourse, the Good.”7 His hierarchy, distinguishing between four types of 
argumentation (genus, similitude, circumstance, and authority) placed Lincoln’s 
arguments against slavery at the top, as they dealt in absolutes and sought knowledge of 
the truth. Weaver did not wish to accept rhetoric apart from the fixed nature of things: in 
a pluralistic democracy, it was not sufficient for a healthy body politic that standards for 
public discussion would be located within the confines of audience acceptance. There 
must be a means to determine validity in argumentation. Effective and persuasive 
language divorced from the assumption of a fundamental certainty could not overcome 
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the unhappy advance of organized, mass coercion aided by propaganda for the ultimately 
empty goal of greater status.8
Losing the Good 
 A “rhetoric of truth,” however, which resisted a debased 
language and acknowledged unseen realities might. Rhetoric must be more than an 
instrumental discipline. For Weaver, it should also serve as an ethical means.  
That political leaders, and presidents most especially, seemed little concerned 
with ethical language – and far more interested in the centralization of authority – 
contributed to agrarian anxiety about losing the authentic, the rooted, and the good. 
Weaver’s notion of an ideal rhetoric, one employed to find and illuminate truth, 
suggested a culture, like the myths that may encompass it, were in some way spiritual by 
the order of a being that is the summit of love, truth, and beauty. The enduring religiosity 
of the south since the shock of industrialization and world wars may point toward the 
cherishment of “southern values” and institutions not simply because they were regional 
and historical, but because they were thought to be true. The ability for leaders to 
subjugate others to their will in ways once unimaginable was a frightening concept for 
those whose ancestors, within living memory, made their life and living from toiling in 
the soil. Rhetoric, that which points humanity toward a better understanding of human 
limitations and the proper boundaries of action, was for Weaver muddled by the 
temptations of economic prosperity and political power. He discerned southern culture 
as fragile and worthy of protection; and he distrusted those of any ideological 
background who might claim the necessity of a “cleansing.” Those rhetoricians that 
considered the ethical consequences of decisions by taking into account irreversibility 
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and finality, unwilling to rule out, a priori, some consequences as unacceptable,9 
approached an argument from circumstance. In contrast, the essence of Lincoln’s 
rhetoric was reform according to law; that is, reform according to definition. And so the 
“true conservative” was one that approached the universe as a paradigm of essences, “of 
which the phenomenology of the world is a sort of continuing approximation. Or, to put 
this in another way, he sees it as a set of definitions which are struggling to get 
themselves defined in the real world.”10
Characteristic of the disagreement about Lincoln’s use of presidential power was 
M.E. Bradford, a professor of literature and a well-known defender of the heritage and 
traditions of the south. He criticized Lincoln as a man who had abolished his past and his 
family, driven to join “another tribe” and to “act upon a larger and larger stage, and not 
by the Christian rectitude which requires us to be good stewards of our given abilities or 
to answer a special ‘call.’” He participated, instead, in “essentially gnostic myths of 
‘self-invention,’ and detached from the traditional pattern in which a providentially 
given set of talents is developed and employed.”
 The southern agrarians, despite significant 
disagreement about Lincoln, tended to agree with Weaver in viewing their region and 
the bubbling, if inexpressible, desires for “natural” laws as a proud exception to 
prevailing and unfortunate American trends.  
11 (His criticism of Lincoln was one 
reason that prevented him from assuming the chairmanship of the National Endowment 
for the Humanities that President Reagan nominated him for in 1981.12) Bradford’s 
rejection of Lincoln was more representative of the southern agrarian critique of 
centralized, activist presidential power and the national greatness rhetoric occasionally 
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used to justify it. He was considered a prominent “paleo-conservative,” a term that 
entered the political lexicon as a conceptual and political counterpoint to “neo-
conservative” in the book The Conservative Movement, published in 1988 by self-
described paleo-conservatives Thomas Fleming and Paul Gottfried. In their usage, the 
description applied not just to the traditionalists or anti-modernists writing in the 
agrarian south but also to any “embattled conservative” opposed to the influence of 
anticommunist Democrats (leftists accepting of the New Deal) upon the conservative 
intellectual (and political) movement.13
These thinkers, whose chief outlets were small circulation periodicals of literary 
and cultural criticism, emphasized religiosity, national and Western identity, the 
protection of civil society and mediating institutions, family traditionalism, pride of 
history and heritage, and anti-interventionism. They actively opposed communism, 
corporate and social welfare, demographic change, and those policies seen as 
governmental authoritarianism. There was identification with those who opposed the 
League of Nations, supported the Immigration Act of 1924, and worked to defeat 
President Franklin Roosevelt. Others looked back further in history for a kinship of 
outlook, to Edmund Burke and the anti-federalism of President Thomas Jefferson and 
John Calhoun. Paleo-conservatives took many of their bearings from the pre-Second 
World War, anti-New Deal arguments. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
uneasy and informal alliance with anti-communist supporters of welfare capitalism, such 
as Norman Podhoretz and Irving Kristol, descended into something resembling mutual 
distrust and a long-simmering hostility. According to Gottfried, the tension has been 
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exacerbated by the second American war with Iraq and persistent calls for an aggressive, 
interventionist foreign policy. The “struggle for democracy” in other lands tends to be 
viewed as overly ideological, a harmful diversion from the struggle against more 
pressing domestic concerns. This has caused “paleo-conservatives” to create new outlets 
of news and opinion, and potentially to develop new allies also suspect of “Wilsonian” 
ideological premises.14
For these figures, a conservatism overly enamored with economy, power, and 
material accumulation was insufficiently concerned with the content and development of 
family and civic character, and as such it did not deserve its label. Sentiments like 
restraint and humility – characteristics not often used to describe any president, even by 
their supporters – were highly valued by southern agrarian critics. They sought the 
“local” and the “old” rather than the global, the new, the abstract, or the ideological. 
Southern agrarians generally believed that family was the most crucial institution, the 
very foundation of a good society which faithfully adhered to permanent things and 
ancient moral truths. Against these stood both big government and big business, which 
look out for each other at the expense of community-based, moral association. Bradford 
told the Heritage Foundation in a 1986 lecture: “All of our social myths presupposed 
some version of the corporate life – that man is a social being, fulfilled only in the 
natural associations built upon common experience, upon the ties of blood and 
friendship.” No president for traditionalists could unite a concern for social health, 
however eloquently expressed, with the valued traditions of community and custom. 
Such a task must fall to smaller units of organization. Otherwise, a spirited passion, such 
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as the temptation among government officials to create equality of outcome, “threatens 
to swallow up our reverence for law, responsible character, moral principle, and 
inherited prescription.”15
Conflicts of Visions 
  
Jonathan Haidt, a psychologist specializing in investigations of human morality, 
has suggested that such a vision helps to explain a root of differing political visions in 
contemporary American politics. He generalized about “two rules:” feelings come first 
and tilt the mental playing field on which reasons and arguments compete; and second 
that moral domain varies across culture. A “liberal, Enlightenment” morality of justice 
and rights does not capture the concerns of all groups – those inclined to justify 
judgments with talk about respect, duty, and family roles. Thus morality is not just about 
how humans treat each other. It is also about binding groups together, supporting 
essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way. A stable network 
composed of many overlapping groups that can “socialize, reshape, and care for 
individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish 
pleasures” is desired by those whose vision values self-control over self-expression, duty 
over rights, and loyalty to group.16 For “traditionalists” and “paleos,” a human person 
was bound, however loosely, by the loyalty that place defines and inspires. And the 
needs of the moral life – community and a sense of belonging – could not be met by 
market forces. Agrarian writers declined to accept an expansive view of individual 
liberty, one that would allow the human person to be reduced to “commodity.” Rather, a 
non-ideological vision of family and community protected culture, history, and tradition 
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not for their own sake, and not to their own end, but because this realm of interpersonal 
feeling was a means to ethical conduct and self-knowledge. And at the foundation was 
religious faith, or at the least a sense of the sacred.   
Southern agrarian critics of expansive presidential power continuously expressed 
hostility toward perceived threats to living in a more sanctified and noble way. Among 
the most persistent of these threats was destruction to enduring and valued mediating 
institutions between the family and the state. A decline of these institutions damaged 
group cohesion. The means of destruction included militarization, industrialization, 
growth in the size and scope of government, and the rapid imposition of a cultural decay 
made possible by new technologies. And so religion and politics, for example, were not 
to be synonyms – there is no “moral equivalent to war.” The failure to make a distinction 
might make one susceptible to the “messianism” of centralizers like Wilson and the 
Roosevelts, presidents perceived by agrarians to utilize foreign conflict as an instrument 
of domestic control. Such presidents were also perceived as being a friend of not only 
big government, but capitalists bent on making big industry bigger. There was 
antagonism to the elevation of empiricism, seen to be the spirit of the age, as applied to 
human organization. A “physical imagination of science,” in contrast to a “physical 
imagination of poetry,” limited the metaphysical undertaking of “symbolic imagination” 
that operated in necessary analogy of the human to the divine.17 To cast it aside for the 
promise of intellect or power was a descent into the loneliness and alienation of 
nothingness, for the sake of a cult of the will.   
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A failure of imagination supported false, synthetic communities, which were the 
products of coerced unity. Robert Nisbet, a sociologist whose work was admired across 
generations of southern agrarians and their paleo-conservative heirs, believed the “quest 
for community” was a powerful, internal force made difficult by the demands and 
complexities of the modern world. For him, freedom should be not simply an affair of 
individuality. It should also be fostered by the light of community association developed 
among the like-minded. He defined conservatism as “the protection of the social order – 
family, neighborhood, local community, and region foremost – from the ravishments of 
the centralized political state.”18 These social orders were voluntary, local, naturally-
occurring in a social context, and slow to form. The orders were acquainted with a vision 
of human life as possessed of meaning and responsive to a mysterious, transcendent 
force that tells the person their actions are not arbitrary and temporary. Agrarian writers 
communicated such an inexpressible sentiment by attempting to construct an insular 
world through the written word – even as the great difficulty, and perhaps hopelessness, 
of constructing their own world was acknowledged. They found the rhetorical language 
of presidents overseeing an unprecedented post-war economic boom to be infused with a 
sense of immediacy – the “modern” acting impiously, some manner of desecration of 
long-held, regionally-developed virtues. For Weaver, the customs of his south was a last 
center of resistance against the “false messiah” of science and technological 
manifestation, its traditions incorporated as moral ends toward a more civilized life.19 An 
imaginative mindset, particularly toward history, was essential to comprehending these 
persuasions. This mindset was also the essential aspect of their rhetoric.  
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Text Creating a Language 
Literary critic and legal scholar James Boyd White has described rhetoric as “the 
study of the ways in which character and community – and motive, value, reason, social 
structure, everything, in short, that makes a culture – are defined and made real in the 
performance of language.”20 In this definition, a rhetorical examination assumes that 
presidential rhetoric, to take an example, is relevant to an audience – the audience is not 
simply a passive recipient “soaking up” ideological positions. In addition, there is the 
assumption that the communicative acts of a president are not simply an empty shell 
masking a more “real” process of politics, no matter how such a political reality might 
be defined.21 As a matter of method, then, I think it is useful to consider the 
communication of southern agrarians and paleo-conservatives in their critiques of the 
American political power as a text creating a language. By this I mean that as Edmund 
Burke aimed to guide the reader of his Reflections on the Revolution in France toward 
the language of the British Constitution, thus inducting them as a member of the 
community that his language created and inclined to reject other possibilities, so too did 
these writers attempt to construct and preserve communities defined, in no small part, by 
their use of words and style.22 Among many traditionalist writers, the south was viewed 
as a place of literary flare and strong resistance to “outside influence.” In his book The 
Politics of Prudence, Kirk summarized the political sentiment of the region thusly: “Ever 
since the forming of the Union in 1787, the dominant political tendency in the southern 
states has been resistance to centralizing power. Far more than any other region, the 
South has set its face against Leviathan – that is, against the swelling omnipotent nation-
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state, what Tocqueville called democratic despotism, the political collectivity that 
reduces men and women to social atoms.”23
The language of southern agrarianism conveyed that it was easier to destroy than 
to create. There was skepticism of attempts to remake community in obedience to an all-
encompassing political or social goal. In a time of widespread disharmony, such as a 
war, American presidents have spoken and taken action with the explicit statement, or at 
least the suggestion, that unity (with the government as an organizing instrument) was 
vital to govern constituents through a crisis. In 1917, President Wilson affirmed the 
importance of national unity: “It is imperative that we should stand together. We are 
being forged into a new unity amidst the fires that blaze throughout the world.”
 
24 The 
1930 southern agrarian manifesto I’ll Take My Stand and the writings of poets and 
essayists such as John Crowe Ransom and Robert Penn Warren (who, as an 
integrationist and mentor to Ralph Ellison, came to publicly repudiate some agrarian 
views) were praised by Weaver for eloquence, as “paraphrase could not do justice many 
vivid passages.” A people might be politically “reconstructed,” but as Weaver argued 
“its culture is a matter of birth and growing, hardly amenable to political edict.”25 In his 
persuasions, Bradford laid claim to “the rhetoric of the common good.” Its “theoretical 
ground” was a preference to a “greater good or obligation.” Here, a properly employed 
rhetoric should operate in “restoring to the political conversation of our time” a character 
of caution, concerned with the risks of change.26 Looking back from the early 1970s, 
Bradford thought derisively “concerning the abstract philosophic or ethical validity of 
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arguments advanced in encouraging the great reorderings of priority marked by the past 
twenty years.”27
To justify and expand upon such sentiment, traditionalists looked to history. 
There, they had little trouble forming a kinship of association skeptical of the quick 
social and political change seen as disastrous to the continuation of constitutionalism and 
local community. Kirk praised the Roman statesman Cicero as “a man of brilliance who 
set his face against a military revolution,” writing that “as a model of republican virtue, 
Cicero meant much to the leaders of the infant American republic.”
 
28 Kirk and the 
agrarians wished, I argue to share in the ideal of a foundational natural law of the sort 
expressed in Cicero’s The Republic: “True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; 
it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its 
commands, and averts from wrong-doing by its prohibitions.”29 The imposition of liberal 
individualism and collective state action as advanced by presidents and legislatures 
were, in a paleo-conservative and southern agrarian critique, measured by harm to 
others. There was a recognition that the individual was born into a community, and into 
the moral constraints that prevail among community members. The underlying core of 
Ransom’s manifesto, for example, was a rejection of the “hollow blandishments” of 
science and the industrial economy thought to be translating a scientific ethos into 
society. A systematic application of scientific expertise to the complexities of human 
interaction failed to provide for the promised good life. It introduced consumerism and 
degraded the concept of labor.30 It was alien to the communities of the region.     
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Such language was infused with a moralizing sentiment and set against a 
relativism thought to aid a militarized ideology. Southern agrarians and northern 
sympathizers such as Kirk did not just look back fondly to figures such as Burke, 
Adams, Jefferson, Calhoun, and Randolph.31 They drew from historical example to 
make warning for the present and lessons for the future. Bradford labeled Lincoln “the 
genial prophet of expansion, modernization, and commercial progress,” a figure that 
never disappears even after he has long been absorbed into myth. He wrote that an 
“attractive meliorist rhetoric must be developed to enforce his designs,” the central 
aspect of this rhetoric being “the mythic articulation of a tempting vision of delights to 
come – or likely to come, if just a few attendant suggestions are honored by a bemused 
electorate.”32 A strong, forceful rhetoric of presidential action (and of course the actual 
centralizing deeds themselves), mythologized so that other presidents were willing (or 
perhaps, in certain circumstances, eager) to follow, was perceived by these critics as an 
unfortunate public attraction. The domestic planners, who found inspiration in the 
socialists, national and international, were a menace of unforeseen circumstances and 
unintended consequences. Such ideologies, under the archetype of the ongoing attempt 
to live by human devices since the Enlightenment, were nostalgia for the future, 
unmoored and overly permissive of evil action due to a lack of prejudice, wisdom, 
restraint, and an unconcern for history. To return to the example of Mussolini’s 
intrusive, centralizing, “spiritually unmoored,” executive force, he wrote in his 1921 
political tract Diuturna: “Everything I have said and done is these last years is 
relativism, by intuition . . . . From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all 
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ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to 
create for himself his own ideology, and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of 
which he is capable.”33
In White’s analysis of Burke’s Reflections, there was an “intimate and necessary” 
connection between the organization of language and the organization of community. A 
reader was presented with a language in which the community of value was constituted, 
maintained, and defended. Further, “to be adequate to these purposes, his language must 
be many things, the first of which is comprehensive, capable of addressing a question as 
a whole, as it really is, and of putting together everything that bears upon it.”
 The rhetoric of those sharing in Kirk’s dispositions, communal 
and value-laden, was an opposite of this generalization.  
34 Ransom 
lamented that the “unreconstructed Southerner” was the only one who will stand against 
prevailing fashion and look backward rather than forward, like a “quaint local character 
of eccentric but fixed principals who is thoroughly and almost pridefully accepted by the 
village as a rare exhibit in the antique kind.”35 Championing “European principles of 
culture,” he and other southern agrarians did not display much formal agreement over 
what constituted the good life. Yet there were recurring motifs – specifically the 
ravaging effects of “modernism” and the loss of cultural memory. Paul Murphy, the 
author of a history of southern agrarian writers, summarized that a central question of 
their motives and goals was “not only of where do I stand, but also, who belongs?”36 
The rhetoric, the language, and the text (in the twelve essays of I’ll Take My Stand and 
elsewhere) were not meant for all. These communicative acts were aimed at a particular, 
small audience of European-based males with an anxious mindset. It is notable that 
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women and African-Americans – together a solid majority of the total of southern 
residents – were hardly mentioned in their work.37
 Agrarian writers presented their readers with a language of impending defeat as 
they nobly fortified against an impending flood. Metaphors of struggle abounded in the 
texts. Ransom’s manifesto stated that the southern region, “looking defensively about 
her in all directions upon an industrial world,” must not succumb to the “weapons of 
industrialism.” He then asked: “Will the Southern establishment, the most substantial 
exhibit on this continent of a society of the European and historic order, be completely 
crumbled by the powerful acid of the Great Progressive Principle?” The defeat of the 
Civil War, he continued, had physically impaired the ability of the region to present “an 
attractive example of its philosophy in action,” the result being that the “American 
progressive principle has developed into a pure industrialism without any check from a 
Southern minority whose voice ceased to make itself heard.”
 The posture, even with the reality of 
political and social control in their regions, was pessimistic and defensive.   
38 Accompanying the siege 
mentality and heated language was a belief that the south represented humanist values 
universally applicable. A justification of regional sentiments was embodied in a dramatic 
narrative, one of loss and closed possibility. From this, in turn, arguments could be 
extracted. These arguments proposed that threats imperiled not only a nation or a certain 
area but a critical element of civilization as well. The threat came from an identifiable 
enemy – for southern agrarians, the atomizing forces of modernity – and a response, 
even if it was lament and retreat, was necessary. It has been argued that presidential war 
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rhetoric has also followed such a pattern, although one important difference was that 
presidents usually indicated that a threat required forceful, immediate responses.39
 One scholar of presidential rhetoric, John M. Murphy, has argued that as the 
human view of the world has changed from one “infused with God’s purpose through 
one saturated with human reason to one permeated by language, so too has authority 
mutated.”
 
40 The political promise of liberalism, egalitarianism, individualism, and 
rationalism, was in Kirk’s praise of Sir Walter Scott, “infected with this passion for 
uniformity and utility.” Better was “tenderness toward ancient prerogatives, with every 
precaution to make sure that no person or class suffers a particular injustice in the name 
of some seeming general benefit.”41 Such prerogatives and cautions, though, were 
increasingly difficult in the south, given the rapid transformation of the region between 
the publication of I’ll Take My Stand and the end of the Second World War fifteen years 
later. Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal sparked a profound reorganization of the southern 
economic and social structure. Although the region steadily industrialized after the Civil 
War, there was no “industrial revolution.” There was, instead, a lag behind the rest of the 
nation in industrial capacity and employment. The sharecropping system faded and 
large-scale federal intervention spurred modernization.42 The defensive posture of 
Ransom and the agrarians was a defense of a disappearing way of life, a clarion call 
against the inroads of scientism, technology, and industrialization presented as 
destructive and atomizing to localism. And as a professional teacher, editor, and literary 
scholar – as well as a founding member of “The New Criticism,” the textually centered 
method of literary analysis that for a time was prevalent in scholarship – Ransom 
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himself eventually disengaged from traditionalist cultural and political analysis.43
Preserving Authentic Community 
 Others 
would certainly take up the banner of grievance for what was “lost,” warning against 
visions of perfectibility. But few could match the rhetorical influence of a transformative 
president such as Roosevelt, the leader who, in some effect, successfully renamed 
laissez-faire economic liberals the “conservatives.” In the final analysis, the “culture of 
the soil,” where agriculture was the leading source of wealth and prestige, could not long 
withstand the modern world.     
What endured in the agrarian rebuke of presidential power and its rhetoric of 
strength, unity, and centralization was a desire for authentic community. In studying 
rhetorical ethics, Wayne Booth envisioned the “self as a field of selves,” not as an 
automatic individual making discrete rational choices and bound by unambiguous rules 
so much as a social product in process of changing through interaction, sharing values 
with other selves.” White has applied such an imperative to polemical material, focusing 
on the constitutions and reconstitutions of language, character, and community and their 
processes of mutual influence.44 The formulations of Kirk and agrarian writers implicitly 
claimed a better, more fulfilling, way of living – a higher calling. In their custom and 
tradition, the rural and the old were, in a “traditionalist mindset,” what remained of the 
ingredients to the essential social good of a community. This was the personal and the 
familial in voluntary association. These smaller “communities,” with mediating 
institutions between the person and the state, stood in opposition to a “modernist” 
industrialism and its accompanying irreligion, disregard for high culture, and 
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degradation of the quality of human interaction. In the words of Ransom: “This is simply 
to say that Progress never defines its ultimate objective, but thrusts its victims at once 
into an infinite series. Our vast industrial machine, with its laboratory centers of 
experimentation, and its far-flung organs of mass production, is like a Prussianized state 
which is organized strictly for war and can never consent to peace.”45
The discursive community was sustained and extended by the terminology of 
exclusivity made more attractive not just by small numbers and the fragile existence of a 
valuable heritage, but a certainty of moral and spiritual correctness. “Progress,” in 
contrast, was seen as relativistic and uncertain. To follow its vast, glittering light was to 
be on a path of destruction and emptiness. An anti-ideological, moralizing sentiment, 
appealing to the wisdoms and prejudices of great figures, was an agrarian mode of 
reasoning, “practiced as if they were valid, reliable, authoritative.”
  
46 The political 
rhetoric of agrarian writers followed the critiques of presidential power. The growth of 
government should be limited by its legitimate authority, the source of which was the 
workings of civilization and the “natural rights” of persons created in the image of God. 
Writing as the end of the first Gulf War in 1992, Bradford stated: “the notion that the 
Declaration was designed to have one meaning in its own time and another one today, 
sometimes the doctrine of president Lincoln, goes against everything that we know about 
human nature in that it imagines Christian men obliging their children and grandchildren 
to conduct vast and potentially dangerous social and political experiments that they are 
unwilling to see attempted in their time and place.”47  
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International crisis and domestic financial woes were changing the relationship 
of the American people to their government. During New Deal period, legislation such 
as the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 gave President Franklin Roosevelt wide authority to 
dispense food, ammunition, and arms to any country he considered vital to the defense 
of the country. There were predictions of dire consequences if these and other New Deal 
policies took effect. Roosevelt was viewed by some critics as a dictator, eager to take 
revenge for the failure to implement his entire program, often due to the actions of the 
courts. Kansas Governor Alf Landon, the Republican nominee for president in 1936, 
wrote to his campaign manager that “it is a terrible thing for the President to gamble 
with the social and economic welfare of a hundred and thirty million people because he 
is peeved at the Supreme Court’s decision.” His running mate, the publisher Frank 
Knox, expressed confidence that “the President’s attack upon the Constitution has 
proved to be a “disastrous boomerang.”48 Senator Robert Taft of Ohio criticized the New 
Deal’s centralization and expansion of federal power in terms of costs to economic and 
personal freedom. “Every policy,” he inveighed, “should be studied in the light of the 
regulations which it may involve, and in the light of its cost in taxation.” War, conducted 
since the rise of the nation-state by centralized governments, concentrated power in the 
hands of a centralized state, thus threatening the American ideals of limited government 
and separation of powers he cherished. In 1939, Taft anticipated that war would lead to 
“an immediate demand for arbitrary power, unlimited control of wages, prices, and 
agriculture, and complete confiscation of private property.” In the months before the 
attacks upon Pearl Harbor, he repeated his belief that if the U.S. entered World War II, 
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“before we get through with that war the rights of private property in the United States 
will be to a large extent destroyed.”49 Yet events intervened, and by 1965 hardly any 
conservative politicians would speak nearly as explicitly about rescinding the New Deal 
as Senator Barry Goldwater did on the campaign trail. Further, a majority of the 
electorate appeared to be comfortable with the welfare state. Most writers and officials 
within the American conservative movement followed President Dwight Eisenhower’s 
lead in accepting the reality of its existence and even its parameters – at the same time as 
they renounced deficit spending, extolled the virtues of self-reliance, called for trimmed 
budgets, and disapproved of the growth of federal bureaucracy.50
Considerations of the constitutions and reconstitutions of rhetorical language face 
what might be termed an ontological problem: what does it mean to be a human being, 
and a human being who speaks or writes rhetorically?
 
51 In the exercise of centralized 
government prerogatives, a central component of rhetoric was a demonstration that 
actions were decisive and correct. Presidents could use “the imagery of movement” to 
transpose calculated inaction into significant action. The veneer of humility could be 
accompanied by calls to action.52 To take one historical example among many, the first 
inaugural address of Thomas Jefferson praised George Washington as an earnest and 
determined leader. In a time of significant political rancor and uncertainty, Jefferson’s 
appeal to his audience acknowledged those who doubted his own judgment and, at the 
same time, reminded them of precedent. During this rhetorical process of association, 
Jefferson stated of his predecessor: “Without pretensions to that high confidence you 
reposed in our first and greatest revolutionary character, whose preeminent services had 
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entitled him to the first place in his country’s love and destined for him the fairest page 
in the volume of faithful history, I ask so much confidence only as may give firmness 
and effect to the legal administration of your affairs.”53 And concerning President 
Woodrow Wilson, J. Michael Hogan has written that unlike other presidents, he did not 
oversimplify ideas for audience consumption. Wilson was “widely perceived as the very 
incarnation of the ideal orator: a man who used the power of eloquence to advance truth 
and the common good; a man of high ethical principles and prophetic vision; the ‘good 
man skilled at speaking.’”54
A Social World 
  
But for agrarians, and for agrarian sympathizers like Kirk,55 effective appeals to 
public opinion could not indicate the advancement of truth or the fostering of the 
common good. This was especially true when the orator was imagined to be a threat to a 
cultural and social order. The orator, Weaver wrote in Visions of Order, in the diagnosis 
of cultural crisis must be concerned with “men in being.” This meant, at the least, a 
rejection of the idolatry of the “machine culture.” He warned that “we have given grants 
of power to things which we delight to create and to contemplate, and they abuse us and 
interfere with our better interests. But the road away from idolatry remains the same as 
before: it lies in respect for the struggling dignity of man and for his orientation toward 
something higher than himself which he has not created.”56 This sort of reference to a 
higher good, while not always lived by those that claimed an appeal of God, was 
frequently invoked to an audience receptive to such an appeal. In their rebuke of abstract 
rights, ideological theory, industrial capitalism, and other products of liberalism, 
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southern agrarian “reconstituted language” connected sentiment with terms through 
negative association. This was contrasted with a somewhat “standardized” method of 
argument advancing standardization. Ponderings of agrarian economics, for example, 
drew attention to the ways in which a globalized economy harmed stable culture and 
community. And denunciations of distant bureaucracy drew attention to superior forms 
of human organization, a sentimentalized humility and citizenship learned through 
familial relations. Calls for judgment of these drew attention to the unfortunate 
separation of ethics and virtue from the reasoning of public life.  
Such argumentation situated the speaker squarely in a social world. Ideally, this 
was one of an “agrarian” or “traditionalist” sentiment. The persuasions worked to 
socialize behavior in a particular, somewhat insular social world. Effective rhetoricians, 
as well as effective political leaders, understand social context as the arena of their 
activity and as a source material.57 And so a “centralizing” presidents such as Wilson, 
who might have been a “good man” referring to a higher good, was to be resisted in 
rhetoric and deed. There was poor conformity to an association seen to be under threat. 
As such, I believe the social context of agrarianism could only be partially grounded in 
concrete reality. Those sympathetic to such a way of life were operating in an 
inescapable, and always changing, vortex of modernism, liberalism, and individual 
rights unleashed by the philosophical earthquake of the Enlightenment. As “inventors” 
of texts, as poets and orators, many of the contributions to discourse were to “re-present” 
from a collection of fragments that were to understood to remain fragmented – assuming 
that they ever existed at all.   
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The language, like Burke’s in the Reflections, was literary in character and “anti-
theoretical.” In White’s analysis of Burke, the purpose was to “create” a language so that 
new ideas and sentiments could find their expression, which the reader would then learn 
and use.58 Likewise, Kirk, Weaver, and the writers of southern agrarianism evoked a 
different world of vice and virtue than one their readers might have been familiar with. 
The “evoking” of a different, “better” world necessitated good character when the 
relation between self and culture was not so much instrumental as “reciprocal.” To 
reciprocate “agrarian” and “traditionalist” sentiments was to partake of the “anti-
modern,” the communal and associational “good.” Finally, there remained for the 
traditionalists and non-traditionalists alike a familiarity in appeals to concepts few would 
spurn – community and family. Building on this, the imagination of Kirk and others was 
a vision in creation of a “real world,” heavily borrowed from history and in opposition to 
much of their political leadership. These thinkers and writers conveyed a metaphysical 
contract of eternal society that must be preserved, a partnership between the living, the 
dead, and those yet to be born.59 The southern agrarian and the traditionalist, attuned to 
the local more than most,60
 
 were questioners of modernity. Given what they thought of 
the confines of sinful humanity, they attempted to preserve for their audience some 
measure and memory of the “lost good.” That such a good may never have existed was 
not the point.  
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CHAPTER III 
PHILOSOPHY  
 
A Smaller Sphere: Kirk’s Critique of Modernity 
Rhetorically, Russell Kirk was an inventor. His constituted community of 
conservatism, an invitation for readers and hearers to share in his assumptions and 
conclusions, was based upon notions of such large and complex terms as equality, 
justice, freedom, and virtue. It was also distinctive to the American experience as that 
experience might be commonly understood. By selectively taking from the past and 
interpreting the present, he consciously “invented” what conservatism meant. This, in 
turn, actively built an audience of association, especially with the like-minded of bias 
and sentiment. Through a plausible (if at times unique and isolated) interpretation of 
historical figures, events, and the constitutions that form governments, he brought 
together a “community” that I designate as a grouping of “order.” His critique of 
modernity can be summarized in the consistent, deliberate use of one word in place of 
another: “person” rather than “individual.”1 Kirk, to take a noteworthy and telling 
example, downplayed the influence of John Locke upon the American constitution. He 
was part to a loose, raucous “anti-Lockean” and “anti-Rousseauian” community of 
American conservatives that included writers of the southern agrarian tradition among 
others.2 His alternative: against the tide of modernity, through a determination to not 
reduce the beautiful to the useful, the “actual-ness” of society, locally cultivated for 
more than utility, helped toward the ends of happiness ultimately found in the 
transcendent and reflected in the small spheres of home, family, and the immediate. 
Kirk’s existence in the modern world, and thus his persuasions, was incorporative, not 
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transformative. “Natural law,” the “permanent things,” and the “moral imagination” 
were not a formula for pure reason.3
A False Freedom 
 His sentiments of order assumed an associative 
community that gifted the traditions of custom and the shape of morality. A “properly- 
ordered” moral imagination was necessary for the love and communion that humans 
intrinsically crave.  
Kirk thought any promise of an earthly paradise foolish. In writing against “a 
formula of politics,” (meaning the ideological) he was a leading representative of the 
strand of post-Second World War American conservatism that sensed an inverted 
religious fanaticism, an undercurrent of intolerance and totalitarianism, in the propensity 
to take the “freedom of choice” as the highest good. When unwilling to compromise or 
deviate from its revelations, there is, he thought, potential danger contained in such a 
freedom. Kirk’s determination that rationalism, unfettered freedom, and materialism 
could not explain the whole of life or offer a satisfactory, fulfilling end contributed to his 
conversion to Catholic Christianity, as well as to the legacy of what I and other critics of 
his writings consider his “postmodern imagination.”4 Gerald Russello has written the 
“problem” Kirk dedicated a career to facing was the Enlightenment project itself: its 
universalizing equality, secularism, and rationality were destroying the delicate cultural 
and intellectual inheritance of Western civilization. Following this mindset, preservation 
of the good and the virtuous was difficult when faced with what sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman has memorably termed “liquid modernity,” an engagement of society whose 
members interact primarily as consumers.5 Here, present-day consumerism in materially 
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prosperous yet spiritually confused liberal democracies was no longer about satisfying 
needs, but desire – a proposition Bauman described as “much more volatile and 
ephemeral, evasive and capricious, and essentially non-referential entity than ‘needs,’ a 
self-begotten and self-propelled motive that needs no other justification or ‘cause.’”6
The freedom that modernity valued, in other words, was elusive, unstable, and 
risky. As a rhetorical popularizer for his vision of the better life, spiritual and material, 
Kirk’s constituted community was an argument countering the “diabolical imagination,” 
an imagination that must be tolerated by an acceptance of the act of choosing. This did 
not mean, however, that he consented to the premise of the exercise of free choice as 
inherently good regardless of consequence. His assumptions and discourses were 
premised on a different anthropology altogether. More specifically, as imperfect, 
corrupted, emotional, social creatures, he thought humans should be free to be virtuous. 
Kirk’s sentiments, arguments, and language were a rejection of the content and methods 
of modernity (insofar as they can be generalized). His language of custom and tradition 
(conducted in a style that could, I think, be fairly depicted as anachronistic) was not 
well-suited to the dialectic of the current social and political order, one so impacted by 
the autonomy of liberalism. But he did put forward an alternative. The authority of the 
home, of that particular time and place where a person enjoyed the formation of their 
identification as persons, should ground one in a way acknowledging that temporal 
possibilities were not endless.  
  
 The “traditionalist” conservatism of Kirk, which I identify with “paleo-
conservatism” and the imaginative, sentimental, literary localism of southern agrarians, 
  
191 
was a warning against the defiance of authority for the sake of being absolutely free in 
morals and politics. Libertarians, a group he derided as “chirping sectaries” in the title of 
one essay, were deficient due to their general unconcern for a transcendent moral order, 
allegiance to self-interest, failure to comprehend the human condition as both good and 
evil, and adoption of egoistic attitudes. The dictates of custom were in opposition to the 
“old-fangled folk” who “carry to absurdity the doctrines of John Stuart Mill”: “The 
ruinous failing of the ideologues who call themselves libertarians is their fanatic 
attachment to a simple solitary principle – that is, to the notion of personal freedom as 
the whole end of civil social order, and indeed of human existence.”7
 It was, Kirk conveyed, in politics and theory where words such as “liberty” and 
“freedom” and “justice” and “order” were most used. But custom, cultural habit, poetry, 
and literature, in their resilience built by the spheres of home, were more important than 
politics and economics because they were not simplified attempts to make logical those 
things which are inherently illogical and asymmetrical.  Therein was the “classical and 
Christian concept of justice” as opposed to the “denial of any source for justice except 
the commands of the sovereign state.” All law, he continued, “is derived from the 
religious understanding – that is, all law in the traditional societies of the West; law in 
totalist states is another matter entirely.”
 Kirk’s concept of 
freedom was, at least in part, “Augustinian”: freedom must be orientated toward a good 
(and toward the supreme Good that comes from God) or it is not truly a good. And the 
absence of such an orientation led to a false and empty freedom, regardless of how 
seemingly attractive or beneficial it was at the time. 
8 Thus liberty and freedom must be “rightly 
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ordered” because “liberty and justice may be established only after order is tolerably 
secure.” By contrast, libertarians gave priority to “abstract liberty.” Conservatives 
realized that liberty “inheres in some sensible object,” discerning that “true freedom can 
be found only within the framework of a social order, such as the constitutional order of 
these United States. In exalting an absolute and indefinable ‘liberty’ at the expense of 
order, libertarians imperil the very freedoms they praise.”9 Kirk and other figures of 
“Augustinian imagination” such as Allen Tate, perhaps the most prominent southern 
agrarian poet and author, sought to constitute a vision of life to satisfy the human 
longing for transcendence while still being rooted in a particular time and place. Like 
Augustine, they knew they were born into a declining world. The temptation to turn 
inward, away from communion with others, as time and place crumble does exist for the 
sensitive chronicler anxious of the new and unfamiliar. And yet the “Augustinian 
perspective” was a turn inward of memory, understanding, and will, not to isolation. 
Despite the fragmentation and brutality of a breaking civilization, and without forsaking 
the present, these writers “sought a society built on the heart, a stable community of men 
directed toward a common, transcendent goal.” The task was to preserve from the 
“ravages of civilization in collapse” those elements of permanent value.10
And so the object of life was not success, pleasure, or power. Nor was it the 
political enforcement of equality. The equality “consequent upon the nature with which 
God has endowed us,” Kirk wrote in The Conservative Mind, was of one sort only: 
moral. “Divine mercy judges us not by our worldly estate, but by our goodness, and this, 
after all, far transcends mundane political equality.”
  
11 High virtue, and the truest end of 
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freedom and virtue, was love, communion, and association with persons that valued the 
same. In Kirk’s rendering, these were the interactions of family, local community, and 
God. Culture, a long and fragile development of family, community, and God, was more 
important than politics. And all political problems were, at their foundation, moral 
problems. Contrary to a varied yet persistent revolutionary zeal in history, tradition, 
custom, and accumulated wisdom were not tyrants to be abolished in the abstract 
construction of a newer and more just society. They are imperative to the personal and 
communal good. In his book The Roots of American Order, Kirk wrote:  
Society, Burke said, indeed is a contract, a partnership; but it is not a mere commercial 
concern to ensure private profit, not yet expressed in the unlimited General Will of 
Rousseau. Indeed men do have rights by virtue of their human nature; but these rights 
are not bloodless abstractions, nor are they limited to mere guarantees against 
governments. To narrow natural rights to such neat slogans as ‘liberty, equality, 
fraternity’ or ‘life, liberty, property,’ Burke knew, was to ignore the complexity of public 
affairs and to leave out of consideration most moral relationships. One of the most 
important of the rights which men possess in society, Burke remarked, is the right to be 
restrained from actions which will destroy their neighbors and themselves – the right to 
have some control put upon their impulses and appetites.12
 
 
“Freedom,” then, was not in and of itself a virtue. A properly directed freedom 
must include community restraint. Many of his political critiques of modernity were 
polemics against libertarianism, whose manifestations of freedom he saw as something 
resembling a religion. Abstract notions of individual liberty in modern, prosperous 
liberal democracies were not easily compatible with sentiments of community restraint 
informed by the morality of custom and tradition. Christian ethicist and law professor 
Stanley Hauerwas has contended that morality is not chosen and confirmed by example. 
Instead, the moral life is learned through imitation: “This is intrinsic to the nature of 
Christian convictions, for the Christian life requires a transformation of the self that can 
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be accomplished only through direction from a master. The problem lies not in knowing 
what we must do, but how we are to do it. And the how is learned only by watching and 
following.”13 Lacking God, Kirk wrote that humans “act either according to impulse or 
in obedience to ‘common utilitarianism.’” Across his writings, he was firm in this 
conviction: “So far as liberty, equality, and fraternity have any existence or meaning in 
modern society, they are rooted in Christian morality; and if positivists and rationalists 
succeed in their endeavor to explode the religious convictions of society, they will bury 
in the ruins those very liberal social principles by which the school of J.S. Mill professes 
to live.” The “fundamental internal error” of utilitarian, modern politics was “that 
society can be ruled by discussion. But the tremendous impelling power in all societies is 
force;” and few forces were more compelling than religion and place.14
A Manner of Communion 
 
A more “properly ordered” means of virtue drawn from community norms, 
tradition, custom, and accumulated wisdom has in common with many postmodern 
critics an antipathy to the dogmas of modernity. There is skepticism that reliance on 
forms of rationalism is sufficient to solve what are, for the “traditionalist” conservative, 
fundamentally moral problems. The fallen, inherently sinful nature of humanity could in 
fact be redeemed, but not by a mechanistic spectacle, not by experts, and certainly not in 
this life. For Kirk, the political expressions of modernity were a road to relativism, moral 
decay, and an unfortunate, enormous appetite for innovation. The moral imagination 
must survive as a guide for society in this gap. I believe this imaginative, sentimentalist 
perspective of the modern world colored nearly the entirety of Kirk’s persuasion. 
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“Postmodern conservatism,” a term new to the discussion of how the “right” could 
reform itself, is perhaps one avenue of returning conservatism to a different mode of 
discourse, one less enamored over the pursuits of political power. With regard to human 
organization, the dialectic of logical analysis that arranges in accordance to abstract 
notions of the individual or society was characteristic of liberal modernism. According 
to Russello’s The Postmodern Imagination of Russell Kirk, such dialectic imparted only 
a “thin” theory of life. An imaginative writing, though, was concerned with the 
formulation of images and the cultivation of imagination.15
Such an imaginative sensibility, inspired by Kirk and other writers,
 Be it poetry, history, or the 
many variations of opinion-giving, this “knowledge” that humanity was meant for 
eternity considered itself aware of ethical truth and abiding law in the chaos of events, 
which set humans apart from the momentary existence of other animals.  
16 might be 
characterized as an “inexplicable faculty” that strengthened the bonds of human love and 
communion. Despair, a crisis of meaning, could be avoided because it was possible to 
distinguish between the good and disillusions of progress. Individualism, the argument 
went, was isolated and self-seeking; it cannot long endure. Man is a highly social, 
“gregarious animal.” The very idea of modern individualism was unstable, Kirk wrote, 
because humans are made for cooperation. Individualism is the negation of society: “We 
yearn to be love and to be loved, to belong to something bigger than ourselves…When 
we cease to cooperate, the average sensual man becomes Cain, with his hand against 
every man’s. In such a condition, there exists freedom of a sort, but it is what John 
Adams called the freedom of the wolf, as distinguished from the moral freedom of the 
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truly human person.”17 Love, always stronger than death, endured in the constant of 
human nature. The freedom that does exhaust itself was a product of a culture 
“coddling” communion through the values – the generational knowledge of elders and 
extended family members – within the small spheres of local community. Its ends were 
indifferent to political maneuverings aimed toward earthly perfectibility; those ends, 
Kirk wrote, tend toward devolution away from true perfection and into the repressions of 
pure power. His manner of communion – organic, slow to develop, and unorganized by 
political authority – was embracing of the “truly free,” as there is an object, a fulfilling 
end, of personal and familial affection. Completed only with a transcendent full 
communion, a “matured culture” allowed history, custom, tradition, and accumulated 
wisdoms to preserve the well-ordered guides of personhood. All ages and institutions 
were to be judged in the light of such principles of justice and order, learned in part 
through revelation and in part through the long and often painful experiences of 
humanity.18
For Kirk’s “Gothic mind” and “Bohemian Tory” approach, many public debates 
were among different stands of a similar liberalism. (Most notably, many economically 
“conservative” notions were economically “liberal.”) It was wrong, he wrote, to 
prematurely follow the assumptions of the many flowerings of utilitarian assumption, 
such as that institutions were likely good and that “freedom of choice” was a good, so 
long as others were not clearly harmed. Ontologically, he found many social and 
political arguments to be centered in a self-serving utilitarianism.
 Modern concepts of freedom, it followed in his critiques, were unresponsive 
to his ideas of “natural right.” 
19 That such sentiment, 
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beautiful and forcefully stated as it might be, do not and likely cannot exist comfortably 
in the world (modern or otherwise), was recognized by Kirk.20 But to dwell on this 
reality was to miss the point of his persuasions, especially as a conjurer of imagination 
and images. The “instruments of effectiveness,” as was fitting with his “bohemian” 
persona and “man of letters” lifestyle, were predominantly stories, remembrances, and 
imaginative readings. As with freedom and modernity, he suggested there were limits to 
what language could offer. Language had to point to something else beyond human 
capacity; it was not to be thought of as encompassing. What must be rejected were 
assumptions of rationalism when engaged in personal interactions. Thoughts did not 
mimic hypothesis and language need not adhere to rationalist argument in expressing a 
point. Kirk, this is to say, spoke and wrote discursively, inviting the reader to an “anti-
modern” association in resemblance to the associations of family and locality.21
In this association, the rhetorical path could be loquacious and repetitive, full of 
play, but the language did not endlessly reflect on itself. It worked for a goal that may 
have required memorable – and, not infrequently, somewhat heated and apocalyptic – 
language to draw in those of a like-minded, traditionalist, literary disposition. In that 
spirit, he did not attempt to define his terms in detail. His view of modernity was, 
therefore, not well formulated. In engaging the work he produced in more than four 
decades of correspondence, writing, and lecturing, I conclude he observed the many 
working definitions of this large term, modernity, in a similar fashion because he felt 
they shared an underlying framework: humans have the ability to think like a “god.” 
This state of mind (that individuals are responsible to themselves first, inherently 
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possessing the constructive ability and the right to pursue freedom and its ensuring 
contracts22) was, in practice, a politicized temptation to the exercise of calculated, 
centralizing compulsion. Kirk, for instance, was certainly not the only commentator in 
the immediate aftermath of two gruesome conflicts to criticize world war as a direct 
consequence of the collapsed modern project. Surveying the devastation, he found the 
divorce of power and person complete after centuries of reductionism. Personhood was 
reduced to subjectivity as impersonal institutions and processes followed a “soulless 
logic.” According to political scientist Rein Staal, “the aspirations that had inspired the 
founders of modern thought – the conquest of nature through science, indeed the 
conquest of human nature through science and the emancipation of power from moral 
restraint – had been achieved beyond anyone’s wildest dreams, and they had turned to 
ashes before that success could be enjoyed.”23
 The imaginative, historical reading of The Conservative Mind and The Roots of 
American Order
 In Kirk’s mind, the mission was to 
counter the trendy, the radical, and the morally defective. And his alternative included 
pointed evaluations of those within the American conservative movement who bought 
into the premises of liberal modernity.  Defining himself against presumptive allies 
sharpened the imaginative, historically-based reading: as a man unbound to ideology and 
political expediency, opposition was an obligation. Many conservatives, lacking first 
principles, were too easily and too cheaply seduced in ways not dissimilar to the 
liberalisms of leftist causes. Temporal authority was their common end.   
24 located its enemy in the utilitarianism and romanticism of several 
Enlightenment figures, Bentham, Mill, and Rousseau first among them. Their ideals 
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were the underpinning of utopian, ideological dreams “left” and “right,” including the 
libertarianism and socialism strongly present in the currents of twentieth century 
American political discourse. To escape the structures of liberalism and “reconnect” 
with an older, pre-Enlightenment Western tradition was Kirk’s way to avoid the 
scheming trample of long-developing culture and tradition, the asymmetrically strange 
and odd, the nonconformist, and the mysteriously religious.25 Utilitarianism – lurking in 
the universalizing, coldly rationalist and secular equality of the Enlightenment, the 
ideological fever of the French Revolution, and the elevation of unmoored “rights” – 
could, he wrote, be countered by the search for meaning. The things true for all people at 
all times, transcending matter and time, came through interpretation mediated by 
historical experience. From the understanding that man was made “in the image of a 
Person who is invisible,” ethical principles emerged that make easier the difficulty of 
humans living well in a community, “so that they will not be as the beasts that perish.” 
An order of a society, whatever its modern pretenses, could shine through to grant an 
ethical meaning to existence.26 The “permanent things” were the measure of true societal 
progress. Upholding these produced higher social goods than utility: norms of courage, 
duty, justice, integrity, charity, and familial help were Kirk’s standard for judging 
persons and their institutions.27 Such an appreciation of norms were acquired in the 
outgrowth of organic community unorganized by the mechanisms of the state, beginning 
with family and extending to the small spheres of community such as church and school. 
Accumulated experience was the teacher of life.28 But, following Burke, Kirk sensed 
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that history, even as it instructed, could be perverted by the passions of human sin. 
Burke wrote in Reflections on the Revolution in France: 
We do not draw the moral lessons we might from history. On the contrary, without care 
it may be used to vitiate our minds and to destroy our happiness. In history a great 
volume is unrolled for our instruction, drawing the materials of future wisdom from the 
past errors and infirmities of mankind. It may, in the perversion, serve for a magazine 
furnishing offensive and defensive weapons for parties in church and state, and 
supplying the means of keeping alive or reviving dissentions and animosities, and adding 
fuel to civil fury. History consists for the greater part of the miseries brought upon the 
world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, 
and all the train of disorderly appetites which shake the public with the same.29
 
  
For Burke and his traditionalist American followers, permanent causes of evil 
could adopt different ruses and diverse causes in differing ages. He continued, “those 
attending only to the shell and husk of history” may think they are waging war with 
“intolerance, pride, and cruelty” but they are, “under the color of abhorring the ill 
principles of antiquated parties” instead “authorizing and feeding the same odious vices 
in different factions, and perhaps worse.”30 Thus a revived ancient order, however 
imaginative or rooted its qualities, should reconcile itself to the strength of ethical 
perception beyond the earthbound barriers of experience and momentary events. Herein 
was the necessity of poetry and art capable of informing and inspiring humanity to value 
the inherent dignity of their nature. The assumptions of utility and the lessons of history 
alone, Kirk adamantly held, were insufficient for the good life. In fact, they were a 
terminal path of disillusion and boredom. And so the “idyllic imagination” of Rousseau 
(whom Burke called “the insane Socrates of the National Assembly”), which rejected old 
dogmas and manners, rejoiced in the notion of emancipation from duty and convention 
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and in the end harmed the forming of a normative consciousness which should be 
nourished, at least in part, by a literature of moral imagination.31
Responding to Crisis 
   
In his critiques of modernity, Kirk brought the preservation of human agency (of 
a religious sort) into his perceptions of an ideal modern freedom. And the non-ideal was 
thought to manifest something resembling a secular religion. Rigid, a priori abstractions 
of individual liberty were, in effect, worshipful; but they worshiped planning and 
science, in agreement with Mill’s argument that the grand sources of human suffering 
were conquerable by human striving. In contrast, a sentiment of locality and community 
restraint, informed by an enduring morality, was a firm refusal of the utilitarianism that 
was “the immediate inspiration of a crowd of anti-religious and anti-traditional 
popularizing writers.” As a harbinger of the “lavish hopes for material comfort,” he 
derisively summarized Mill: “These superior human beings, as they progress toward 
material perfection, will cease to require the childish comforts of religious consolation; 
present sufferings abolished, they will shrug their shoulders at the prospect of eternal 
life.”32
In this dissertation, it is through comparisons to “utilitarian thinkers” that biases, 
rhetorical terminologies and historically-based narratives take their texture. In Kirk’s 
writings was an assumption of the opacity of “fact.”
 By contrast, Kirk’s “permanent things” could be possessed in ways permanent to 
the conduct of life, through subjection to the “properly ordered.” Historically informed 
sentiments were a tool for that mysterious journey.  
33 This is not to say he rendered facts 
wrongly, only that his assumptions of historical continuity – such as a straight line from 
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Burke to an American founding certainly influenced by Locke and “Enlightenment” 
principle – may have brought too much of his own intellectual desire to the dialogues he 
instigated and shaped. To briefly consider a contrast, the “third person narration” of a 
historical telling, generally but not always dispassionate, is itself a rhetorical device. 
Facts are linguistically delivered, a cog in the larger discourse that is not a strict 
reproduction of incidents (which an audience might take it to be). Yet the manner of the 
“telling,” removed and seemingly uninvolved, occupies the illusion of unbiased 
reproduction. There was little such posturing with Kirk, whose language, style and 
content did not follow a logical pattern to get a point across. His persuasions (discursive, 
narrative, “fiction-centric,” and full of story and play34
 By facing a “modernity” distinguished as socially and economically atomizing, 
the narrative of alternative sentiments expected to build and support localized civic 
) feature little pretense of existing 
as unbiased or straightforward. The “certainty” of his rhetoric was not in the language or 
terminology, given that he made few attempts to step outside of a “conservative 
framework.” And the rejection of “rationalism” in politics was further evidenced by the 
absence of “hypothesis” from his social and political writings. Aims plainly evident, he 
intended for an audience to reach his own conclusions with him through a process of 
reading and hearing and thinking. But it was not only this, as their shared agenda was 
largely indefinable. In the popularizing of Burke and an Ango-American conservatism, 
Kirk’s rhetorical inventions were a response to the crisis of modernity through the 
criticism of the excesses of individual autonomy and its literary, historical constructions 
of an alternative narrative.  
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institutions. These “small spheres” were a descendent, and more broadly a synonym, of 
Burke’s “little platoons” of family and local association.35 The complexities of 
humanity, life itself, and the realities of sin were benefitted by institutional support, 
afforded by adherence to some ancient customs (marriage first among them). Marriage 
relationships with children, for example, also involved the neighborhood and the varied 
layers of community. The union is elaborated for extended periods of time, many 
conservatives have argued, both in social costs and in social capital. Thus public 
commitments to the parameters of marriage are reasonable and vital – for those wishing 
to raise a family in particular. By this view, those part of a relationship receiving benefits 
from institutional commitment should encounter no shame or disregard. “Public” 
commitments tend to be stronger than “private” ones. Marriage, a long-developed 
custom, deserves community support. The traditionalist might state that aggregate trends 
pinpoint the married family with children as a cornerstone of society and morality, a 
worthy example to be emulated, and a reflection of the love of God whose sanctity is 
under constant threat.36
In other words, it is because so few are exceptional in their talents, opportunities, 
and circumstances that norms and institutions matter. This manner of thought is, I have 
suggested, essentially a rejection of the liberal Enlightenment-based project. At the risk 
of over-generalization, in the modern project, dominant in so many public arenas from 
issues of law and economy to entertainment and sports, the destiny of the individual is 
shaped, to a large extent, by their own conception of their own imperatives. This is an 
assumption common even among the “political right” broadly defined. In his opinion of 
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the controversial Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, Justice Anthony, an 
appointee of President Ronald Reagan, wrote: “At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.”37
Their adversaries are the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse – in particular that Fourth 
Horseman, who is called Revolution. Yet my young comrades and I, pursued and 
pursuing through the ponds and scrub of the Pere Marquette railway yards in the dark, 
rescued prisoners from the enemies’ base: we found it possible to win against odds. If 
we defy the Four Horsemen, it may come to pass that the Permanent Things will not fall 
trophy to Chaos and Old Night.
 A contrasting view might highlight the costs of unchecked individual 
autonomy or challenge those concepts of freedom without a “virtuous” end, promoting 
instead the self-denial and delayed gratification that have served the past well. When 
such “conservative sentiments” of restraint, locality, and family-orientation bloom, 
figures like Kirk might suggest that however furiously and well he wrote, they were only 
a small part of the revival. The world and the person cannot be remade by the flame of 
any flawed human image. The long-existing sentiments he was tapping into, rather, were 
a conduit of recovery. In an essay detailing the more genuinely conservative (distrusting 
of the “typical social planner, trained in Benthamite methods, blind to individuality and 
true order, intent only upon Efficiency and Simplicity”), he wrote of the obligation to 
recovery order, moral and political, “a task to stagger Hecules.” He conjured up battle 
imagery (“Ignorant armies, supplied with the weapons of annihilation, clash by night on 
our darkling plain”) and concluded: 
38
 
   
  Such representative flourish and content, perhaps overly prone to blustering and 
usually lacking in specific policy prescriptions, are less credible in a society that highly 
values progress, mobility, and individualism. Kirk’s traditional conservatism, as I have 
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identified it, does have an air of irrelevancy and quaintness. A deep skepticism of 
“material opportunity” and “social improvement,” entrenched also in the conduct of his 
personal and family life,39 could be described as antithetical to the American experience, 
especially in the midst of a long economic expansion. The sentiments and responses to 
modernity of Kirk and those of a loose but related grouping (“southern agrarians” and 
“paleo-conservatives”) were not explicit as a base of influence for policy or political 
discourse. One reason is that the “Old Right mentality” was as much an instinct and a 
aesthetic taste as a set of commitments, and orchestrating an argument around questions 
of taste is, perhaps, a hopeless enterprise. Much of what I have labeled the 
“traditionalist” outlook stemmed from a sentimentalized affection, which may or may 
not be originated in an actual, shared experience of the past.40
Out of Fashion 
 This contributed to the 
making of his influence as less than what it could have been. Today, Kirk’s impact upon 
American “rightist” thought and practice is at times negligible, even within the confines 
of an “intellectual conservatism” increased in popularity to the point of becoming a 
prominent political movement.  
In a sense, Kirk was a victim of the successes of which he was an integral part. 
With conservatives in a position by the late 1970s to harness the mechanisms of 
government toward national power, a thinker who declined to participate with the details 
of policy would inevitably lose audience to “experts,” technical and otherwise. Clad in 
out-of-fashion suits, immersed in old books, and a self-described “bohemian,” he was 
oddly out of place with the media savvy and business-like soldiers of the “Reagan 
  
206 
revolution.” There is also a bigger gulf: his defense of “natural” hierarchies, grave 
misgivings of technology, and relative silence on the danger of “bigger government” to 
economic growth (especially by comparison to the more libertarian-minded) were 
informed by moral and aesthetic worries. A disdain for populism and the identification 
of the Reagan-era conservative project with “freedom” and “democratic capitalism” 
were reasons enough for marginalization, no matter how strong the mutual hostility to 
centralization.41 Kirk’s Catholic Christianity and invocation of a “constituted” past to 
validate sociopolitical principles, parallel to and informed by a religious heritage, were 
at odds with those within the conservative intellectual movement (particularly the “neo-
conservatives”) who worked to shape conservatism in a way less considerate of the past. 
For the “neo-conservative” critic, history may well need a secular redemption, a freeing 
from the present to become more open and thriving in the future. For Kirk, these 
“forward-looking” worldviews contested with the collectivist movements on its own 
liberal terms; they were, in essence, arguments among cousins. He continuously cited a 
preoccupation with liberty in the Anglo-American political tradition as a root of its 
moral malaise.42
An “associative” view of socio-political order animated by the moral imagination 
and the sentiments of religiosity was, essentially, a cultural effort. Perpetuation of the 
factions of politics and attempting to impose beliefs through the fiats of law – politics, in 
other words, being more important than culture – was conducive to the framework that 
replaced one imposition for another, unconcerned with an ultimate ethic in the pursuit of 
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power. Kirk recognized America and the West in the “Age of Enlightenment” to not be 
incomparable in this respect:  
Yet presidents of the United States must not be encouraged to make Perpetual War for 
Perpetual Peace, nor to fancy that they can establish a New World Order through 
eliminating dissenters. In the second century before Christ, the Romans generously 
liberated the Greek city-states from the yoke of Macedonia. But it was not long before 
the Romans felt it necessary to impose upon those quarrelsome Greeks a domination 
more stifling to Hellenic freedom and culture than ever Macedon had been. It is a duty of 
the Congress of the United States to see that great American Caesars do not act 
likewise.43
 
 
Kirk’s incorporative manner of things true across time and history as applicable to 
current crisis confronted modernity as the elevation of a private rationality over 
accumulated wisdom. This facilitated impersonal actions at the expense of the small 
spheres of home, family, and local community. Its motives for action were not love and 
communion but some manner of utility, just another step up the ladder of exercising 
secular authority. And so to once again generalize a complex subject: under the umbrella 
of modernity, personhood was “reduced” to individuality, a wellspring of the modern, 
Western, liberal tradition which flowed through Locke and many of his contemporaries. 
This generalization was one reason Kirk maintained the worldviews of contemporary 
political discourse, right or left, each tended to fight on “liberal terms” as cousins. (To 
return to the example of libertarianism and socialism, one emphasized political liberty 
and another economic equality.) Political liberty included within it a notion of equality 
argued in terms of rights. A liberal political paradigm accepted both political liberties as 
a basis of social order as well as economic equality – equality was, then, not inherent in 
the fundamental dignity of the person but an outgrowth of political liberty referring back 
to right and opportunity.  
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“Red Tories” such as Phillip Blond, sharing in the similar intellectual sentiments 
of Kirk,44 have argued this is precisely the wrong place for a society to be. Personhood 
as reduced to an atomistic individual is isolated and self-willing, deluded into a supposed 
capability of determining actions and goods without societal interference. In this 
argument, rightist and leftist movements have substituted rights for the dignity and value 
of personhood. And among the more regrettable products was a managerial state that has 
wrecked havoc on “the old mutualism of the working class.” The result is a “destroyed” 
middle and working class morality in the name of permissiveness, and a 
commoditization of intimacy and the body: “this left-libertarianism repudiated all ties of 
kith and kin and, through it was utopian in aspiration, its true legacy has been the 
dystopia of divided families, unparented children and the lazy moral relativism of the 
liberal professional elite.”45 Traditionalist conservatives were not surprised such 
anthropology would lead to the “de-personalizing” of persons where the “violation” of 
“rights” becomes a chief societal offense.46
Discourses of Values 
 Here, also, is an explanation for the 
difficulty of gauging the impact of Kirk’s persuasions. Appeals against modernisms 
were, in and of themselves, inescapably a part of the modern project by technological 
delivery, as well as by assumption. Through responding to political struggles and public 
policy issues, the offering of solutions (however vague and cultural-centric) suggested 
that humans were in fact able to discover satisfactory solutions for their problems. Kirk’s 
rhetorical inventions, no matter how coherent or compelling, in their attempts at poetry 
and aesthetics might best be thought of as “beautiful losers.” 
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The healthy cultural and spiritual environment of his vision, elusive even to those 
chasing it, was apprehended in a shared language of values. Kirk asked the reader to 
imagine that the world of his rendering was a real world, one in which readers were to 
make their way through active engagement with the materials of the text to learn about 
the real or imagined world of which they are a part. The reading was reconstructive and 
participatory, an “experience from the inside, with the intimacy of the artisan, if only in 
a tentative and momentary way, the life of the language that makes a world.”47 His 
creative facilities opposed the “individualistic” ethos of the United States, and it spurned 
the idea that the American Constitution of 1789 was, largely, a “Lockean” construction. 
He warned against “choice” as a high virtue, because the convenience of choice could 
become an unanticipated, lonely terror.48 Individual autonomy as a central truth that 
should be vindicated by social and political order was for Kirk a form of dissociation, a 
surrender of the soul to obsession for immediate yet unfulfilling enjoyment. Society was, 
instead, an intricate continuity of lives. To raise the human condition to a level less 
unworthy began by “brightening the corner where you are; by improving one human 
unit, yourself, and helping your neighbor.”49
His discourses imparted, implicitly and explicitly, that humans were communal, 
moral beings meant to accomplish something good, in ways big or small, during their 
short stay in the temporary world. In confronting modernity, Kirk and other conservative 
thinkers
  
50 unearthed what was for them a paradox: modernity was both marked by 
relentless warfare and a universally declared desire for peace. Commitments once 
reserved for local community had been transferred to mass movements standing as 
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surrogate moral communities, providing an otherwise missing sense of historical 
purpose. With the dissociation of “traditional” communities from the centers of power, 
the “modern” ventures of war, standardization, mechanization, and bureaucracy become 
invested with their own sense of moral identity and belonging.51 Regardless of the truth 
of such sentiment, I believe it was understood by traditionalists that moralizing was 
insufficient to end the supposedly corrosive character of abstract freedom, especially 
economic freedom. The corrosive character of society could not “end.” And as a result, 
despite a period of American “conservative” ascendancy in the wake of discontentment 
with “liberal” government actions, the “familial, religious, and local” communities 
continued to suffer a decline. This was due, at least in part, to the traditionalist inability 
to provide a plausibly authoritative account for norms of tradition, faith, and place – 
regardless of the actual norms of law, markets, and choice.52
Kirk’s persuasions against a utility to “personhood,” where the social limits of 
developing customs and institutions were dismissed to “free” human agency, necessarily 
made provision for transcendent metaphysical principle. By this principle, all signs were 
not arbitrary and all meaning was not existentially or culturally constructed. The “small 
sphere” of local community, originating in the family unit that mimics the love of God, 
was for Kirk and his followers an imagination capable of comprehending the true and 
the good in ways that motivate humanity to the objective realities, to the truths that move 
human hearts to the actions beneficial to their natures. Wayne C. Booth, in his 
ruminations on the purposes of rhetoric, pinpointed this as the “central metaphysical 
question”: who or what made the universe such that it can be apprehended only in a 
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shared language of values? He wrote that “rhetorical questions pursued honestly will 
finally lead to a God-term.” Although Booth was dismissive of reliance on “any 
religious doctrine to show how much has been wrong with the doctrines of modernism,” 
he and Kirk would, I believe, find common ground in the “central notion that man’s 
value-embedded symbolic processes are as real as anything we know.” Both might agree 
that man is self-making and remaking, a symbol-manipulating creature, an exchanger of 
information, a communicator, a persuader and manipulator, an inquirer.53 Man is a 
“rhetorical animal,” imposing belief through personal engagement – but to what end? I 
argue that Kirk would concur with Booth’s statement that “the ‘whole scene’ of the 
atomic self, isolated in a cold universe, is undermined, the great liberal, critical fiat, 
‘Make up your own mind,’ no longer quite makes sense.”54
Kirk’s “literary Catholicism” taught that constructs, and the constituted 
communities of their imaginative reading, employed a reality more intelligible by the 
transcendent. Physical symbols were in union with meanings; the “indissoluble unity” 
between signifier and signified made it possible to grasp the depths of mystery.
 (Nonetheless, Kirk would 
rebuff any claim of meaning as simply linguistic.)  
55 Kirk’s 
constituted community and symbolic meanings attempted to break the barrier of 
momentary, private experience. His “moral imagination” was sacramental. Without it, he 
foresaw an “armed doctrine” in the vacuums of individualistic modernism, an inverted 
religion utilizing “central political power and strength of arms to enforce conformity to 
its ‘rational’ creed.” His critique of modernity was a lament at the destruction of ancient 
institutions and beliefs for a cleared path to utopia. Secular dogmas replaced a Christian 
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charity with false “fraternity;” the symbols of transcendence were adapted to a new order 
but in a degraded form, the incessant promise of an appetite satisfied motivating the 
malicious.56
 
 As ensconced by an innate desire for communion, by custom, and by 
accumulated wisdom, humans do possess in the rhetoric of “moral imagination” the 
faculty for ethical perception. Whatever its imagination, historical constructs, and 
rhetoric, Kirk’s critique of a modernity that has abandoned this love and communion 
offered little that was “new.” Tapping into ancient arguments about unseen things, he 
insisted audiences recognize purpose among creation. This insistence was integral to his 
arguments as an author and indicative of his failures as a socio-political figure with a 
lasting and concrete legacy.  
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Creation in Imagination: Postmodern Rhetorical Constructions  
 
Russell Kirk was one of the first American conservatives after the Second World 
War to perceive in “postmodernism” an opportunity for conservatism to assert itself 
amid the collapse and confusion of “modernity.” Surveying the Western political and 
social landscape after decades of conflict, he was skeptical and cynical toward what he 
termed “ages of reason” positing logical, empirical answers for the messiness of the 
human condition. Those responses to crisis and uncertainly he classified as too closely 
binding an individual will and vision of leadership with actions not contemplative of 
other persons. Inspired by Edmund Burke’s opinion that casting aside revealed religion 
and organic civil society for a “humanistic religion” would bring forth unpredictable and 
revolutionary consequences, Kirk claimed to persuade in the void of an “exhausted” 
modernity. In the place of a “defecated rationality,” empty theory, and cold reason 
should exist an “age of sentiments,” conviction derived from other sources than human 
reason alone.1 He wanted for humanity, disciplined by tradition and imagination, to 
eschew the temptations of “systematic thinking” but still find a unity of vision, based 
upon serene temperament and an embrace of values and mystery.2
The persuasive language of Kirk was, I argue, fortified by the skepticism of what 
could be termed “postmodernism.”
  
3 More specifically, his conservatism – sourced in an 
unknowable, transcendent order and set against ideology in its preservation of worthy 
customs and conventions in its “humble attitude” toward a cautious change – overlapped 
with the postmodernist distrust of legitimating knowledge through an overarching 
system of thought, particularly a system which would suggest to encompass legitimate 
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truth and proper societal placement of various organizational parts. Kirk’s incredulity 
toward “metanarratives,” in other words, rebuffed a totalizing series of propositions. The 
second “postmodern” aspect of Kirk’s language and persona was a rejection of the 
“autonomous self” and an acceptance of a “social construction” attitude toward life. This 
construction, as has been argued, came from the tradition, custom, and convention (more 
than a bit of it imaginatively conjured) which developed and perpetuated meaning 
through the learned practices and symbolisms of expression – fragilely, the vital work of 
each successive generation. 
A Refutation of Self 
In “postmodern” discourse, self is often displaced as a central presence in 
experience and appropriated as a personal signifier. This is, in effect, a refutation of self 
as a central presence in human experience and a turning away from commentaries 
directing toward the processes of rationalization.4
As a theory of power, rhetoric talks about how opposing ideas and opposing people 
relate to one another in discourse and how people create discourse in the context of 
which to execute their power plays and power moves. Rhetoric shows us how to argue, 
which is a way of defending ourselves against attack. It shows us how to justify. It 
shows us what counts as evidence, how to find evidence, how to do research. It shows us 
how to approach judgment. And it also tells us how to make judgments and how to 
justify our judgments.
 As a thinker and popularizer against 
the power of the large, the mechanized, and the rationally planned, I think that Kirk’s 
persuasions of more “properly ordered” sentiments (those orientated toward home, 
history, custom and community) fit Michael McGee’s summary of rhetoric in the context 
of postmodernism:  
5
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In the approach to judgment so as to sway an outcome, the persuasive will can be 
employed as discourse to influence the environment by promoting identification with the 
audience. This appeal is not an “imposition” but an “invitation” to an association greater 
than the individual. Such identification is a form of “community building” through the 
artful, attractive capacity of words for any number of purposes. And among the 
purposes, of course, might be an increase of influence or actual power. If modernism as 
a political perspective (as some of its critics would have it) is rooted more in the 
“empirical” than the “transcendent,” I would suggest that the “postmodern” and the 
“conservative” might find common cause against the drive for power as channeled 
through the individual will – where experts or markets would dominate more than shared 
conceptions of the sacred. For Kirk, the “rationalist” pursuit of wanted goods defined 
what was “good” by what was desired and by the means of its delivery. Thus the 
elevation of scientific knowledge became, for the human will, an “instrument of his 
moral and physical destruction.”6 A formula of ideology promising earthly paradise was, 
by such sentiment, a totalizing system and a destructive grand narrative of power. 
Solutions, it followed, resembled an inverted religion resistant to compromise against its 
absolute truth. In its rhetoric and sentiments, the commonalities of postmodernism and 
Kirk’s conservatism are at the intersection of this “anti-ideology.”7
 Kirk’s end was not the fulfillment of personal desire but the regeneration of the 
moral imagination for his time. And his time was a period overly enamored with 
technology, planning, and confidence in the human ability to discover ever better means 
of existence. He conveyed humanity was engaged in a struggle against the “altar of 
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progress” of an abstracted reasoning devoid of experience and historical lesson. Human 
disregard for sentiments of mystery, custom, and tradition was a vulnerability to the 
romantic magnetism of utilitarianism, and “leaders in spirit and mind must be taught to 
rise superior to material possessions; and this cannot be accomplished without a 
genuinely ethical or humanistic working.”8 Those who knew him intimately have 
recounted a lifelong antagonism to efforts among American conservatives to keep or 
develop an ideology.9 Kirk sensed that “ideology” enshrined an objectionable and false 
abstractness to historically contingent beliefs. And disastrously, his political allies might, 
in practice, advocate to impose something resembling a civil religion. Especially in the 
case of foreign military conflicts, this was likely to lead to disastrous results, no matter 
how innocent the motives.10
Countering Ideology 
  
Ideology, like imagination, might arise from anywhere in his rhetoric. The 
critiques of traditionalists tended to find ideology most prevalent in politics.11 For them, 
it functioned as a replacement religion. Second, an ideological rigidity made political 
compromise very difficult. Ideology was for these writers a manner of “religious 
dogmatism” in a political context, one completely inconsistent with a conservative 
outlook due to the minimization of the nuances and shades of gray that animate social 
and political life. In summarizing this sentiment, Gerald Russello, author of The 
Postmodern Imagination of Russell Kirk, has labeled ideology a “quintessential modern 
product” because “it divides the real from the theoretical and inflates the latter ant the 
expense of the former.” To counter this, Kirk’s moral imagination featured discernment, 
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as one of its chief purposes was “the ability to see through the travails of the moment 
into certain truths.” This “vision” began with an appreciation of the transcendent as a 
check against the hubris of totalities, concrete or theoretical. The elusiveness of the 
“central mysteries of life,” which could reinvigorate the ethical and practical motions of 
daily conduct, was also an opportunity for creation and discovery through the uses of a 
faculty central to human morality: imagination. Kirk’s use of the term “imagination” was 
for the purpose of such discernment. His persuasive abilities, inflamed by a believing 
Catholicism, were aimed at taking a “fractured self” and reconstructing toward the 
highest end, the ethical.12
After his conversion in 1963 at age 45, Kirk’s transcendent moral imagination 
was further activated by Catholicism and what I have termed its “sacramental 
imagination.”
  
13 This encompassing way of life demanded, as he saw it, an “emptying of 
self” by the sacraments and their prompts to a healing reconciliation and a continual 
prayerful contemplation. As evidenced by aesthetic pleasure, the moral imagination was 
a formidable persuader.14 But, Kirk asked, what of the many (including those who might 
claim apostolic faith) with a “diabolic imagination” – those who search for identity 
through the ideologies and images that surround them? These tend to be driven by what 
“sells,” or what is thought to “work,” aiding what Kirk might characterize as an 
intolerable civil social order.15 I believe that one question he struggled with was the 
following: within an aggressively secular public sphere, what also existed alongside a 
fallen human nature, when there is too much reliance on a straitened form of rationalism 
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and the false science of materialism to address fleeting feelings of emptiness – 
effectively, a spiritual deficiency?  
The “Kirkian” conservative was likely to view all political problems, at their 
foundation, as moral or spiritual problems. And the postmodern might view all political 
problems as unsolvable, as humans exist in the confusions of rootless, circulating 
fictions.16
In this imaginative and creative task, most important was the work toward 
“redemption.”
 If rights-based liberalism, with a more mechanistic view of the human 
imagination, fetish for rational solutions, and love of power-wielding experts finds its 
political expression in modernity, a “postmodern conservative” might view the “liberal” 
(that is, Enlightenment) order as failing to meet the always-present necessity of human 
mystery and unexplainable sentiment (that is, spirituality). This is to say that “what 
comes next” need not be a “hyper-modernism” of relativism, amorality, devotion to 
unending progress and innovation, and derision of tradition. Kirk’s “moral imagination,” 
with its power of perception and claims of possession of universal value testifying to the 
inherent dignity of human life, was a pursuit of virtue confluent with the common 
pursuit of standards of discrimination that resisted the aims and designs of the “enemies 
of permanent things.” It was a denial of the concept that humanity could know or build 
any form of totality. Kirk thought a moral imagination orientated to the permanent things 
to be an enduring source of inspiration that elevated and guided toward virtue, wisdom, 
and first principals. To explain and defend this was the role he assumed. 
17 Within this transcendent, religious context, I suggest that Kirk’s 
incredulity toward “metanarratives” was directed toward a subjective and mediated 
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understandings of, for example, salvation history (truth) presented as salvation history 
itself (Truth), or reducing “The Way, The Truth, and the Life” – which Catholic 
Christianity emphatically states refers to a historical person – to a totalizing series of 
propositions. This is why I contend both postmodernism and the “Burkean,” “Anglo-
American” conservatism which Kirk persuasions wished to build possessed important 
commonalities. These were a rejection of the autonomous self and a reception of the 
social construction of life as guided by tradition and custom, which developed and 
perpetuated meaning through learned practices and the symbolisms of expression. To 
generalize of the cultural impact and communicative language that would allow for 
comparisons, in both of these large terms (postmodernism and conservatism) is an 
earnest epistemology – a critique countering themes of modernity – as well as an arch 
cultural schtick of persuasion, something less philosophically serious and more 
culturally aesthetic. This rhetorical device of creation, persona, and imagination does 
facilitate, I believe, a feasibly constructed interjection of language (a persuasion most 
successful among the “religiously-inclined”) crucially assisting the call toward the more 
“permanent,” yet always mysterious, things.  
And because there was, for the traditionalists, so much reality that would remain 
hidden, there was much that language could not adequately capture. In making sense of 
the stories of modernity, a “contextualization” of issues following an established (rooted 
in “history”) and sentimentalized pattern of “ethics” and “morals” was helpful.18 Amid 
the inexplicable ways of political and societal organization, emotions and experiences 
like uncertainty, suffering, frustration, and a sense of story from another point of view 
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could be conveyed with loss or distortion. For the traditionalists, the “moderns” were 
missing vital elements of societal order. Kirk’s task, as he saw it, was to find a way to 
talk and write about these experiences in the language of the “community” and 
“association,” attractive to the like-minded as well as a larger potential audience. This 
process required thinking about the language itself: what it can do, what it can be made 
to do, and its limitations.19
Postmodern Rhetorical Critique 
 The “spiritual” and “traditionalist” actions and arguments, in 
other words, were involvement by means of invention to a reimagining of the world and 
not to a routine application of established rules or principles. Thus Kirk’s conservative 
sentiments were, like Burke’s, highly “adaptable” even as they emphasized the solidity 
of place, history, tradition, and custom.  
In these considerations of Kirk, the “moral imagination,” and postmodern 
rhetorical construction, I recognize the term “postmodern” is a large and often confused 
one. Here I follow Bruce Gronbeck’s portrayal of postmodern rhetorical critique: the 
base of sociality is rhetorical and social relationships are constructed, maintained, 
repaired, and altered rhetorically, through systems of discourse that humans use to build 
reciprocal roles. He has asserted that “without faith in discursivity, human bonds are 
destroyed,” and that “there are no foundations not only for institutional life – politics, 
education, economics, religion – but no fundament from which the idea of meaning itself 
can arise.” Life contains mutual influence grounded in “shared meaning structures, that 
is, grounded in rhetorical transactions.”20 And so a “rhetorical postmodernism” need not 
abandon attempts to find foundational meaning or truth. There is, instead, recognition 
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that philosophy has limits, and that rationalism – perhaps the most consistent 
underpinning of the “modernist” projects (including the literary and artistic ones), 
against which postmodernism is a reaction – can never eradicate the inherent mysteries 
of existence. A totalizing theorist, by contrast, partaking in the “universalist” and the 
abstract, essentially rejects the incomprehensibility of the human creation through a 
determination to correct its ills by addressing the whole. There is, as Kirk might have 
stated, less of a concern with personal sin than there should be.  
The intersection of Kirk’s Catholic Christianity, his conservatism, and the 
postmodern rhetorical constructions was an understanding and acceptance of the 
unknowable, internalized so as to always scorn promises to unlock the mysteries and 
uncertainties of life. These variations of conservatism and postmodernism recognized 
that humans were situated in a certain time and place. The products of time and place, 
further, could not be separated from their temporality. In the persuasions of “moral 
imagination,” the ideologies opposed by conservatives and the meta-narratives opposed 
by postmodernists turn the temporal into the eternal, the developing into the absolute, 
and truth into Truth. Kirk’s persuasion was a conservative sentiment “anti-ideological” 
in that it opposed making thought and practice – things intimately rooted in time and 
place – into bloodless abstractions uprooted from reality. There was preference to “trust” 
that which had been repeatedly shown to work (insofar as this difficult detection was 
possible) – but not because a new idea must be false or because time-tested wisdom was 
absolute truth itself. The rhetorical constructions, the invitations to join in shared 
assumptions and sentiments through language and ideas, were also questioning the 
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notions of certainty. According to Gerhart Niemeyer, in Kirk’s concept of anti-ideology 
there was embrace of an “intellectual openness toward reality: the immediate reality of 
social, economic, and political relations, and the divine reality beyond and above this 
world. Beyond this openness, conservatives cannot say much about themselves. They 
pretend no firm system of ideas about the means to deal with life’s troubles.”21
This sentiment was most evident in Kirk’s construction of a conservative 
intellectual tradition. Using well-known, well-respected historical figures, he “evoked a 
past from which conservatives could draw their guiding principles and individual 
models.”
  
22 His books, essays, lectures, and mentorship contributed to the “future” and 
also “wrote” the past. The figures lionized in his most famous work, The Conservative 
Mind, forged an “identity” capable of noteworthy rebellion against an ascendant post-
war American liberalism. This book, among several others, was a work of “genealogy,” 
a “recovery” of figures and principles and a significant act of imaginative historical 
scholarship, accomplished through a deliberate attempt to dramatize the past.23
As a Catholic, Kirk was careful to affirm that humanity does possess the ability 
to live well.
 Presented 
were thinkers and actors who “saw” that the modern world’s intention to transform 
aspects of its disappointments – including, possibly, human nature itself – was a failure. 
It was a religious vision only occasionally secularized.  
24 He was influenced by “New Humanist” critics such as Irving Babbitt and 
Paul More; their contention that works of history and literature could serve as moral 
uplift was a lasting influence.25 And some postmodernism, in its acceptance of a 
sentimentalized imagination as a conduit of appreciation for the inexpressible, bemoaned 
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the altar of rationality and ideological construction too often worked to separate 
humanity from historical existence – an existence that should be open to historical 
narrative as fictional construction.26
Thus he highlighted the importance of deference to the dispositions formed by 
trial and error as an expression of collective experience. There should be “that body of 
literature which helps us to form the normative consciousness of the rising generation: 
that is, to enliven the moral imagination.” Kirk described himself as a “historian and 
diagnostician,” not as one who has labored to offer “facile remedies for our present bent 
condition.”
 For Kirk, this was not an elevation of the arbitrary 
or a denunciation of fact and truth, but an incorporation of the concept of the good and 
the limits of knowledge into the conduct of life. He professed such a sentiment as a 
humbled acknowledgment of the mystery that dominated all stages of human existence. 
Ordered societal explanations of totality were to be avoided not simply because humans 
cannot access them, but because it was not wise to human nature to try. The totalitarian 
temptation was far too well established. Humans, Kirk communicated to his audience, 
cannot fulfill the entirety of human desire.  
27 This approach – “history as literature” – engaged the language of a text by 
committing to an imagining of a world where certain declarations of significance were 
valued and others were not. This is one reason why I consider Kirk’s use of language to 
have been both an ethical and a highly social activity. He thought about the human 
condition, and those figures serving as positive (“men of vision”) or negative examples, 
by comparison to a greater good. From this transcendent foundation, a purpose of his 
writings, particularly about history and literature, was to bequest a common culture, 
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ethical and intellectual, so that readers might be united through the works of the mind. 
The language of reverence and mystery was a calling to a higher purpose, a challenge to 
look beyond the temporary and toward an order which holds things in their place. The 
associations might follow the acts of moral imagination were, as a consequence, at least 
in part dependent upon Kirk’s unique interpretation of American history and custom, 
which were presented as “Burkean” and “Anglo-American.”  
A Variant of the Postmodern 
His variant of “postmodernism” was, then, not an attack on truth, virtue, or some 
divine foundation as a basis of human conduct. It was more of an enticement to join a 
community so as to discuss truth, goodness, beauty, and the transcendent things thought 
to give life meaning. There was, in Kirk’s “associational” rhetorical constructions, a 
truth of revelation that should inspire awe, reverence, and humility for all those that 
encounter it. For these, there was the power of ethical perception beyond private 
experience and temporal tedium of momentary events. Philosophically, there was no 
formula capable of reducing the reality of an unseen order (one gradually, partially 
revealed to a human nature properly attuned to it) into a discursive syllogism.28
By definition, human nature is constant. Because of that constancy, men of vision are 
able to describe the norms, the rules, for mankind. From revelation, from custom and 
common sense, and from the intuitive powers of men possessed by genius, we know that 
there exist law for man and law for thing. Normality is the goal of human striving; 
abnormality is the descent toward a condition less than human, surrender to vice.
 Of 
human nature “discovering” truth, Kirk wrote:  
29
 
 
To convey the notion to innovate was not to reform, and to reflect upon how a 
conservative critique of human nature and affairs might impact discussion about the role 
  
228 
of government, Kirk from his earliest writings pondered underlying realities of human 
experiences (elusive and inexpressible as they were). Spiritual voids “addressed” by the 
fleeting pursuits of pleasure should be met, in his view, not by the variations of technical 
pursuit. The discipline of the mind, the instillation of prudence, the presentation of a 
coherent body of ordered knowledge across subjects, and the pursuit of knowledge for 
its own sake better fulfilled human emptiness. As such, the “rising generations” must be 
helped to make their way toward wisdom and virtue. “True freedom of the mind” abides 
by such aims.30
   In this conception of life, to step back from the constant motion of seeking status 
and power, of always being “plugged in” to technology – of religious dogmatism in a 
secular, political context – allowed for the room to express the past and initiate a variety 
of imaginations: historical, poetic, civic prophetic, and moral. As modernism and 
liberalism exhaust, Kirk wrote, it was proper to appeal to the emotional and imaginative 
resources humans can invest in place and personal history. These were essential 
components of the person in the continuation of a social self-identity. The imagination 
gave flesh to sentiments and anxieties, new and abiding, perhaps too inchoate to define 
but still appreciative of beauty, which is the “index to civilization.”
 Through a detailing of these imaginative ethical standards, I believe Kirk 
made use of his fame, stature, and gift with words to construct for his followers an 
“associational” way to talk, read, write, and live. 
31 He behaved, even 
in his non-fiction, as if this renewal could be achieved through a literary narrative. A 
“postmodern conservative”32 possessed concern for the imagery a society creates of 
what it admired and condemned – people can participate in and change history. A 
  
229 
community brought to creation by its language demanded the mysteries of free will, 
divine guidance, human agency, local, family-orientated choices, and the “organic” 
applications of developed, historical custom be respected as cornerstones of a 
temperament in but not of the confusions of modern society. This was one way for the 
natural limits of personal and political power to be better understood.33
Kirk’s associations of imagery and imagination were, I think, designed to foster 
the “ingenuity” of a civil society. The “narrative” form of his writing (as opposed to a 
more strictly “historical” one) was supposed to be conducive to providing lessons and 
examples of valuable meaning drawn from a human consciousness that transcended 
history.
    
34 History, after all, was itself seen to be contained within the immanence of a 
mysterious nature. Kirk, in writing that the “ideologues” and “planners” sought totality 
rather than the seeker of inexpressible permanent things, applied such a prejudice to the 
various ways of understanding civil and historical society. According to Russello, the 
imagination assumed a central place in Kirk’s thought because a disorder of the 
imagination was an inevitable feature of a modern world. This disorder was continuously 
advanced by those leaders that insisted upon the imposition of ideologically-based 
rigidity, regardless of stated intention. Given that people searched for their identity 
through remembered and creatively conjured images, many “modern” images were 
based either on the false science of materialism or a debased sensuality. (Kirk termed 
this the “diabolic imagination.”) And so it fell to the non-ideological conservatives to 
fashion the appropriate images which could convey the sensibilities of mystery to each 
generation. This approach of conservatism was reconstructive, a “recognition that 
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engagement of the sentiments through an imaginative rendering of history was just as 
important as an appeal to reason.”35 
 By such generalizations, I have argued that his conservatism was a descendent of 
the anti-ideology of Edmund Burke, a Whig in alliance with an early period of 
“Enlightenment” British liberalism (the Glorious Revolution) who strongly reacted 
against its excesses in the form of the French Revolution. Irish author Conor Cruise 
O’Brien, relating the bitter split within Burke’s political party, quoted the soaring 
rhetoric his subject delivered to Parliament in May 1791: “I regard the French 
Constitution, not with approbation but with horror, as involving every principle to be 
detested, and pregnant with every consequence to be dreaded and abominated.”36
This skepticism as I have generalized it considered “objective,” “scientific” and 
“empirical” “proof” to not exist when considering the mysteries of the human condition.  
Proof was unlikely to ever exist, in any way “easily” identifiable, to the satisfaction of 
one not inclined to believe an argument in the public sphere about how to organize 
 A 
more proper doctrine of human conduct, Burke might argue, could be found in the 
claims of Christianity and the veneration of an evolved constitution of natural rights 
flowing from the transcendence of Christian revelation, not through quickened designs 
of a hopeful abstraction. I think the “postmodern sentiment” of these generalizations, in 
the “narrative form” of Kirk (and aided by his colorful and quotable language) was a 
useful device for his historical instruction and persuasion and an essential device for his 
constitutions of American conservatism. This was the rhetorical device of “anti-modern” 
skepticism consistently placed in the public sphere.  
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human affairs. Second, for Kirk and the traditionalist conservatives the flawed and finite 
behavior of human thinking – full of selfishness and status-seeking – was unable to 
“know” the truth about the divine, about humankind, and about their environment. 
Knowledge was always filtered through unique perspective. Responses featuring the 
claims of rationality and abstract reason were openings for totalitarian terror. Kirk’s 
rhetoric elevated Burke’s teaching that, given the arrogation of individual reason to rule 
directly over others, it was easy and tempting to increase what reason was ruling, and to 
expand from the “political and legal to the economic, social, moral and spiritual.”37 
Kirk’s “postmodern” rhetorical constructions of the “moral imagination” were in general 
harmony such sentiments: finite, flawed, self-centered human thought and conduct was 
not capable of discovery of truths about the divine and its created humanity except in 
fleeting fragments. Human reason was hopelessly limited. The British philosopher (and 
political conservative) Michael Oakeshott’s most well-known work, Rationalism in 
Politics, has argued the modern history of Europe was besieged by the rule of reason. 
Behind every utopia and every grand generalization of the “courses of history” or the 
“nature of man,” and behind every “instant constitution” for a new governmental 
association, was “political rationalism,” a glorification of technical knowledge.38 This 
“glorification” was very much contrary to Kirk’s call for a sustained and serious 
engagement with “morally imaginative” literature, poetry, and history. The endurance of 
an inexplicable and mysterious beauty in nature despite so many attempts at conquest, 
particularly that which endured before mechanized machinery, was a testament to the 
insatiable human search for glory and immortality. And so a large, mechanized tyranny 
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exercised in the name of the “good” was difficult to quell because it could be conduced 
with the approval of the tormentor’s conscience, a conscience eager to find a piece of 
glory and immortality.  
 Like Kirk, Oakeshott insisted upon a propensity to enjoy what was “available” 
rather than to constantly wish for something else, to delight in what was present rather 
than what may be. The aesthetic experience, in other words, was reflective of the ethical 
life. Philosopher and rhetorician Peter Lawler has written that postmodernism properly 
understood begins with the realization that humanity should be grateful for what they 
have been given. And what they have been given was not only a self-conscious morality 
and a mysterious freedom, but “all sorts of natural compensations for our distinctively 
human misery.” Powerful emotions such as love were not an illusion, and humans have 
been fitted by nature to seek and to know truth.39 In addition, Oakeshott wrote to be 
conservative (that is, to share in the conservative sentiments) was to thematically 
engage, to appreciate, not a creed or a doctrine but something resembling a disposition. 
The end to this appreciation was a manner of thinking and behavior in certain matters, 
namely the preference of some kinds of conduct and conditions of human circumstances 
to others. These preferences were, in turn, to be constructed from within contemporary 
circumstance rather than transported from idiom of general principle – a process which 
might be the beginning of an ideology. The conservative disposition centered upon a 
propensity to “prefer the familiar to the familiar to the unknown, the tried to the untried, 
fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbound, the near to the 
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distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present 
laughter to utopian bliss.”40
Rhetorically, an “appreciation for the present” was another appeal to great 
“conservative” figures of history, even as there were consistent efforts for reform among 
them (namely what Kirk found to be the cautious, humble, historically-rooted reform of 
    
Edmund Burke). For those I have identified as traditionalists, such reflection was an 
invitation to readership to share gratefulness and an acknowledgement of the fragile 
inheritance of the past in terms of ethics and morality. Esteem must not follow the new 
or the advanced because of novelty, but because of measures of inherent worth. Change, 
likewise, would always come; and it should find societal acceptance as a general 
principle. Oakeshott, like Kirk and the reconstituted Burke, advocated against large-
scale, abstract, quick change (especially for the sake of change): the good society, and 
the kinship and friendships in association that form the foundations of a strong civil 
society, could not tolerate rapid innovation. Human were, across time and environment, 
associational beings. As persons, as family units, and as societal actors, this manner of 
persuasion conveyed that humans prefer the familiar to the unknown, the tried to the 
untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbound, the near to 
the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, and the 
present to promises. Change and circumstance will long be with us, they asked their 
audience, but how often do people contemplate their accommodation? An “unthinking” 
change was generally presented as an emblem of extinction and a threat to identity. The 
follower of Kirk’s conservative temperament (one supportive of identity preservation) 
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was to judge by disturbances to the moral imagination. It was, in his persuasions, the 
way to avoid the diabolical.  
Avoiding the Anarchy of the Modern 
Aware that not all innovation was an improvement, and appreciative of the good 
of the present, the persuader of associational, traditionalist conservatism suggested that 
to innovate without improvement was either a designed or an inadvertent folly, but folly 
all the same. As every improvement involves change, this judgment must weigh the 
benefits (to aesthetic and spiritual health, for example) and also the benefits anticipated. 
Innovation, however, was an equivocal enterprise, in which gain and loss (including 
familiarity) were so intertwined that it was often difficult to forecast the future. There 
was no such thing as an unqualified earthly improvement. According to Oakeshott, the 
conservative temperament and aesthetic preferred the small and the limited to the large 
and the indefinite and a slow rather than a rapid pace. It stops to observe current 
consequences and make appropriate adjustments. The more “traditional associations” 
founded upon kinship and loyalty must not become detached from positions of relevance 
to societal decisions of economics and politics if they were to communicate moral 
lessons. The occasion was important as well: the most favorable occasion for innovation 
were those times when the projected change was to be limited to its intention and least 
likely to be corrupted by undesired, unforeseen, and unmanageable costs. The 
disposition was “warm and positive” with respect to the enjoyment of kinship and open 
discussion. It was “cool and critical” with respect to change and innovation. These two 
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inclinations were to support and elucidate one another. The known good was not to be 
surrendered for an unknown “better.”41
Lawler has differentiated his and Oakeshott’s characterization of “conservative” 
and “postmodernism” sentiment with the “rootless, circulating fictions” variety that 
might deny the existence of any foundational truth. He wrote that “attacks on our ability 
to perceive the truth and goodness of nature and human nature are actually modern in 
origin.”
       
42 Kirk, I believe, would have concurred. In The Conservative Mind, he wrote 
that collective wisdom, designated as the “filtered experience of mankind,” can save 
humanity from the “anarchy” of the modern “rights of man” and “presumption of 
reason,” which through justifications of “absolute liberty,” “absolute equality,” and 
similar projects actually precipitate men into moral and civil chaos. “True conformity to 
the dictates of nature” required reverence for the past and solicitude for the future. 
“Nature” was not simply “the sensation of the passing moment;” it was eternal, “though 
we evanescent men experience only a fragment of it.” Human beings have no right to 
imperil the happiness of posterity, he continued, by impudently tinkering with the 
heritage of humanity: “an enthusiast for abstract “natural rights” obstructs the operation 
of true natural law.”43         
  Kirk constructed this living tradition as an alternative to modernity and to 
the exhaustions of liberal, Enlightenment-based order. An outlook consistently opposed 
to ideology – religious dogmatism in a secular, political context casting aside the 
nuances and shades of gray that exist in actual social life – urged the recovery of virtue 
and wisdom through the use of what Burke first called the “moral imagination” and an 
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upholding of what poet T.S. Eliot first called “the permanent things.”44 For some 
traditionalists, these phrases have summarily articulated their critique of modernism, or 
their “postmodernism.” The “postmodern sentiment” was a rejection of what has 
distinguished the “modern world” above all, by which I mean a particular definition of 
what a human being was though to be – an individual. But that definition, according to 
Lawler, could describe what a real or complete human being is. If the modern world was 
to be superseded by another world, as he and others believers in Christianity argued, 
humans would continue in their humanity. They would remain beings with souls, 
capabilities, and longings uncommon with those of other animals.45
Sentiments of “conservative and postmodern” imagination argued that a spiritual 
dimension was imperative to forming the associations that humanity craves. Their 
rhetoric, as such, shunned the perceived sentiments of the rational, scientific, “modern” 
pursuits. They worked to provide their audience with insight that the solely “physical” 
could not. Their concepts of moral order were part of a prevention of the escalation of 
brutality serviced by technological advance. Defending the “permanent things” and 
perceiving ethical truths amid the chaos of events was, for Kirk, a creative faculty. In his 
rhetoric, a debased barbarism tended to fill the vacuum left by the absence of the 
spiritual, those elements orientated toward home, history, custom and community: 
“Ideology provides sham religion and sham philosophy, comforting in its way to those 
who have lost or never have known genuine religious faith, and to those not sufficiently 
intelligent to apprehend real philosophy.”
  
46 In such language and by such an underlying 
attitude, I will argue that Kirk the writer and philosopher was reinforcing his relationship 
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with the reader, forming, if just for a moment, a community of two that was to be 
comprehended through shared assumptions.47
For Kirk’s community of readers, a technologically-minded pursuit of wisdom, 
goodness, and permanence was a source of restlessness and artificial happiness, a 
diversion to unfulfilling nothingness. The drive to conquer nature should be associated 
with the inability to live well, as negative impulses swell into a vacuum of status-
seeking, a process inevitable for failure due to inescapable sin, leading to an inescapable 
death. “Individual” self-fulfillment has taken precedence over the human person. In the 
entry for “modernity and postmodernity” in American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia, 
Lawler made a connection between the elevation of the “human person,” a spiritual as 
well as a material being, and “conservative postmodernism” (“postmodernism rightly 
understood”). Moral and political life in “modern times” no longer sought to cultivate 
human souls but to advance rights of contract and to protect from physical harm: “This 
authentic postmodernism is based on a criticism of modernity for its lack of realism, for 
its inability to tell the truth about the greatness and misery of being human. The basic 
human experiences are of limitation and of responsibility; to live well, human beings 
must accept the distinctively human duties that come with living in light of the truth.” 
Even so, human beings were not free to impose their own will on nature. They could not, 
in other words, make and remake the world at their convenience. But, “born to know and 
love,” not just to suffer and die, they were fitted by nature to know the truth.
 The avenue for this connection is a 
criticism of the “modern.”  
48 
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Despite a shared hostility to grand theorizing and absolute certitudes, Lawler and 
Russello have written the sentiments of a “postmodern conservative” differ from much 
of could be classified as postmodern thought. In their renderings, such thought followed 
Nietzsche’s efforts to liberate human will from the reductionistic tendency of modern 
scientific reason. It was a celebration of a free human creation for no particular purpose. 
History could not end as Hegel or Marx concluded it might because history has no real 
point; and that which is rational or predictable is inhuman. Such a criticism of the 
“modern” was, instead, an “intensification of the modern tendency to liberate human 
will from natural and divine constraints.” Place, and not the nothingness of Nietzsche’s 
abyss that surrounded humanity’s brief and accidental existence, was central to Kirk’s 
postmodern and moral imagination. While some thinkers against modernism sought to 
replace society with radical politics or more marginal subcultures, his “postmodern 
conservatism “was an imaginative reaching back.”49
An Abandonment of Principles 
 The rhetoric was historically-
centered, invoking the exemplary examples of those that lived a respect for the customs 
of, for instance, “localism” and “civic virtue.” These were presented as guards against 
the dangers of politicized totality. 
I find that Kirk’s personal reality was necessarily social. He foresaw the primacy 
of personal identity in modern liberalism as a limit to local civic community, whose 
mediating institutions should function as a fundamental defense against the politicization 
and commoditization of the person. His “ordered liberty” began with the Hebrews, a 
people that discovered, through the leadership of Moses, that there “watched over them 
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an all-powerful intelligence or spirit which gave them their moral nature.” Such a 
revelation was for Kirk the unveiling of truth that could not have been obtained from the 
empirical experiences of the world. It was communication of knowledge from a source 
that transcended ordinary human perception, and without such social knowledge and 
cooperation humanity cannot cooperate. Communities needed revelation and reason, 
together.50 Echoing Burke’s references to “Providence,” Kirk took his assertion that the 
principle of “true politics” was morality enlarged. He criticized modernism and 
liberalism for the abandonment of principles based upon classical and Christian notions 
of natural law, granted by God and perceived by creation through reason and revelation. 
As a man much read in history and experienced in the conduct of human affairs, Burke 
knew that men were not naturally good. They were actually beings of “mingled good and 
evil, kept in obedience to a moral law chiefly by the force of custom and habit, which the 
revolutionaries would discard as so much rubbish.” Burke knew, and hence those that 
enjoy the fruits of constitutionalism know, that “all the advantages of society are the 
product of intricate human experience over many centuries, not to amended overnight by 
some coffee-house philosopher.” Religion, “man’s greatest good,” worked in 
conjunction with the reason of experience toward an established order fundamental to 
civilization. Thus Burke “set his face against the revolutionaries like a man who finds 
himself suddenly beset by robbers.”51
Modernism and liberalism were, Kirk conveyed, successors to the arrangements 
of abstract rights. They stubbornly pursued perfectibility. But because the “Burkean 
conservative” was infused with the “postmodern conservative” sentiment, “anti-
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ideology” understood humanity as a social animal by nature, grounded in time and place 
and joined to history – even as this truth was puzzling and hardly expressible. Political 
theories of the origins of society based on an “a priori” assumption of a primitive “state 
of nature,” therefore, were to be rejected. These were dangerous because they ignored 
history and opened the door to abstract, ideological speculations that substituted fictions 
for a “reality” in practical politics. In the arguments of a “Burkean conservatism,” such 
“social contract” theories conceived of society as isolated, self-sufficient beings living in 
organized communities.52
When reacting against the excesses and hubris of the “modern,” Kirk viewed his 
persuasive writing to be in the service of the right, the good, the true, and the beautiful. 
In analyzing his arguments and those of a similar “postmodern” disposition, stylistic 
 Burke’s “traditionalist” followers led by Kirk, the forerunners 
of “postmodern” critique, countered that society was indeed a contract, but one between 
God and man, as well as among all generations. The more stable rights flowed from faith 
and custom. Herein was the “ordered liberty” of Kirk’s assessment of contemporary 
society. His phraseology, praise of historical figures, and vivid imagery were among the 
attractions of his rhetorical community of traditionalist conservative sentiment in “true” 
association. As he constructed it, such a community refused to displace the authority of 
the ancestral. And, like the Hebrews, these communities of association communicated 
externally and among themselves while in communion to the transcendent. They 
preferred a cautious vision of wisdom to the more alluring yet arbitrary and perilous 
authority of choice. A goal of his rhetoric was to, in some inexplicable way, halt the 
progress of the “tyranny” of such choice.  
  
241 
flourishes accompanied a sustained historical and philosophical attack against the rise of 
the “scientific” as applied to messiness of human conduct and organization. The rhetoric 
of reaction, then, while “imaginative” was not “sophistry” as the term might be used as a 
pejorative. I believe that Kirk and traditionalist “postmodernists” did not desire the 
machinery of manipulation or argument for its own sake. They perceived, instead, that a 
culture inflicted by “modernism” consisted largely of what people (and perhaps most 
notably the “elites,” given their perceived influence) thought and were willing to accept. 
Symbols and images, in other words, were not simply distractions but rather the very 
ingredients of a culture. In the “postmodern” creation of moral imagination, and in the 
associative life of morality, the meanings of words mattered a great deal. A culture that 
could no longer resist the temptations of the “modern” was a culture that was unlikely to 
value the small, the local, and the long-developed. It was a culture unlikely to commit 
much energy to the discussion of those words. Members of Kirk’s community were not 
like the “unfortunates” mired in the confusions of modernism and liberalism. In fact, 
they possessed something more valuable, more foundational, more mysterious, and in 
the end better. For his rhetoric of moral imagination, and following his historically-based 
and imaginative facilities of socio-political creation, this was a “something” that must be 
shared and more highly valued if society was not to be enchanted by promises which 
might transform enthusiasm into a more violent cause. In working against modernity, his 
rhetorical conduct was creation in imagination.  
Kirk’s writings promoted the notion that the goodness and virtue humans may 
access was found by an understanding and acceptance of human limitations. Much of 
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this was done through the presentation of examples from historical figures. W. Wesley 
McDonald has written that characteristic of his style was the tendency to express 
principles through the words and ideas of those figures he most admired within the 
British and American conservative tradition. Kirk applied these in “innovative” ways as 
responses to contemporary ideological challenges, by insisting upon a historical 
approach and philosophical reflection to understand society rather than abstract 
universals.53
And so an “associational community” where the common, social goods of 
communion are valued would not consider a “person” to be an “individual,” as the term 
“individual” would work to devolve the common good into a limited concept of 
individualism. In my estimation, Kirk sought the “metaphysics” (to use an awkward 
term perhaps encompassing the concepts of tradition and transcendence) of the human 
person, an unseen order of faith and reason that placed ethical norms above utility and 
subjective interest. His impression of the modern world was of noise and confusion, a 
place of hopeful promise but ultimately a place of false and fleeting hope. Much of the 
problem of modern morality, as he wrote, was evidenced by the unstable status of the 
good.
 For example, the rhetorical missives against unbridled capitalism and 
utilitarianism, prominent in The Conservative Mind, could be viewed as his working out 
of a more coherent, consistent metaphysics of the human person (one eventually found 
in Catholic Christianity).  
54
 
 His language, confident in assumption and robust in tone, was the attempt to 
combat the illusive strength of an ill-defined “modern.”   
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The Moral Life: Rhetoric and Association in Conservative Community 
 Russell Kirk envisioned an ethical connection to informing through historical 
instruction and offering opinions on cultural and political crisis. The author had a 
responsibility, he thought, to involve the reader in a verbal process bespeaking the 
morality of the mind. Through a persistent, somewhat repetitive pattern of phrase and 
argument, by a restatement of certain terms and sentences, he expanded and echoed their 
first appearance and intention.1 He wrestled continuously with words and meaning, but 
remained loyal to a concept of “first principles” around which a community of the like-
minded could rally. As a teacher and exemplar of an American conservatism that 
followed Burke, he sought “wisdom” and “prudence” in the public sphere, and not just 
cleverness, intelligence, and willingness for hard work. Members and potential members 
of Kirk’s “community of sentiments” were both inside and outside of the American 
conservative movement as it developed after the Second World War. Yet his skepticism 
of global democratic revolutions placed him apart from much of the conservative 
movement after the fall of the Soviet Union, as “paleo-conservative” critics of “neo-
conservatism” have argued.2
The wisdoms and prejudices of Burke translated into America were, for Kirk, 
greater knowledge and valuation of the truths embedded in the noise of an increasingly 
bureaucratic and standardized society. It meant thinking in terms of norms instead of 
 As such, Kirk’s conservative community was an anomaly, 
albeit an influential one. An examination of his rhetoric, which was filled with historical 
appeal and perspectives out of step with much of current conservative argument, draws 
out this uniqueness.   
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ideals and rights. In his view, liberalism, or rationalism in politics, followed the rise of 
industrial capitalism and the growth of the state to become an effort for control over 
property, trade, work, amusements, education, and religion.3 Kirk wrote in part to build a 
community of readers that recognized human beings existed for more than as fodder for 
the exercise of power. It was not proper, this is to say, to be temporarily comfortable by 
the dazzling advances of technological knowledge. His criticism was intended to inspire 
greater action: recognition that the human will cannot liberate emotional and spiritual 
emptiness, and also that freedom as a supreme principle is an empty end unless there is 
an understanding of what it is for – community and communion.4
Kirk’s persuasions assumed that people can in fact be drawn to the permanent 
things, spiritually, even as notions such as good and true are not easily defined. There 
was the assumption, across his works, that the immovability of the good and true may be 
known and shared, for the person and across generations. His conception of the world 
held that the supposed liberating impersonality of organization, coerced structure, and 
technology follow, in the well-ordered society, the constraints of personal subordination 
required for more authentic community, communion, and emotional bond. The reader 
was continuously invited, through his text and persona, to participate in an alternative, 
one of prudence, prejudice, and tradition. At the foundation of this sentiment, Kirk’s 
books and essays made a distinction between the “abstract rights of man” and man’s 
“actual nature.” The French reformers of 1789, for instance, did not turn to “precedent, 
 The reader must know, 
therefore, what was good and true in the human life. There is more to being a human, a 
relational being, than the pursuit of pleasure.  
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prescription, and custom, as did the British” because these were held “in contempt, as if 
such influences were the dead hand of the past.” The revolutionary sanction for the 
“sacred” rights of humanity, amorphous and lacking precedent, valued the wrong things 
in the wrong way. He thought the actions and constituted language of the new French 
government utilized natural rights doctrines both incorrectly and incompletely, leading 
to a turn to the abstractions of such “speculative minds” as Rousseau’s.5
A Methodological Formulation 
 And this, sadly, 
was too much of an inspiration for the modern world. As an antidote, for more than four 
decades Kirk invited his readers to share in his assumptions and conclusions through his 
writing, political activism, and lectures. This was an invitation to apply the wisdoms of 
past to the problems of the present. His language – imprecise, mystical, and reverential – 
was the driving force of this persuasion. 
 My methodological basis for examining the ways in which Kirk warned against 
the managerial state and the decay of civilization, and the ways in which he struggled to 
articulate alternatives, is James Boyd White’s When Words Lose Their Meaning: 
Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community. White has 
written that the relationship between an individual author and the harnessing of language 
and culture can be considered as a “textual community.” Here, the aim is to establish a 
lasting rapport between the author – including the representation of self through the text 
– and the audience. White’s connotation of language is as follows: “shared conceptions 
of the world, shared manners and values, shared resources and expectations and 
procedures for speech and thought.” It is through these that “communities are in fact 
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defined and constituted.”6 In probing the relation that a speaker establishes with 
language, he has suggested imagining the world of text as a “real world.” And by 
ascertaining a sense of the relationship that exists between the speaker and the materials 
of the culture, “we can experience from the inside, with the intimacy of the artisan, if 
only in a tentative and momentary way, the life of the language that makes a world.”7
A text, especially a historical or fictional one, is according to White largely 
“about” the ways in which its reader will be changed by reading it.
 
This is an invitation for the reader to “exist” as a “character” in the world “created and 
sustained” by the text.  
8 Such a “method of 
reading” is defined generously so as to include “writing and speaking, indeed all the 
ways we have of living with language and with each other through language; and it is 
about a ‘way of reading’ conceived of not merely as a method of analysis but as a way of 
attending and responding to a text and a situation, of acting and being in relation to 
language and to other people.”9 As with Kirk, I believe White’s insights are, in effect, an 
invitation to partake in his own conceptions, manners, values, and expectations as an 
author and critical observer of cultural and societal development. By this I mean the 
“way of reading” facilitated recognition of the limitations of not appropriating an author 
into the present, and of assuming that the reader will not be changed by a text. Peter 
Teachout has categorized the methodological method of the book as an “inquiry into the 
role of argument in culture – into the way in which the imaginative employment of the 
‘rhetorical resources’ of a culture can operate to criticize and transform that culture.”10 
This book, I think similar to the life work of Kirk in “association,” is an exposition of the 
  
250 
ways in which language, personal character, and culture are bound together. And like the 
“traditionalist” calls for a remembrance and practical valuing of what is good in a time 
and culture, White’s method is a critical and creative employment of inherited language 
and the ways in which it serves as a powerful force for the “reconstitution” of both self 
and community. The relationship humans establish with words determines, in part, “who 
they really are,” as persons in relation and as a larger culture.11
From these inherited elements and impressions, the rhetorician builds a cultural 
language which presents the possibility of restoration – of self and community. In a law 
review article, White wrote that like law rhetoric invents; and like the law, it invents out 
of something, not out of nothing. Thus the persuader must accept that fact of real and 
important differences among cultures and that it is necessary to engage in a process of 
meaning-making and community-building of which they are, in part, the subject. 
Rhetoric, he argued, is specific to its material: the knowledge out of which the 
rhetorician ultimately functions will not be scientific or theoretical but practical. “This 
is, in fact, our earliest social and intellectual knowledge, the knowledge we acquire as 
we first begin to move and act in our social universe and learn to speak and understand. 
It is the knowledge by which language and social relations are made.”
 This method is an 
exploration of the human imagination at work within a context – criticizing the cultural 
environment, the language, the mythic environment.  
12 Examining how 
communities cultivate, together and in opposition, to other identities, this type of 
rhetorical analysis focuses on justice, ethics, and politics. For White, discourse “calls” 
communities into being. When an author represents through a text, the language 
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constitutes individuals, values, and cultures – but not in a coercive manner, as readers 
possess the agency by which they are able to “use language to gain meaning or lose 
meaning, to constitute or reconstitute their identity, community, and culture.”13 Rhetoric 
is an art by which culture and community are established, maintained, and transformed. 
The rhetorical process is a process through which individuals and communities form and 
maintain their identities.14
  Within communities formed by rhetoric, rhetorical appeal takes note of the 
structural reciprocity between language and the character. Each person is partly made by 
language, which present categories through which the world is perceived and motives 
are developed. Yet humans are also users and makers of language; and in the remaking 
of life and internal character there is necessarily a shared, collective process. According 
to White, “the reciprocity I speak of thus is defined by our language – our language is 
the set of shared expectations and common terms that enable us to think of ourselves as a 
‘we’ – and that language too can be transformed.”
 
15 Humans, in their communicative 
acts, create social settings. This is the conduit through which individuals form 
relationships. Communication is reflexively constituted within the act itself, forming and 
reforming identity, social relationships, and ideas. The complications of morality and 
politics – and indeed, all the perplexing aspects of the relational life – are thus 
encompassed by the field of communication, including the beginning and negotiation of 
meaning. Persuasion is necessarily impacted by cultural and economic evolutions, as 
social practices are inseparable from language. In this continuous creation are occasions 
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where an individual might remake what White terms the “shared resources of meaning,” 
which shapes the scope and direction of public and communal life.  
Language, then, is not stationary. In the “flux” of reading, of words and symbols, 
White has presented a technique of reading that focuses attention on the nature of the 
language a particular writer or speaker has inherited, on the way the author acts upon 
this language as a modifier, and on the nature of the social and ethical relations that the 
author establishes with the reader, those whom are written about, and with the natural 
world.16 Burke’s Reflections, for example, praised the virtues of the British constitution 
in contrast to the dangerously abstract creation of French revolutionaries. The British 
statesman employed definition of a sturdier, more properly ordered community. One 
way the reader was brought into this alternative was by an appeal to self, character, and 
culture. Appealing to the history and culture surrounding the constitution, which he 
positioned as proudly ancient and admirable, Burke worked for changes in the persons of 
his particular association that would then lead to changes in the community. Burke’s 
purpose, White wrote, was not to communicate ideas that were “already perfectly 
statable in existing languages but to make a language in which new ideas and new 
sentiments can be expressed, a new constitution established, in the text and in the world: 
a language he wishes his reader first to learn and then to own and use.”17
Imparting a Better Reason 
      
In using White’s insights as a foundation for study of Kirk’s “rhetorical moral 
imagination,” I find that his conservatism was mistrust of the secular overarching 
narrative – and most especially of the variants of materialism, scientism, and 
  
253 
progressivism of Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, Mill, 
Bentham, and Marx. Individual autonomy and liberalism in the American context were 
temptations to ignore the reality of sin, the weight of history, the mystery inherent in 
humanity, and the traditions present at birth. Inspired by Burke, Kirk took his readers on 
a pursuit of actual solutions to real problems, utilizing the “imagination” to explore how 
individuals can live and prosper as members of a community faced with societal and 
political crisis. The persuasive power of the “moral imagination” and calls for its 
substantive use provided a more acceptable set of political solutions than a reliance on 
ideology.18 Kirk’s rhetorical appeal, as with Burke, made a heavy, if selective, use of 
history. Although America did not have a strong “conservative tradition,” it was not 
against any principle to constitute, from a study of admirable figures, an imaginative 
invention of such. This invention may have separated tradition from history, but it 
allowed for Kirk’s recurring narratives of Burke, T.S. Eliot, and others to become the 
teachers of American prudence and wisdom. Kirk’s tradition partook of invention and 
renewed functions as a response to new situations; otherwise, he thought it would die. 
Reform was a positive, necessary term. And yet, as in the mind of some Catholic 
thinkers he admired, he found it was futile to discuss the process of reforming without 
reference to form.19
History, Kirk wrote in The Conservative Mind, was the gradual revelation of a 
supreme and unfathomable design – “often shadowy to our blinking eyes, but subtle, 
resistless, and beneficent.” One arrives at principle – right reason imparted in 
“permanent form” – through a comprehension of nature and history; and principle is the 
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human expression of cognizance of providential purpose.20 The moral imagination, 
conveyed with attractive rhetoric in reference to a more supreme true and good, stirred 
the spiritual, mystical aspect of man. It was the knowledge of humanity as composed of 
sinful beings destined to morality even as they were created for eternity. The capacity to 
perceive abiding, ethical truths amid the many avenues of life’s chaos compelled this 
imagination to not live in the moment, as did a machine or an animal. A “moral 
imagination” was the “strange faculty – inexplicable if men are assumed to have an 
animal nature only – of discerning greatness, justice, and order, beyond the bars of 
appetite and self-interest.”21 Among American conservatives, Kirk’s traditionalism, 
fame, and talent as an communicator placed him as a prominent leader of communities 
(formed mostly through texts and lectures) set against not just the variants of leftism and 
collectivism, but also against his own occasional allies, given an American conservative 
movement prone to nationalism, foreign policy adventurism, and cosmopolitanism.22
 Following the work of White, such a language weaves into – and consistently 
manipulates – a way of thinking among readers, fostering an acceptance of assumptions. 
Proper sentiments, for Kirk, were the very foundation of good actions beneficial to 
community and to the personal soul. Without them, the noise and bustle of the modern 
could drown out voices advocating for the familial, the small, the organic, and the 
historical. In a short book explaining the superiority of the American system over the 
 
The language he established with readers in his constituted community of association, of 
those inclined to a likeminded sentiment and disposition, was chiefly local, regional, 
agrarian, bohemian, and mystical.   
  
255 
materialist Soviet one, he wrote: “In much of the world, political discussion has 
degenerated into a Babel of furious of furious voices, all crying out abstract god terms 
and devil terms that bear small relation to real governments, or real economies, or real 
men and women. The American cause cannot be explained or served by strident 
propaganda of that sort. And the American cause is so complex and living a thing, grown 
out of such an ancient soil, that it cannot be described in singles phrases like ‘capitalism’ 
or ‘democracy’ or ‘equality.’”23
Kirk was a relentless critic of perceived modernist errors: runaway liberalism, 
collectivism, utilitarianism, positivism, atomistic economic individualism, a leveling 
humanitarianism, pragmatism, socialism, and ideology foremost among them.
 The “American cause” was composed of many moral 
and political and economic factors, he wrote, some of them peculiar to America. Thus 
the American Constitution, embodying the principle of restrained government through 
checks and balances, was a successful “conservative” instrument, but one always in need 
of protection and renewal. The zealous appetite and ambitious will of man must be 
controlled. Tradition in history – an unwritten law of conduct for society and an 
established order of civilization – was a force capable of doing so.  
24 His own 
vision was antithetical to these and other products of “Enlightenment thought.” But the 
vision was still rooted, he claimed, in the American founding many of his traditionalist 
followers personally cherished. On this point, White’s methodology lends some measure 
of coherence for the seemingly contradictory, such as praise for the American founding 
yet condemnation of the supremacy and excesses of liberal, individual autonomy. The 
rhetorical appeals contained within constitutions and reconstitutions of language, 
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character, and community, to restate White’s subtitle, are mythic realities made more 
real. They work to constitute a popular base for action. The particular, smaller worlds 
constructed by authors appealing to current and potential members of a community of 
readers and listeners contained traditions, values, and aspirations for a particular way of 
dealing with experience, and of making meaning out of an uncertain and complex world. 
Therein was the possibility of real friendship, kinship, and community.25
Constructing a Textual World  
  Examination 
of the loose yet enduring alliances of American conservatism, particularly of those 
distrustful of freedom as a high ideal and “individual autonomy,” does I think reveal a 
real and affectionate association, a kinship forged mostly by the pen.   
White has written that an author can construct a world through text, selectively 
borrowing from history to advance a vision of a more perfect order. And through 
“constitutions and reconstitutions,” rhetoric can produce and form identity, change the 
character of the audience, and help to form organizations and social movements. He has 
assumed, it follows, that identity is not always a given. The text is action with words; the 
engaged audience is not internally stationary. The text creates and awakens actions: “the 
writer always makes a community with another in his text, and this community has a life 
and character of its own. To attend to this fact is to raise all the questions that such 
relations present: the nature of friendship, justice, and generosity, the way that the self 
and its interests are defined in relation to others, and what it means to try to form a social 
world that is better for both.”26 For one critic, White has suggested the author of a text 
acts with words to create, criticize, and recreate relations at two levels: that which the 
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author establishes within the text between characters, and the relation that the author 
attempts to establish with the reader. Depending upon the linguistic conventions and 
rhetorical resources, this relation might vary from the slyly manipulative to the didactic 
to the dialectical and genuinely educative.27
Surveying the critics of his work, White responded that his concern was not so 
much the ways in which language loses meaning as much as the ways in which authors 
“transform” their language and give them new kinds of meaning. What happens next, he 
has asked, after a meaning is lost, and how can an audience respond to that loss? His 
work argues that the experience of loss is often definitional in the life of a person, and 
perhaps even more so in the life of a culture. In those moments, there is a realization: 
“language cannot work in the simple and unproblematic way one had theretofore 
imagined, and more deeply, that the sense of harmony between one’s self and one’s 
culture, the sense of belonging in a world in which you say and think what others do, is 
broken beyond repair.” People think about the matter of “dead and living language” on 
either of two assumptions. First, that words themselves carry their own meanings, and 
the task is to arrange them in sequences that will have the same significance, in any 
utterance and in any context. Second, that words have the potential of meaning, and that 
it is our opportunity and task to give them specific significances through usage.
  
28 White 
does not conceive of words as static units of meaning. Instead, words and phrases 
develop meaning through interaction with language, culture, and situation. Likewise, one 
purpose of Kirk’s writing was to facilitate judgments and attitudes toward societal and 
political order in accord with his vision of the American founding, a founding he thought 
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rooted in the British tradition. As such, his language and manner were an integral part of 
the argument. He sought, as I have presented him, to address the total human situation, 
to speak to ailing conditions, and to set the example as a man of excellence and as an 
advocate of the sacred.29
 A legal scholar, White viewed the relationship between law and the larger 
community as reciprocal: the source of law is ultimately the community itself, which the 
law in turn serves to reinforce or reconstitute.
 He was, in sum, the leader of a “community,” a place where 
culture and wording may change but the “permanent things” remain – there are natural 
laws, and man does not stand alone.   
30 I find this to be similar to Kirk’s view of 
history and tradition. Those institutions and practices worthy of preservation, worthy of 
generational teaching, must be communicated into new forms if they are to endure, even 
as their wisdoms, gifted by the divine, will not change. As an “opposite” of abstractions, 
traditions grow out of accumulated experiences and over time and acquire “almost the 
force of law” through prescription. These dynamic entities, frequently dissatisfied with 
the status quo, are continually alive, bringing forth new meanings and possibilities.31
Some traditions may grow obsolete; all require respectful scrutiny, now and then, in light 
of the age, lest they ossify. Traditions take on new meanings with the growing 
experience of a people. And simply to appeal to the wisdom of the species, to tradition, 
will not of itself provide solutions to all problems. The endeavor of the intelligent 
believer in tradition is to blend ancient usage with necessary amendment so that society 
is never wholly old and never wholly new.
 
Following a rejection of the autonomous individual and liberal political theory, it was 
not possible to escape one’s own tradition. In one of his last books, Enemies of 
Permanent Things, Kirk wrote:  
32
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In an early essay critiquing liberal political theory, Kirk suggested that liberalism 
doesn’t have the narrative power necessary to maintain the popular imagination that 
longs for more permanent things than the fulfillment of the desires of the moment. “The 
liberal system” has ceased to signify anything other than a “vague good will.” All the 
same, liberalism has achieved ascendency because it “promised progress without the 
onerous duties exacted by tradition and religion. It is at present in the process of 
dissolution because, founded upon an imperfect and distorted myth, it has been unable to 
fulfill its promise, and because it no longer appeals in any degree to the higher 
imagination. It has been undone by social disillusion.”33 The Enlightenment awakening 
of Burke and Cardinal Newman, a liberality of the mind, for Kirk had descended into a 
“secular dogmatism, a presumptuous system with too much confidence in rationality. 
The community of his authorship was an alternative to the inevitable vacuum of the 
liberal imagination. Advocacy of the permanent things – the moral imagination – was 
important because he did not wish “to see that vacuum filled by an intolerant radicalism 
of any description.”34
 It is in such representative sentiment a reader may discover the distrust for 
overarching secular narratives and trust in the mystery of an unseen order. Across Kirk’s 
writings, there were always the possibilities of decay and renewal, a constant of 
civilizations dependent upon good and moral decisions. Determinism and ideology, 
insofar as they were influenced by a confident materialism and scientism, were a 
rejection of the Christian concepts that Kirk and Burke shared in their generalizations of 
the fallen world and in their diagnosis of its problems: free will, the reality of sin, the 
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weight of history, the limits of human progress, and the necessity of redemption. White’s 
deliberation of Burke’s Reflections labeled civilization as “an art of a remarkable kind,” 
as the composition (that is, the constitution) of a world affecting both the human and 
physical materials of which it was made. In Burke’s writing against the French attempt 
to rationally reduce and define, it was the culture that shaped the person, as well as the 
person that shaped the culture. Thus the love of family and respect for nature made 
Britain a landscape prosperous and beautiful: “At each stage the central idea is that of 
completeness: the constitution is not the theory, the abstraction, but the complete way of 
life; the individual is not to be spoken of, or spoken to, as a merely political or merely 
intellectual or merely emotional creature but as a complete person, knowing all that he 
knows, doing all that he does; and the relationship between the communal culture and 
the individual character is to be reciprocal and beneficial across the whole range of 
human experience.”35
I find Kirk’s “constitutions” to be as Burke’s, as represented in that quoted 
passage. White described Burke’s manner as conversational, imaginative, difficult, and 
creative, “a kind of cultural art” taking place within the individual in his relations with 
others and with culture. Similarly, among the most significant criticisms of Kirk is that 
the conservatism he long advocated for existed entirely in his mind and did not reflect 
the actual America around him.
  
36 In this dissertation, I contend that such an awkward 
“reflection” was due to his persuasion highly valuing the “mystery” of human 
experience. These mysteries of human experience were ripe for “constitutions and 
reconstitutions;” and like the concepts of good and moral which were a vital part of 
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them, Kirk’s concern was for attitude and inclination, not a definition. Against 
ideological abstraction, his writing worked to form communities set against much of the 
modern while still very much a part of it, as evidenced by a reluctance to construct a 
detailed, comprehensive, coherent alternative. Kirk’s moral imagination, a primary term 
and one taken from Burke’s Reflections, signified for him the power of ethical 
perception beyond private experience and momentary events. He wished it to be 
extracted from centuries of human consciousness, aspiring to apprehend the right order 
of the soul and of political, societal organization. From age to age, permanent things 
were “expressed afresh” and sustained by the spirit of faith and a system of manners. 
This informed humanity of the inherent dignity of their nature.37 Through the taking 
these phrases from figures he exemplified, and through the building of a tradition he 
textually wove to be a continuation of history more rightly ordered, Kirk encouraged in 
his readers – his community – an embrace of imagination.38
This was also a confident hope. Kirk aimed, like Burke, to “persuade his reader 
to his view of the world, to his sentiments and his language, and these are not held out 
for criticism or refutation.”
 This was his constitution 
and reconstitution, the foundation of his associational community. Certainly lurked 
behind his texts and anyone willing to welcome a change in the imagination may have 
adopted them. Within this community one might find adventure, heroism, and historical 
examples of what could again come to pass. There was an “accessible” hope for those 
mired in the dead ends of the directionless pursuit of power and pleasure.  
39 The application of metaphors was a way to express the 
existence of normative truths that transcended dialectic, upholding permanent things for 
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the sake of cultural and spiritual health, the small community, and the commonwealth. 
His writing has been described as a “romantic” reading of the past for the purposes of 
the present, and as an inspiration for an emerging conservative movement through the 
pulling together of a series of only partially related ideas and events into a more coherent 
narrative.40 Indeed, Kirk did not record the past. Instead, he created it in reference to a 
greater good. The Conservative Mind, for example, was far more concerned with ideas 
and vision, drawn from disparate figures and events, than with “facts” straightforwardly 
rendered. An admirer, prominent “neo-conservative” critic and presidential speechwriter 
David Frum, wrote shortly after his death that “he strained all his powers to summon up 
a vision of the Anglo-American past that would stir the imagination, and entice us to 
preserve as much of the vanished aristocratic age he loved as we possibly could.” While 
appearing to be a history, as each chapter closely studies the writing of varied thinkers in 
this constituted past, Frum wrote that Kirk was not interested “in the tangle of facts and 
events from which his subjects’ ideas emerged.” The book was a “work of literature 
meant to achieve political ends.”41
Integrating a Textual World 
  
There was a “reorganization” of material and argument throughout Kirk’s 
conceptions of history and order.42 He “took” historical, spiritual, and social patterns (as 
well as images) to generate something unique and “new” from pre-existing material. 
This is why I have labeled him a “rhetorical popularizer,” even as he vigorously engaged 
in the arguments of history and philosophy. White has made this distinction between the 
historian and the philosopher: the historian records processes by which life is lived, and 
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the philosopher, like Plato, establishes a world within which “language and life can be 
cooperatively rethought and remade.”43 Kirk aimed to do both. Surveying the many and 
varied chasms of the conservative movement broadly defined, Kirk wished to draw in 
and provide a service to those who stood, even if they did not fully realize it in the 
conduct of life, for the “good.” These were observers who understood that intellectual 
activity and a rousing of the imagination were urgently required in modern society. In 
their association of sentiment, they could be defined by comparison to, as Kirk phrased 
it, “all those professedly ‘pragmatic’ persons who think of a conservative government as 
one that keeps in office by serving or placating certain prevailing interests – and so 
prevents worse from befalling those in the seats of the mighty.” Temporal victories, in 
fact, would evaporate in short order if unsupported by the enduring art of persuasion. He 
insisted that a political movement could only subsist by its alleged pragmatism for so 
long until “tumbled over by the next political carnival, shouting fresher slogans.” But as 
long as there were those versed in the conscience and mind of characters capable of 
sacrifice, thought, and sound sentiment, there will be the possibility of enduring reform 
and reinvigoration.44
 Language, character, and culture, inextricably bound together, express an 
integrated view of the world. From that premise, White’s method fits Kirk because the 
integrative ethic of these authors was not a language of theory. There was no “system” 
or fixed set of ideological truths. There was a series of “ethical performances.” A vision 
was considered as actually performed in language and conduct, not just in claims made 
and ideas expressed. The “true meaning” of a text was to be found in attending to it as a 
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complete performance, in the way words were used, in the attitudes and prejudices 
behind them, and “in the larger movement and pattern of the work as a composition – in 
short in the work’s imaginative design.”45 Kirk’s texts featured no premise of neutrality; 
and the performance of his language was a lament against the commercialization of 
modern civilization. That commercialization, an optimistic societal uplift, was perceived 
to be eager for commoditization and eager to cast aside the rural, the naturally 
aristocratic, and the traditional. Concern for those living amidst the glittering attractions 
of modern life was matched by Kirk’s retreat to the life of “a man of letters” in isolated 
and rural Michigan, on the ancestral family property. He conducted his life, this is to say, 
as if he truly, intensely meant his words. Surveying the contentious educational 
landscape of his time, Kirk brought into his argument the sentiment that cautious, 
informed, and necessary reform was made impossible by the “antagonist world” of the 
“terrible simplifiers, the frantic ideologues” who refused to be bound by a moral order – 
the contract of eternal society joining the dead, the living, and those yet unborn. If social 
order was not to dissolve into the “dust and powder of individuality,” he wrote in an 
essay about the possibilities of domestic revolution, it was necessary in any society and 
in any age to submit to a code of civility.46       
 Such civility, though, would ring hollow as empty rhetoric without the 
accompanying persona. Repeated in the essay on the American university and the “New 
Left” that had come to dominate it in the 1960s was a recurring theme that highlights his 
persistent, repetitive pattern of phrase and argument: the existence of moral order, the 
mysterious ties that bind, and the exemplary figures (primarily Edmund Burke) who 
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prudently demonstrated ways toward the solidity of the metaphysically valuable. This 
consistent loyalty to permanent things and first principles, in rhetoric and deed, clarified 
and reiterated for an audience his own “true meanings.” A memorable, repeated 
phraseology and clarity of language, complimented by a personal adherence to localism 
and civility, I believe attracted readers to his “world” of the smaller communions of 
church, guild, family, and friends. This was a deliberate retelling of Burke’s “little 
platoons;” and it was effective because more than a few Americans were ready to hear it 
as American society underwent its rapid post-war transformations. This style of life was 
for many more alive and fulfilling than the bland predictability of a more “rationalist,” 
“standardized” existence overly inclined to serious theory and the work of “utopia.” 
Forrest McDonald, an academic who has written sympathetically about southern 
agrarian sentiment, recalled a strong current of geniality in Kirk’s correspondence, an 
affability and “play” in argument. There was, also, much historical pretense: the signing 
of his name in one letter to McDonald was Marcus Tullius Kirk.47
 To convey the notion to innovate was not to reform, and to consider how a 
“conservative” critique of human nature and affairs might impact discussion about the 
role of government, Kirk was compelled to address what he thought to be the underlying 
realities of human experiences. The spiritual voids addressed by the fleeting pursuits of 
pleasure should be met not by the variations of technical pursuit but by the discipline of 
the mind, the instillation of prudence, the presentation of a coherent body of ordered 
knowledge across subjects, and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake – in short, 
 Marcus Tullius is the 
name more commonly known as Cicero. 
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“rising generations” should be helped to make their way toward wisdom and virtue.48
Particularly for those of inclined to similar sentiments, Kirk wrote to address and 
soothe anxieties, new and renewed as modernity raged, perhaps too inchoate to define. 
According to Gerald Russello’s consideration of his relationship to “postmodern 
thought,” he did this through a “literary narrative.” This was a sharp contrast to many 
“conservative” commentators and controversialists after the Second World War. They 
tended to be focused on electoral victory or the political issue of the moment. Kirk’s 
conservatism was never “modern.” It remained unburdened by what might be termed 
“Enlightenment frameworks.” His concern for the imagery a society creates of what it 
admires and condemns fits with his rejection of history and tradition as something 
objective, immovable, materialist, or determinist. People can, he thought, actually 
participate in and change history.
 In 
drawing out these ethics, and by making their necessity explicit, he provided a way for 
conservatives to talk and live. To step back from the constant motion of seeking status 
and power, of always being “plugged in,” and of religious dogmatism in a political 
context, allowed room to express the past and initiate a variety of imaginations: 
historical, poetic, prophetic, civic, moral. Convinced that liberalism had exhausted itself, 
he appealed to the emotional and imaginative resources humans can invest in place and 
personal history as essential components of personal and social self-identity.  
49 The constituted community of his language 
demanded that the mysteries of free will, divine guidance, human agency and choice, as 
well as the developing creations of custom, be respected as cornerstones of a 
temperament in but not of the confusions of a modern society. Thus the limits of 
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government and political power could come to be understood by a citizenry. His 
association was for the “natural ingenuity” of a civil society, an association presented in 
uniquely given his imaginative qualities and seemingly solitary stands on some issues. 
But Kirk’s “narrative” form, as opposed to a “historical” one, was conducive to 
providing lessons and examples of valuable meaning drawn from a human consciousness 
that was thought to transcend the currents of history. History, after all, was for Kirk itself 
contained within the immanence of a mysterious nature. It was ideologues and the many 
hubristic planners that sought the tyrannies of totality, not the seekers of inexpressible 
but permanent things.     
 Because so much reality will remain hidden, there was in the constitutions of 
many American conservative traditionalists much that language could not adequately 
capture. The task was to find a way to talk about these experiences, difficult to express 
and to sympathize with, in the “language of the profession.” What language could be 
made to do was for White “a call to invention, to reimagining the world, not to the 
routine application of rules or principles.” Literature “at its best is always about the 
language in which it is written, its ways of imagining the experience of others, its 
response to the conventions of authority with which it works, and so on.” To seriously 
engage the language of a text was to commit to an imagination of a world where certain 
declarations of significance were possible and others less possible. The use of language 
was an ethical enterprise. In White’s characterization, “we define ourselves and those we 
speak about in what we say.”50 Kirk, in an essay on the teaching of “humane literature,” 
claimed that a “principal purpose of studying literature is to give us all a common 
  
268 
culture, ethical and intellectual, so that a people may share a general heritage and be 
united through the works of the mind.”51
Such an “invitation” to share in his beliefs and conclusions still resonates for 
some conservatives, and particularly for those of a religious persuasion that worry about 
the content of culture. A personal character, in Kirk’s definition, should be sound 
because of its larger cultural, societal implications. And so the language of reverence and 
mystery was a calling to a “higher purpose,” a challenge to look beyond the temporary 
and toward an order which holds things in place. Kirk continues to be read because he 
presented robust and confident answers in a time of widespread anxiety. In “association” 
– and especially in the call to “personhood” – there was an invitation to discuss truth, 
goodness, beauty, and all of the “transcendent” things he thought gave life its true 
meaning. Even so, the limits of an inventive and narrative persuasion continue to present 
challenges to a conservative movement tempted, as most political movements are, by the 
pursuits of power.    
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Promise and Error: Kirk’s Concepts of Home 
 
 Since its founding on the North American continent, as throughout its expansion, 
the idea of America and the nation itself has existed as a potent allure for tens of 
millions. Russell Kirk, ever fearful of the “destructive power of fanatic ideology,” 
envisioned the United States as the “great conservative power in a world that has been 
falling to ruin since 1914.”1 He advised that too many citizens were unprepared to 
defend the convictions and institutions of the principles that the American nation should 
uphold. Culture, the locus of ethics and morality that was a conduit of norms to 
succeeding generations, was for him embedded in the fabric of everyday life. It was 
menaced and fragile, following an assumption that humanity was fallible and never close 
to perfectible. This view has placed him awkwardly in the contexts of American 
conservatism, as his persuasions pinpointed the “conservation” of Enlightenment 
liberalism as not conservative – a term like “neo-liberalism” being more accurate. His 
rhetoric, centered on culture,2 was orientated toward the “home.” His ultimate reference, 
his supreme images of the good, was an unsystematic vision of civic settlement that 
privileged, as he saw it, the “associative in communion” above the alienated, the 
responsible over the self-serving, and the communal over the individual.3
Kirk approached culture as morality writ large, a morality still bearing the 
imprint of historical predecessors. Such cultural shaping could come by a cautious social 
evolution, a quickened “liberation,” or preservation. Not all means were desirable. 
Society, Kirk wrote, can be betrayed through ignorance by destructive coercions foreign 
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and domestic; and “good-natured ignorance is a luxury none of us can afford.”4 Kirk’s 
concept of a well-ordered America was an “organic” system of morality, a system taught 
first and best from the home. It was ignited by a creator and inseparable from a 
“restrained liberty.” He believed the “founders of the Republic put no trust in absolute, 
unqualified Liberty. Unrestrained Liberty they thought as dangerous as unrestrained 
Power.” Liberty and civil freedom must be “balanced and bounded by the safeguards of 
conscience, custom, good order, and good constitutions.” The “modern American” 
should return to the biases of the eighteenth-century American, using the word 
“freedom” to denote freedom under God and law as justified by the years of national 
experience.5
Hope and Obligation  
 His concepts of nationhood and home, animated as they were by historical 
renderings and a rhetorical discourse of an imaginative vision, were also inspired by a 
concern for the communities of his actual and potential audience. These concepts were 
not objectively complete or “fair,” nor were they meant to be. 
As a practitioner of rhetoric, Kirk was not a historian or a philosopher but a 
moralizing “collector.” He worked to convey a consensus of those thinkers and actors he 
presented as worthy of emulation. By discerning general principles of a transcendent 
order through the moral imagination, to which American society should continuously 
conform, Kirk’s convictions (such as a Christian concept of original sin and human 
imperfectability) were formulated and shared. Politically, as a founder of American 
intellectual conservatism one error he sought to correct was the penchant for looking 
perpetually to government to solve social problems. He thought this culturally 
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debilitating. To the detriment of the small spheres of localism (the voluntary fraternities 
of civil society that maintain a more just, natural, and lasting order) the embrace of the 
big, bland, predictable, rationalist, and the standardized had given rise to the licenses of 
freedom, an invitation to decadence and statist solution.6 A culture devoid of inbuilt and 
organically transferred ethics and morals, one that resorted to legal deterrence as an 
influence over behavior, was broken. His defense of America as a shining example of 
conservative sentiment in a world gone mad was a defense of a social fabric, resting on 
revelation, and confronted by an advancing “liberal” anthropology begun by the 
excesses of secular Enlightenment, especially the “ignorant impracticality which 
produced the events of 1789 in France.”7
This social fabric was contemptuous of individualism and utilitarianism as social 
atomistic. They were, in fact, a basis of voracious democracy, ponderous states, and 
theories of abstract rights. Kirk’s high regard for generational obligation took the 
“individualistic” strains of “modernity” and “liberalism” as direct challenges to the 
continuance of community as he would prefer them to be viable. Modernity and 
liberalism, products of complex and many-sided traditions, can I think be understood as 
political doctrines whose primary goal was to secure the conditions necessary for the 
exercise of personal freedom. Implicit in this definition is the “natural” freedom and 
equality of all humans, established by individual rights, consent, tolerance, liberty of 
thought and discourse, a separation of private and public, and personal autonomy as 
elaborated by institutions including a division of powers, representative democracy, and 
an independent judiciary.
  
8 Taking such a definition as valid, I believe Kirk was uncertain 
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about how to effectively “reorder” a nation founded on many of these political doctrines, 
an uncertainty shared by some traditionalists and many conservatives in the years after 
the Second World War. It was difficult to “reorder” by the light of “conservatism” 
without a solid understanding of what in America’s (revolutionary) history was in fact 
conservative. Kirk’s struggle to “construct an American genealogy” produced, according 
to the historian Arthur Schlesinger, a “great scurrying about” for roots and an “odd and 
often contradictory collection of figures.” One European-born prominent member of the 
“American Right” called him “desperate,” writing the “American experience of life…is 
indisputably a fierce yen for institutionalized ‘progress’ by utopian legislation and 
industrial gadgetry.”9
Kirk’s concept of America was as a place of despair and disappointment but also 
hope. The country could return to the conservative sentiments of its past were it to 
finally set aside the attractions of an effectively unlimited individual will. One end of an 
“unlimited will” for traditionalists like Kirk was the growth of a managerial state 
“necessary” to secure present and future individual liberties.
  
10 In making “respectable” 
an “intellectual conservatism” with the publication of The Conservative Mind in 1953, 
his “moral imaginations” of “permanent things” were nourishment for two goals: to 
promote attachment to worthy American traditions and to issue warning about the 
widespread ignorance of them. And the inventions of history and rhetorical appeal were 
not antithetical to reality, he insisted, because tradition itself employs invention. Facts 
and the imagination of their telling could formulate tradition from history. This process 
was creative and dynamic, as “tradition” was constantly revised, rewritten, and 
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reinterpreted. Each generation, Kirk wrote, faced the task of confronting fundamental 
truths anew through fresh interpretations. Present throughout his writings and lectures, 
such a style of communication (a lament, a warning, and a call to return) was different 
from the telling of history,11 which might presuppose a separate past to be analyzed as a 
series of actual, sequential events. His concepts of tradition, on the other hand, assumed 
within itself the continuity of what was passed on, to be always “involved” with the past 
yet perceived in the present.12
 His great worry was for a multifaceted domestic crisis sourced in a deficiency of 
spiritual worth. Such a spiritual deficit should, he communicated, be addressed by 
philosophy and theology more than the political and social battles of the moment. There 
was this danger because modern “American civilization” was mired in a broad “culture 
of choice,” one facilitated by the market economy. The country had “room aplenty for a 
variety of traditions; diversity and freedom of choice, indeed, are themselves American 
traditions.”
 As I have characterized it, Kirk’s concept of America was 
fundamentally reconstructive. These actions and calls to action were a defense, and a 
critique, that followed his rejection of “modernity.” The reconstructive project was 
literary and aesthetic, a “discourse of grief” and a call for preservation against what he 
identified as the arrogant secularisms of modern thought. The “moral imagination” 
energized rhetorical processes through a concern for communities and persons losing 
their way in the confusions of an increasingly complex existence. This crafted (or so he 
aspired) a shared imaginative experience.  
13 Even so, the bustle of life, migratory habits and overly eager enterprise of 
the citizenry, distractions of media, and influx of immigrants unwilling to assimilate 
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have worked to decrease the authority of tradition and custom. While the promise 
granted by the founders endures, driven by the respect they and their insights still 
command, the obsessions of modern life for technology, growth, and upward mobility 
would result in confrontation with humanity’s natural limits. Such obsessions were 
likely to be facilitation for loneliness, alienation, and suffering. But institutions of self-
governance and reverence for prescriptive religion, morality, and family relationships 
were a check to the “assault upon tradition, so that, curiously enough, in a nation with 
only three centuries of history behind it, the mass of the people are probably as 
sympathetic to tradition as is the bulk of the population anywhere else in the world.”14
The High Virtue of Personhood 
 
Crisis, as with promise, always lurked in these competing and, perhaps, irresolvable 
American tensions. From a traditionalist conservative perspective, virtue could not be 
accomplished by any one individual. Societal renewal rested upon an understanding that 
personhood was intimately tied to the communal, as virtue must be learned and shared in 
concert with a healthy generational continuity and memory.  
It was imperative to Kirk’s persuasion, then, to consider transcendence of 
“personhood” and the ensuing commitments of that term. This necessarily required the 
imagination, an acceptance of the reality of the soul. For him, a temporal governor of the 
human race was formed by the good of community extending outward from the home, 
the place most responsible to succeeding generations. The moral imagination, which 
always awaited its rediscovery, “exceeds the power of a whiff of grapeshot.” New-
seeming ideas, sentiments, and modes of state craft might grow popular, but for Kirk the 
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“Post-Modern imagination stands ready to be captured. And the seemingly novel ideas 
and sentiments and modes may turn out, after all, to be revived truths and institutions, 
well known to surviving conservatives.” It may be, he continued, the “conservative 
imagination” which is the guide to the “Post-Modern Age.” Herein was the American 
promise; this was a land that allowed, even welcomed, such an unsettled, practically 
indescribable, theology and philosophy to bloom. Stating that “imagination governs the 
human race,” he wished for Americans, valuing the personhood formed by home, to not 
abandon their spiritual heritage. In this, the country could remain a place favorably 
inclined toward “the diminishing of ignorance.”15
Despite the strong roots of individualism and Enlightenment sentiment in the 
documents, figures, arguments, and actions of the American national founding, Kirk 
persisted, based on his readings and biases, to make use of historical renderings and 
rhetorical persuasion about how societal values were to be decided. These postulates of 
order, justice, and freedom as applied to civil society followed the example of a creation 
of national community, meaning the constitution of American nationhood. According to 
James Boyd White, the achievement of national founding was the self-conscious 
reconstitution of language and community so as to achieve “possibility.” He wrote that 
“In separating from Great Britain and setting up their own government, Americans 
claimed the freedom and the power to remake their own world.”
 
16 And indeed, 
“individual choice” for Kirk need not be a foundational basis of political or social 
legitimacy. His imaginative, sacramental, and religious perception of an inherent human 
dignity, and of a value regardless of the estimation of others, was a statement of 
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opposition to a more prevailing view. In his persuasions, the moral equality and natural 
limits against sentiments of value relativism and Enlightenment-influenced notions of 
individual freedom could also be described as quintessentially American. His written 
and spoken rhetoric, from an analytical and a productive view, was capable of 
employing two seemingly contradictory notions without the intent, in my view, to 
misinform or distract an audience.   
 Across these persuasions, individuality and freedom as a high virtue were 
conveyed as openings for dehumanization because humans were inconsistent and selfish. 
Dissenting from the optimistic prospect that an individual was capable of progress 
through the force of reason, and the collective striving of humanity for the benefit of all 
as humanity was basically good, his opposing position of “the only possible perfection is 
perfection through grace in death” made connection between the political and the 
aesthetic. In a lecture on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Kirk stated, 
“Without religious culture and religious hope, the modern world would come to 
resemble a half-derelict fun fair, gone nasty and poverty-wracked, life a gamble at best – 
one enormous Atlantic City.”17 The acceptance of immovable flaw and mystery worked 
well with his philosophy and theology, and with his refusal to attempt philosophical 
rigor or consistency.18 Humanity betters itself, for Kirk and the coalition of conservative 
writers of like-minded sentiment such as the “traditionalists,” the “agrarians,” and the 
“paleo-conservatives,” by a realization that anything socio-political aiming to approach 
the completeness, the totality, of reality was unfeasible. The attractive and inspiring idea 
that humanity ought to be and can be the master of its own fortune tends to lead to 
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ideology, a magnifier of vice. As such, a humbled reliance on the transcendent, the 
intuitions present as a common feature of human nature across environment and time, 
intersecting with subjective experience and the forces the past, remained central to the 
health of community and civilization. It was also central to his conduct as a “rhetorical 
popularizer,” in both the approaches of persona and philosophical underpinning.   
Visions of Liberty and Tradition 
Kirk’s rhetoric was a persuasion that America needed nothing less than it needed 
ideology. Prudence, prescription, custom, tradition, and constitution have governed the 
American people, not abstractions: “We have been saved from ideology by political 
tradition. We still subscribe, however confusedly, to the norms of politics; we still 
cherish the permanent things.”19 The accumulated wisdom of generations, tempered by 
the slow evolution of observation and involvement, took religious belief (which for Kirk 
made American democracy successful) out of the private sphere of debate. His 
persuasion placed the confounding of religion and politics as significantly less 
problematic than the total separation of religion from a civil social order. Within the 
American conservative intellectual movement, politically active and discursive, I believe 
such an argument was at the heart of conflicting visions. One valued individuality, 
choice, and market economy, while the other valued cultural and historical inheritances. 
Further, the tension between liberty and tradition has frequently materialized in many 
debates. Philosopher Peter Berkowitz, like William F. Buckley and many other writers 
for National Review an advocate for a fusionist “constitutional conservatism,” has 
characterized the various parts of the conservative partnership in America (libertarian, 
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socially traditionalist, and foreign policy hawkishness) in their overlap and uneasy 
association to the dogmas of classic liberalism as follows:  
The principles are familiar: individual freedom and individual responsibility, limited but 
energetic government, economic opportunity, and strong national defense. They derive 
support from Edmund Burke, the father of modern conservatism, as well as from Adam 
Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, and, in his most representative moments, John Stuart Mill 
– outstanding contributors to the conservative side of the larger liberal tradition. They 
are embedded in the Constitution and flow out of the political ideas from which it was 
fashioned.20
 
  
The “conservative side of the larger liberal tradition” was a source of anxiety for 
Kirk’s sentiment and rhetoric. The moral imagination, an “enduring source of inspiration 
that elevates us to first principles as it guides us upwards toward virtue and wisdom and 
redemption,”21 was a necessary bulwark against what he depicted, in an essay praising 
the British Catholic convert and writer Malcom Muggeridge, as a modern civilization 
stumbling down toward a dusty death. The “enthronement of the gospel of progress” was 
blithe to the truth that civilization began with revelation. This is an incitement to decay: 
“Culture arises from the cult; when the cult dissolves, so in time does the culture.”22 For 
Kirk, liberalism, modernism, and freedom as a high virtue made a similar error to the 
collectivism he also scorned in his rhetoric. These concepts and their advocates were 
deluded in their assumptions that humans were, on balance, naturally good willed, and 
that they will surely care for one another if only a certain environment could be put into 
place. It was not the quest for greater knowledge that he wished to see abandoned, nor 
the mannerisms and lifestyle of the intellectual, but the ambitions of intellectuals of the 
political “left” and the “right.” The American people, as with all people, were too 
contradictory, too complicated, and operating with far too much incomplete information 
  
281 
to truly know what might be best in every circumstance. The socio-political policies of a 
civil society, therefore, should be designed with this ignorance taken into account. The 
dehumanizing aspects of value relativism and freedom as a high virtue, each evident 
across the varieties of public discussion, were to be countered, according to many 
traditionalist conservative arguments, first by an epistemological modesty.  
 In the midst of abundance and freedom, the pursuit of happiness was, essentially, 
a pursuit of distraction. In his “reflections on our conservative constitution,” Kirk 
claimed the original intent of the framers was to give the people a “Republic of elevated 
views and hopes” rather than the “arbitrary rulings” that have “invaded some of the more 
intimate concerns and interests of American democracy.”23
In the domain of the law today, as in all other realms of human endeavor, there is waged 
a battle between those who believe that we human creatures are made in the image of a 
Creator, and those believe that we are not much more than fleshly computers. Even 
within the courts of law, created to help to keep the peace, this war is fought to the knife. 
How will this struggle over the nature of law, with the followers of Apollo on one side 
and the votaries of Dionysius on the other, be terminated? Will the Christian sources of 
the law be effaced in America – or will the Christian moral imagination and right reason 
rise up again in strength in our courts of law?
 The precepts summarized by 
Berkowitz were “amorphous notions labeled ‘liberalism;’” and they were anxious to cast 
aside a Christian moral appreciation of law, which “could give way, in the long run, only 
to the commandments of the Savage God – enforced by some Rough Beast, his hour 
come round at last”: 
24
 
 
As with southern agrarians, this characteristically stark generalization and 
rhetorical flourish was the product of a genuine despondency that something valuable 
has been lost. The valuation of “rooted place” and familial responsibility extended 
outward to immediate community was ruined by the chasing of “individual freedom.” 
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When a citizenry indulged their many appetites as freely as possible, once great states, 
regardless of their civic constitutions, would begin to sink toward their dissolution. And 
no matter how admirable a constitution might appear on paper, Kirk wrote, it would be 
ineffectual unless “the unwritten constitution, the web of custom and convention, affirms 
an enduring moral order of obligation and personal responsibility.” Since the horrors of 
global conflict begun in 1914, the world has been “blinded and deafened” by the crash of 
empires and the collapse of constitutions; and “only American territories and American 
laws have stood little touched amidst the general ruin.”25
A Sentiment of Limits 
 His homeland, in other words, 
did not yet fully embrace an optimistic faith of the individual ever progressing by the 
light of secular reason, or a minimizing of more seemingly unimportant and strange 
matters such as mystery and beauty.  
America had kept true to his favored concept of a more genuine, enduring home 
for the pursuit of what made humans truly happy. It was a place yet to elevate either 
“modernism” or “hypermodernism.” Political philosopher Peter Lawler has defined 
modern thought as the “attempt to master or to overcome nature through action directed 
by thought.” Like Kirk, his discernment of postmodernism “rightly understood” was not 
“as it is usually understood.” All postmodernists correctly reject the systematic or 
reductionist rationalism of modern thought, Lawler wrote, but postmodernism need not 
be foundationless or a “celebration of endless self-creation out of nothing.” It can also be 
perceived as a sentiment of limits, conducive to the humbling of hubris, a “realistic 
acknowledgement of the limits of human understanding.” Although there is much about 
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being and self that would always elude comprehension and control, it was possible to 
know enough to live well. An arbitrary character of human authority and the freedom 
from all standards aside from human will should be called “hypermodern.” Its intention 
was not to understand nature but to guide transformative action in accordance with the 
whims of human desire:            
Antifoundationalism, the assertion of the groundlessness of human existence, is really 
hypermodernism, or the exaggeration to the point of caricature of the modern impulse to 
self-creation. Havel and Solzhenitsyn, true postmodernists, write of human beings living 
in the light of the truth, meaning primarily the truth about human purpose and limits. 
Postmodernism rightly understood rejects the illusion of self-creation in favor of the 
reality of conscientious responsibility. So postmodernism is not a rejection of Socratic or 
Thomistic rationalism. Human reason exists primarily not to transform reality but to 
understand and to come to terms with it. There is some correspondence between human 
thought and the way things really are. Postmodernism is the return to realism. But 
realism is not to be confused with the possibility of comprehensive human wisdom, 
which would only be possible if man became God or history came to an end.26
 
 
Lawler’s arrangement of the “natural” world here is one unthreatened by the 
mysteries of being as mediated by human nature and reason. The reason, I suspect, is 
that there was no attempt for a full, totalizing comprehension of human life in 
“postmodernism rightly understood.” “Hypermodernism,” in such a conception, has 
often resulted in some attempt to dominate. “Freedom” colluded with the reality of sinful 
human nature in all its negative and domineering impulses. It was possible to ponder the 
strengths and limitations of the modern world from a perspective “outside” of modernity 
because the effort for security, happiness, and status continues to develop with no end in 
sight; enough has been seen to recognize these will remain pursuits. “Postmodern 
conservatives” can “see” beyond the modern world because the intention to transform 
human nature has failed. The project of “transforming the human person into the 
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autonomous individual was and remains unrealistic; we can now see the limits of being 
an individual because we remain more than individuals. The world created by modern 
individuals to make themselves fully at home turns out to have made human beings less 
at home than ever.”27
With regard to the “rhetoric of moral imagination,” instruction of a will toward 
harmony with the governing energy of a transcendent good in the context of America 
was its supposedly conservative traditions. In Kirk’s imaginative rendering an allegedly 
“Burkean” character of American constitutional construction shined through the 
unfortunate impulses of many citizens and their scheming managers. Human appetites 
were voracious and sanguinary and must be restrained by the “collective and 
immemorial wisdom” of “prejudice, tradition, customary morality.” The traditions which 
Americans still valued were indispensable in developing and guiding a higher nature. 
Precepts and social conventions were the considered judgments and filtered experience 
of generations. They built duty, prudence, and good citizenship.
 Kirk’s aesthetic inclination featured similarities to these 
generalizations of “home.” In searching for a “dwelling place” of his audience, the 
background of his writing was alarm for how the modern person existed, first in the 
small spheres of community. Traditions can help to guide to a higher nature, an aspect of 
being which, under the guidance of transcendent good, moved and inspired toward the 
direction of humanity and personhood in inherent dignity. This spiritual purpose, 
supported by universal standards external to the limits of self, was a check against that 
(more popular and present) aspect of human will governed by selfishness, greed, lust for 
power, and arbitrary desire.  
28 A goal of Kirk’s 
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persuasion was such a vision, one difficult to typify even as I classify him as a 
“postmodern conservative.” The ethic of this vision, and his lament for the Christian 
basis of America and its constitutional order seen to be endangered by consumerism and 
rampant individualism, was led by a creativity that inspired phrases like “some Rough 
Beast, his hour come round at last.” The imaginative visions and the moral imagination 
were formed out of a worried affection for the approach of American communities to its 
composition and long-term future direction. Kirk’s persuasions were not directed only to 
various political and social circumstances.29 In his writings, the cultural intelligence of 
which family, transcendence, custom, and personhood were a means of expression came 
from the delicate handiwork of the few; and “wisdom is not got through shouting-
matches within one generation.”30 Beauty was a form of truth, just as a “good” work of 
art was capable of capturing a fragment of the universal truths and thus set a standard for 
the good society.31
 The connection between inclinations political and aesthetic was crucial to Kirk’s 
concepts of America, in practice and in ideal. A shaping of political identity was not 
only the outcome of opinions on specific issues; this development of identity was part of 
the representation of what a person was striving to become. Rhetorical scholar Michael 
McGee’s outline of the fragmentation of American culture, where interpretation is “the 
primary task of speakers and writers and text construction the primary task of audiences, 
readers, and critics” has suggested that contemporary discourse is a reflection of this 
fragmentation. Text construction has become something “done more by the consumers 
than by the producers of discourse.”
    
32 I think Kirk understood and welcomed the 
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developments of a person as an amalgam of different traditions, an amalgam most 
Americans shared: he was Puritan and Catholic, Midwesterner and Scotsman, an 
American who built an Italianate home in the rural woodlands of central Michigan. His 
work was “intended to demonstrate how one could reclaim a particular tradition and 
make it one’s own.”33
The Importance of True Constitutions 
 A “certainty” of a worldviews political or economic was simply 
not as important – or as lasting for the health of the person, the family, and the 
community – as the habits, customs, norms, and traditions ignited by the imagination. 
And in reviewing his life and work, I find that was one reason why he always included 
literary figures as exemplars of conservative sentiment.  
Kirk’s faith, orientated toward the transcendence of Christian revelation instead 
of politics and its politicians, led him to conclude that America could simply rest on a 
foundation of “conservative principle.” Founding documents could be read as “true 
constitutions,” as the product of a nation’s struggles “sprung from the bosom of the 
community” and not constructed in the “high plains” of abstraction as was the French 
Republic. The Conservative Mind expressed “true constitutions” to be a “natural” 
growth; “in a sense they are the voice of God expressed through the people; but nature 
and God work through historical experience, and all sound constitutions are effective 
embodiments of compromise. They reconcile the different interests or portions of the 
community with one another, in order to avert anarchy.”34 It was by such generalizations 
that Kirk posited a European, “Burkean” traditionalism antagonistic to the spirit of 
modernism, liberalism, and revolutionary zeal into the fabric of an America with more 
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than a few “Lockean” premises. Still, his concept of an American “home,” despite the 
many errors contained within the conduct of its people, retained its promise as the last, 
best hope for a “conservative” to practice their dispositions.  
Kirk insisted that America enjoyed its own conservative tradition sourced in the 
British experience, even as this case depended upon an extrapolation at odds with many 
professional observers. Lawler has written, for example, that “Arguably all American 
political disputes center on disputes concerning the meaning of the principles set forth in 
Thomas Jefferson’s revolutionary document, the Declaration of Independence.” But for 
Kirk, that document was an aberration, a mere statement of separation with little 
significance. The genuinely American constitutional principles, such as the rule of law 
and the protection of property, he thought to be inheritances from the English 
constitutional tradition. This is perhaps the best example of how his conservatism was 
inventive, and “an effort to improve on the American foundation in view of its 
weaknesses.”35
By this view, America’s ensuing political traditions, adept at eschewing 
ideology, adhered to a long Western tradition of natural and divine law. If Kirk’s 
 Over the course of his career, Kirk was resolute in seeing a principled 
foundation of social order in line with his own impartialities, an American genesis 
soaked in “Judeo-Christian” introspection and supported by beautiful documents of form 
and sentiment. And thus it could be the case, he endeavored to discover with his 
audience, that the dreariness of a utilitarian utopianism primed to exploit lonely 
individuality in the name of efficiency and an abstracted, synthetic unity could, through 
a renewal of moral imagination, be resisted.  
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inventiveness was an effort to improve upon the American foundations of political 
organization in view of its weaknesses,36 then his persuasions of American concepts 
required simplifications, assumption, and wishful thinking. The Roots of American 
Order insisted, for instance, that John Locke’s politics and “psychology” had very little 
impact on American beliefs in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Kirk reported 
those present at the national founding “accepted neither the determinism and absolute 
sovereignty of Hobbes, nor yet the whole doctrine of the origins of society and of the 
human understanding as put forward by Locke.” Conceding that Americans “would 
make use of Locke, but they would not worship him,” he found from his study of 
Americans’ reading during that period that “educated Americans often mentioned Locke 
on the eve of the Revolution, but seldom read his books at first hand.”37
It may or may not be the case that Locke was of little use to early Americans. 
Nevertheless, this breezy dismissal was aided by two points: Locke was “mentioned” but 
never lionized, and the “whole doctrine” was not fully accepted. I think it is unlikely, 
however, that any commentator in disagreement over Locke’s influence would make 
such claims. This is an example of why I judge Kirk a historical inventor and “rhetorical 
popularizer” of “traditionalist” conservative sentiment. He wrote that despite its many 
failings, the American order had been a success in human history due to its “checks upon 
popular impulses” to keep its citizens from “arbitrary domination.” A “practical secular 
covenant” was extracted by those believing in “a sacred Covenant, designed to restrain 
 I highlight these 
passages not to argue the soundness of the opinion but to note his rhetorical performance 
of historical significance.  
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the human tendencies toward violence and fraud; the American Constitution is a 
fundamental law deliberately meant to place checks upon will and appetite.”38
Return to Spiritual Order 
 His 
rhetoric converted the past through some manner of manipulation of record and memory. 
The intentions to persuade consistently engaged the audience through the openly and 
repeatedly stated biases, exclusions, additions, and characterizations of the author. 
Kirk’s rhetoric of America was not so much practical or partisan as it was an extension, 
backwards in time and across continents, of symbolisms and emotions permeated with 
the “possibilities” of sacramental, communal solidarity. By this I mean he expected for 
men and women to live and work, with skepticism toward quickened, abstract change 
and a humbled outlook, within the small spheres of their influence.  
In his rhetoric, it was the responsibility of citizens to actively engage these local 
communities, first through the family, where virtue in habitations may be acquired in 
compatibility with an irrepressible social drive. The audience was “called,” in other 
words, to live and think in accordance with his sentiments and emotions as codified by 
his own persona and example. This was Kirk’s “founding spirit” of America, a land 
where “the pursuit of happiness” could signify the restoration and improvement of the 
order of the soul and thus of the republic. Happiness, he wrote in The Roots of American 
Order, was to be “found in the imaginative affirmation.”39 The country was a place of 
“conservative” hope by this renewable spirit, the strength of mind which was capable of 
leading one mired in noisy, confusing, modern distractions to possibilities of more 
fulfilling communion in association. The prudence and constitution that have governed 
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the American people living and building in their communities of custom make them 
resistant to the hubris of managers and planners. But Kirk’s rhetoric discovered many 
still clamoring to more completely control human affairs. Trouble always lurked when 
imagination failed and more “diabolical things” came to be valued: “When faith in a 
transcendent moral order, duty to family, hope of advancement, and satisfaction with 
one’s task have vanished from the routine of life, Big Brother appears to show the 
donkey instead of the carrot.”40
Yet American culture, derived yet detached from centuries of British culture, was 
prone to pride and hubris. Here was his solution to renewing a “shaken culture”: “Even 
such as you and I, my friends, if we are resolute enough and sufficiently imaginative, 
may alter the present course of events.”
 Culture, more important than politics and arising from 
the “cult” (the sense of the sacred growing from a civilization’s agriculture, defense, 
order, architecture, literature, music, arts, law, politics, and education) always needs 
renewal. His rhetoric of “conservative” renewal was orientated toward the “home” of a 
particular cultural continuation, a personal and familial restructuring taking advantage of 
existence in a place and time where such renewal was still possible.  
41 This conclusion is what I have identified as a 
call to join his perceptions of crisis and renewal by following his sentiments. In the 
context of Kirk’s America, there was conjured a place he thought connected to a 
historically-rooted growth of prudence and generational wisdom, not the meanderings of 
an ideology unlimited in its utopianism.42 These persuasions were often preceded by 
historical renderings of a memorable, quotable language. Further, the audience could be 
part of something larger than individual effort, something directly following the 
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judiciousness of the founders. They could join his project of redemption and return at no 
cost aside from the personal and intellectual development many of them were already 
seeking. In sum, Kirk’s critiques were as a contributor to the “universe of discourse,” not 
as a centered subject originating thought. As an “inventor” of texts, his role was to “re-
present” from a collection of fragmentary episodes. This was a recovery of the subject of 
American conservatism.43
In the later ‘Sixties, many of the rising generation thought it amusing to pull down what 
earlier generations had patiently built up; their zeal extended even to the burning of 
university libraries. In the early ‘Nineties, I hope and trust, many of the rising generation 
will find it satisfying to restore their patrimony from earlier times – and so save the 
world from suicide. That labor will require cleverness and courage. Some of you present 
here tonight may choose it for your vocation.
 The gathering of fragmentations for an inventive presentation, 
leading to a call for renewal, was more explicit in the last years of his career. As he spent 
a greater amount of time addressing young conservatives, Kirk would summon a 
restoration in the wake of a failing liberal order:  
44
 
  
This urging to discuss and discover restorative applications for principles 
following the intangible “moral imagination” made it difficult to establish effects, which 
I believe supported optimism amid requiem. According to Paul Gottfried, a political 
philosopher and frequent contributor to debates of conservatism’s meanings, the “misfit” 
between an ideal America representing his “conservative tradition” and what came to 
actually exist drove Kirk to formulating his persuasion as “value conservatism.” This 
was an idealized form in search of “permanent things” that found “illustrations of their 
values in literary and historical works,” an appeal first and foremost to young 
intellectuals of Catholic religious identification. For Gottfried, though, what Kirk was 
really drawing forth were the “non-radicalized sectors of an otherwise radicalized 
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society” when he claimed to be discovering conservative traditions. Even as the 
emphasis on surviving and flourishing traditions caused exaggerations and distinctive 
historical evaluations, the work as a “literary and aesthetic traditionalist” assumed an 
inherently meaningful universe.45 In Kirk’s persuasions, and by his biases, authors may 
exaggerate but a good story of important things tells the truth. The intellectual 
abstractions of determinisms, collectivisms, “free markets,” and the like hammered the 
facts and mysteries of life – their asymmetry, poetic rhythms, and communal, family 
relations – into something supposedly digestible and as a quasi-religion. Instead, the 
universe itself was the ultimate work of art, literature, poetry, and truth; its 
incomprehensible parts worked marvelously together toward a purpose. Kirk wrote in 
The Conservative Mind that if persons were “discharged of reverence for ancient usage, 
they will treat this world, almost certainly, as if it were their private property, to be 
consumed for their sensual gratification; and thus they will destroy in their lust for 
enjoyment the property of future generations, of their own contemporaries, and indeed 
their very own capital.”46         
 The reality of original sin, the only doctrine empirically verifiable, meant the 
function of a conservative in the modern world was to stand against its radicalisms. They 
were to remind the herd that some things do not and cannot change, and to emphasize 
that some truths will escape the rationalizations and logics of the latest fashions. 
Rhetorical scholar Wayne C. Booth has written that the notion humans have reason to 
believe only what has been proved “cannot be lived with by most of us for even a 
moment.”47 Indeed, we are all bursting with ghosts, Kirk opined in his memoir, our 
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emotions, thoughts, and wishes ever changing with the seasons. The “compositions” and 
“recompositions” of the sensations and ideas and desires of our ancestors flow deeply in 
our blood.48 And so politicians and planners don’t grant or shape values, and they cannot 
“save” that from the home and hearth meant to be loved and passed forward in time. 
Human nature was not malleable. The permanence of tradition, art, literature, poetry, and 
history were small pieces of transcendent truths hanging on amid the whirlwinds of 
innovation. If culture was something resembling morality write large, then the “soul” of 
American civilization could, Kirk believed, be lost at the very moment of its culture’s 
material triumph. In sum, he “invited” readers on this “journey” to give direction to 
changes, to “insure that generation may link with generation, some of us must undertake 
the rescue of the moral imagination.”49
An Associative Vision 
        
I find that by these persuasions, the temporality of material and utilitarian 
pleasure was presented as an inferior happiness compared to the intricate continuity of 
lives. As Burke’s “little platoons” of society built on the unit of family, so too did Kirk 
model his concepts of America on the “home” of family. Imaginative to the point of 
invention, they were tied to something always perceived as very real. These concepts 
were similar to a religious rhetoric of “Augustinian imagination” culminating in 
contemplative silence and bringing the mind into immediate contact with an external 
veracity.50 A “moral imagination” was thought to prepare beneficial responses to the 
uncertainties of self, family, and community, as appropriated to any trial. Kirk’s 
“discovery” of a conservative American heritage came in no small part by meditation on 
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“ancient things” – prompts of thought when viewing European ruins and walks in his 
ancestral home of Scotland, for example. An “aesthetic stance” was present in his 
version of conservatism from the beginning of his career. “Americans of a certain 
temperament could vibrate to Kirk’s remembered experience when he had visited 
‘Burke’s house [in Dublin] or the sad scrap of it that remains.’” They could together 
mourn how “the past shrivels,” according to Gottfried. Becoming a “Kirkian 
conservative,” he continued, meant embracing an aesthetic experience and celebrating 
the sentiments of his most well-known contribution to political thought, the six canons 
featured in The Conservative Mind. It was available to all willing to share and espouse it, 
although the appeal was limited. But for those who did, his presentation of sentiments 
with a literary flare, a bohemian Anglophilia, indifference to party politics, and aesthetic 
sensibility made him popular with some American readers.51 Despite this, he remained a 
solitary and lonely figure within the context of the movement he helped lend intellectual 
creditability. And in cultivating distaste for technocratic innovation and working from a 
“late nineteenth-century setting,” his views were not “in sync” with much of the 
conservative movement as it came to exert influence shortly before (and I would say 
well after) his death.52
Kirk’s “associative vision” found all citizens to be flawed creatures torn between 
higher and lower inclinations and in need of the American “conservative traditions.” Yet 
the appeal of his rhetoric was limited by the constraints of America itself, in idea and 
fact. His insistence of a “Burkean” beginning, articulated most comprehensively in The 
Conservative Mind and The Roots of American Order, can I believe be fairly classified 
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as wishful thinking, as an unsustainable and unmoored blueprint of conservative 
founding. Kirk categorically, and I think deliberately, existed and wrote as one out of 
step with the romanticism, Lockeanism, Calvinism, liberalism, modernism, Greco-
Roman republicanism, and other ingredients of an Enlightenment-based blend present on 
the North American continent at the time of revolution. As such, his rhetoric was 
simultaneously constituted, enabled, and constrained by an “institutional design.”53
More specifically, Kirk’s effectiveness is contingent upon an acceptance of his 
unconventional, and perhaps singular, readings. His continuing importance as a 
practitioner of political rhetoric depends upon a preexisting critical inclination (in 
approach to questions of culture, politics, and society) to concepts such as rationalism, 
modernism, and liberalism. These are quite far from a large-scale acceptance. The 
“critical inclinations” were articulated as attempts to order society in accordance with 
something other than the transcendent, the local, and the “naturally” accumulated. In his 
critiques of culture and the managerial state, in fact, Kirk may have calculatingly limited 
his appeal. An endeavor to persuade beyond the boundary of “traditionalist 
conservatives” and those inclined to agree with at least some of the “traditionalist” or 
“Burkean” sentiments would, I expect, have resulted in a different writing style, one 
more conducive to the contemporary reader, or one politically disengaged. The persona 
of a “Bohemian Tory,” a traveling man of letters, was likely intentionally archaic. An 
 And 
although artful rhetoric can alter political or social arrangements, there remain reasons 
for skepticism when accessing the scope and legacy of his influence upon audience, even 
one sympathetic to his concerns.      
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inaccessibility of this sort tended to evoke the responses he desired, but only for those 
already drawn to him.54
Kirk wrote that conservatism had “almost lost the power of language.” Most 
conservatives expressed themselves badly, and few were able to describe any coherent 
moral or philosophical basis for their beliefs. Though their impulses may have been 
“genuinely conservative in the historic sense of that abused term,” they would endeavor 
to defend themselves by the arguments of their old adversaries.
 In “converting” the past by a “manipulation” of record and 
memory, his characterizations of America contained questionable exclusion, distinctive 
and questionable addition, and a happily embraced bias. I think this is because such 
symbolisms and sentiments were likewise entertained by an alliance of the likeminded. 
There was a reassuring, communal solidarity to be found among a place and a people he 
wanted desperately to be saved. But this alliance of the likeminded could not expect to 
enjoy political or cultural ascendency – and there is little evidence to suggest they did 
harbor any such expectation.      
55 As a response, he 
developed a “culturally-based” rhetoric orientated toward the “home: of a smaller, more 
localized communion extending outward into the polis. It was expressed, in part, by 
appreciation for the reality and the promise of an America founded upon “conservative” 
principles. The “good” always in mind, his portrait of civic and familial association 
criticized modernity as an incoherent collection of propositions and practices flowing 
from a common error: hubris. Though the very same criticism might be made of his 
concepts of conservatism and literary based imagination, those inclined toward his 
sentiments unearthed an articulate addressing of their anxieties.  I have stated the 
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historical background of this work was an accounting of how “American intellectual 
conservatism,” its varied and occasionally contradictory strands made stronger and more 
cohesive by the landmark publication of The Conservative Mind in 1953, was 
overwhelmed by the politicization of a movement that was forced to confront the 
challenges of governing.56
 
 Whatever Kirk’s legacy, one lasting influence will be his role 
in moving American conservatism away from a “freedom” and “liberty” influence of 
libertarianism and toward the understanding of society as an “organic organism,” a civic 
order responsive to social and communitarian capital. The extent of this influence, in 
persuasion and persona, remains to be seen.  
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Strategies of Representation: The Associational in Conservatism 
 
 Terms such as “modernism,” “postmodernism,” “liberalism,” and “conservatism” 
are often present in the rhetoric of American political and social discussion. My 
characterizations of these large and difficult terms have been informed by scholars of 
“traditionalist intellectual conservatism,”1 figures that tended to emphasize order of the 
being, society, and the soul. The striving to find absolutes in a relativistic and secular 
society, and to encourage others to value these wisdoms, was a pervasive element in 
their persuasions.2
In his rhetoric against the “modern,” this environment was portrayed as losing its 
property. He believed there was a “text” of life upon which the will of a supreme being 
was inscribed and through which humans could come to understand more profoundly 
their proper place in an order. Yet in “modernity,” Kirk and the “traditionalists” 
distrusted the process of “modernization” which was always under way.
  The notion that society must be grounded in an objective, moral 
order standing above the flux of history, and that every society ought to adhere to 
fundamental, transcendent truths, were sentiments at odds with much of the currents of 
modernity. That large and difficult term, suggesting empirical fact and measurement, 
was for Russell Kirk an insistence upon taking charge of the environment, so that nature 
became a set of laws susceptible to human knowledge.  
3 My application 
of rhetorical scholarship to the traditionalist strands of the American conservative 
intellectual movement (through the lens of Kirk’s calls for a localized, communal bond – 
associations strengthened by the strategies and personas of his persuasions) makes use of 
a method inexplicit yet participatory in a noteworthy nexus. This is the affinity between 
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their political, social persuasion and an understanding of postmodernism as illuminated 
by the “associational rhetoric” employed by the reading methods of James Boyd White’s 
When Words Lose Their Meaning. In this dissertation, I have argued that conservatism 
sourced in an unknowable order and set against ideology in favor of customs and 
conventions, a “humbled attitude” of cautious change, overlaps with a “postmodernist” 
distrust of legitimating knowledge through an overarching, totalizing system of thought. 
Kirk’s rhetoric persisted in denying a “system” which would encompass legitimate truth 
and proper societal placement of organizational parts. This has made him a unique and 
somewhat awkward fit among modern “conservative” American arguments.   
Denial of Autonomy in Textual Community 
In his “postmodern” discourse, incredulity toward “metanarratives” rebuffed a 
totalizing series of propositions. A denial of the “autonomous self” and an acceptance of 
a social construction of life (although a construction guided by religious and community 
norms perceived as healthy and commendable) developed and perpetuated meaning 
through the learned practices and symbolisms of expression, the fragile and vital work of 
each successive generation. It was “characteristically modern,” according to one self-
identified “postmodern conservative” scholar, to be so devoted to freedom that the 
limitations and directions embedded in nature and revelation seem like tyranny.4 This 
line of reasoning and connection of terminologies may or may not be persuasive to an 
observer. But I argue the rhetorical method of White does bind a deliberation of rhetoric 
and postmodernity5 to the criticisms of Kirk and others through its concern for the terms 
by which a social world is constituted and its values defined.    
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 White’s explanations and expositions may obfuscate his unconventional way of 
reading a text. One conception of his work was that literary and ethical performances 
represent acts of “friendship” through the educations offered about how to relate in a 
complex, confusing environment. These acts opened possibilities for a realization of self 
and community. Cumulatively, they form a durable cultural construct linking backward 
and forward through time to generations past and generations yet to be born.6 The sense 
of belonging to the same community is conveyed, a sense actively cultivated by the 
author. Persuasions, therefore, exist in the establishment of relations between an author 
and reader through the harnessing of language so as to form a “textual community.” A 
lasting rapport between the two would be the goal of the “associational” rhetorical 
practitioner. This includes a representation of self through text, which works toward a 
capacity of drawing in the likeminded. This formed kinship that in political terms can be 
a commanding one, particularly when articulated as a struggle against the siege of decay 
and decadence. (Kirk, from the start of his career as a writer and lecturer, communicated 
that only a few were fit for the battles of modern existence.7
More specifically, I find that White and Kirk “invited” the reader to exist not 
only as a participant but as a “character” in the world created and shared by the texts. 
Implicit in White’s effort to define a way of thinking about texts was the expansion of 
what was meant by reading and writing to include every effort to claim meaning and to 
establish relations in language. By examining the language and culture the writer has 
inherited, and the kind of relationship established with those, it was possible to examine 
the relation between the writer and the reader. This was a relationship created by the text 
)  
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itself, what White labeled the “textual community.” It was then possible to ask “what 
connection exists between that textual community and the larger culture that supplies the 
materials with which it is formed.” While the text was necessarily constituted out of the 
resources found within culture – namely words, expectations, values, and conventions – 
the text and the author can nevertheless be critical of those very cultures and their 
components.8
By this I mean that one concept of “postmodernism” can help to shed light on 
certain “conservative” criticisms of modernity, despite differences of ideals with many 
scholars claiming postmodernism. Emphasis on the construction of life by tradition and 
custom, denunciation of the “autonomous self,” and the distrust of comprehensive 
narratives were just a few of the commonalities of postmodernism and a body of 
traditionalist conservative outlook begun by Edmund Burke, a source of widespread 
admiration for Kirk and those he influenced. The creation and continuation of a textual 
community, as well as the attraction of those inclined to similar sentiments toward 
shared assumptions through language, argument, persona and other ingredients of 
culture, was an effort in overlap with postmodernism and traditionalist conservatism. 
Each self-consciously carved out an “imaginative” ethic for self and culture. In his 
 They may even propose a “new world,” as I believe Kirk did. If Gerald 
Russello and others are correct in the designation of this idiosyncratic and traditionalist 
conservative intellectual as inhabiting a “postmodern imagination,” the anti-ideological, 
anti-modern, anti-liberal “Bohemian Tory” and man of letters posture, with his screeds 
against various coercive efforts for human perfectibility, begins to better “fit” a 
categorization of rhetoric.  
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consideration of postmodernism, Wayne Gabardi has defined culture as “the historical 
transmission of a learned repertory of embodied human practices expressed in symbolic 
codes through which individuals and social groups develop and perpetuate a way of 
life.”9 Certainly, thinking through terms such as “culture” and “postmodernism” requires 
effort for definition and an acknowledgment of position and bias. Some scholars have 
disparaged an imaginative, historical transmission of values as a “new conservatism” 
that was simply the projection of the experiences of life under a new form of capitalism 
in which information manipulation has replaced the production of “real” things. And if 
postmodernism is defined not as a disdain for “foundationalism” but more narrowly as a 
reaction against the Enlightenment emphasis on scientific progress and the elimination 
of tradition in the name of a universalizing “reason,” then some element of conservatism 
can be seen as “postmodern” if the term is used, as I use it, as a way (in critiquing the 
“modern”) to describe an appreciation for tradition and limits to knowledge, not to 
emphasize the arbitrary character of human authority or the freedom of each person from 
all standards but their own will or creativity.10
My contention is that White’s approach to language, as shared conceptions of 
manners, values, resources, expectations and procedures for speech and thought by 
which communities are defined and constituted,
  
11 was as unconventional in its approach 
as Kirk and “postmodern conservatives.” Second, I contend this method helps to explain 
rhetoric and its stands against much of the “modern world” most especially. Like it 
might be stated that White’s view of language is not language as it is usually understood, 
Peter Lawler has written that his “postmodern conservatism” was not postmodernism (or 
  
306 
modernism) as it is usually understood. Surveying the failure of the “modern project” to 
eradicate human mystery and to bring history to an end, he has found in postmodernism 
human reflection on the realistic acknowledgement of the limits of human awareness, an 
immersion in unselfconscious contentment: “The driving intention of modern thought is 
not to understand nature or human nature, but to guide action to transform nature freely 
in accordance with human desire.”12 By accommodating to culture in a way that strives 
to dominate it, he continued, a reflection on human freedom was an inclination to 
confuse human will with the transcendent, to lord over creation, and to perceive 
technological success a parallel to the supernatural. The individual replaced the divine; 
and when speaking of self-consciousness, freedom, and mortality, it expressed a 
distorted debt to religious heritage, a debt of anxious denial made possible by the claims 
of freedom. In this, the transformation of social, political, religious, and familial beings 
into individuals, the life mission of liberal, Enlightenment figures such as John Locke 
achieved real success.13
Attitudes Concerning Rhetoric 
 But writers like Kirk worked for “recovery” they knew to be 
small, limited, and difficult. They labored for a return to “personhood” and the 
communal bonds of family and local community. In my analysis, White’s rhetorical 
conjecture has provided a way of demonstration for how this recovery was accomplished 
and how it was possible.  
 In pondering rhetoric and postmodernity by such biases and definitions, I 
contend that “modernity” was a “rejection” of rhetoric. For Kirk, the project of 
grounding existence in the “autonomous individual” was an enterprise fundamentally 
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unresponsive to the fulfillment of human need and desire. Likewise, Richard Weaver, a 
rhetorician of the “southern agrarian” tradition and a friend of Kirk whose concepts of 
rhetoric and imagery is a baseline of this analysis, defined rhetoric as that which creates 
an informed appetite for the “good,” which moves the “soul with a movement which 
cannot finally be justified logically. It can only be valued analogically with reference to 
some supreme image.” In traditionalist conservative understandings, there was a 
“hierarchical order” leading to the “ultimate good,” and “all of the terms in a rhetorical 
vocabulary are like links in a chain stretching up to some master link which transmits its 
influence down through the linkages. It is impossible to talk about rhetoric as effective 
expression without having a term giving intelligibility to the whole discourse, the 
Good.”14
Declaring that “language is sermonic,” he spurned the social-scientific, 
journalistic, and general semantics view that humans might utilize neutral, objective, and 
scientific communication. Instead, all acts of communication take a point of view and 
attempt to persuade.
 Similar to Kirk, many “southern agrarians,” and the “conservative” writers of a 
“postmodern imagination,” Weaver in his rhetoric was intensely concerned with a 
cultural crisis engendered by science (or “sciencism”), industrial capitalism, as well as 
“mass” education and communication.  
15 Dialectic, he continued, is “abstract reasoning on the basis of 
propositions; rhetoric is the relation of the terms of these to the external world in which 
facts are regarded with sympathy and are treated with that kind of historical 
understanding and appreciation which lie outside the dialectical process.”16 According to 
James Aune, the “perennial appeal of the anti-modernist view” was its assertion that the 
  
308 
autonomous self was “prone to loneliness.” In seeking to restore the values of region, 
family, and community to public life, this casting aside of the “autonomous liberal self” 
was a return “to a language of natural law” displaced by the liberal writers of 
Enlightenment who insisted that people could know, without a community united 
through “sacred texts, rituals, and oratory,” what morality requires. The insistence upon 
the “availability of a non-perspectival truth and on the need for a homogeneous 
community” was not a widespread stance in contemporary communication study and 
scholarship. Even so, similar arguments have influenced a variety of writers uncertain of 
the focus on autonomy and open to the notion that rhetoric in its truest sense was a 
clarifying vision, a means by which the impulses of the person and community can find 
some form of redemption.17
A “rejection” of rhetoric was in the elevation of personal autonomy and 
individual choice. The art of rhetoric was dangerous to the freedoms and rationalizations 
of the autonomous. The endowment of oratory was derailing to the prospects of 
knowledge. A “rejection of rhetoric” was both implicit and explicit in the writings of 
Immanuel Kant, whom Aune labeled “perhaps the most influential theorist of liberalism 
in the Western democracies.” The very philosophy of liberal democracy itself was based 
on a “fundamental distrust of persuasion,” he stated, and “once the autonomous 
individual rather than the family or community became the fundamental building block 
of politics, any effort to subvert that autonomy, whether through rhetoric or violence,” 
came to be viewed by Kant’s many and varied followers as an unwelcomed imposition.
  
18 
If nature advises that human freedom was an illusion, necessitating the postulation of 
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freedom as a transcendental possibility to explain morality in terms not grounded in the 
causal explanations of nature, then this “practical philosophy” of the dignity of 
individuals (in accordance to the ability to be practical, rational societal participants) 
suggested the “freedom” to accept objective moral laws was a marker of human progress 
– desirable, inevitable, irreversible.19
 Opposing sentiments to the currents of modernity, brought to life in a manner 
resembling White’s “reconstitutions” of language and community, were largely anti-
rational, anti-utopian creeds. Wayne Booth has written that rhetoric “may be anything 
from the classification of ornamental figures to the theory of man as a logos-possessing 
animal.”
 The individual held the capacity to recognize and 
act from duty. In opposition to such a sentiment, persuasions of “liberty” and 
“individuality” should recognize the extent to which persons of a social world (not 
“individuals”) require the necessity of placing moral chains upon their own appetites. 
Failing social norms to limit forms of expression were disastrous first and most notably 
for the family, the very foundation of the good community. Humans, with the innate 
need for communities, only thrive in the presence of social order – an order that should 
arise from the personal responsibility of constraining appetites, and not from the more 
arbitrary, synthetic chains of a leviathan. In Kirk’s use of rhetoric, the task was to 
preserve “Anglo-American” institutions by such actions.   
20 Kirk and the figures of this study, taking inspiration from Burke as the 
founder of conservatism, professed to be turning the power of rhetoric against modernist 
delusions. By an imaginative, literary rendering of history, custom, and tradition, they 
answered that “men do indeed have natural rights,” but not as many would have them. In 
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the “Christian and classical idea of distributive justice,” Kirk wrote that “the foremost of 
our true natural rights is the right to justice and order, which the radical fancies of the 
French revolutionaries would abolish.”21
Ingrained Values 
 The restoration of “true order” came through 
the encouragement of voluntary associations; there must be liberation from the restraints 
placed by mass forces upon the fulfillment of a moral nature. I think it is true that an 
objective, moral order standing above history to which society ought to adhere was at 
odds with many currents of modernity, and also of postmodernism. As evidenced by 
Kirk and the figures of this study, this loose and informal coalition of “Anglo-American” 
conservatism asserted the value and primacy of a literary, imaginative discourse. 
Through word, speech, phraseology, persona, and the contents of historical inclusion and 
exclusion, they constituted possibilities for an integrated community in fellowship with 
their example. The language of order and value was embedded in the everyday practices 
of life, to be made alive by its participants.  
Values were not “separated” from the shared experiences of the person, as 
persons were inherently social and “made” for communion. White has written that “to 
define the term “rationality’ or ‘reason’ to exclude reasoning about matters of value is to 
demean language and to be false to experience.” To assume that the “proper way” to 
discuss values is to treat them as abstract concepts, as part of an “analytic scheme,” takes 
the assumption that words will have the same meaning in each usage, and that a word’s 
“stipulated statement of meaning” could be substituted for the word itself. Yet this 
denies “to our important terms their actual force and nature.” In actual life, words are 
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complex and central modes of discourse are poetic; and “to deny our language and 
minds these resources in favor of a mode of thought impossibly mathematical would be 
to diminish our intellectual and social lives beyond reason.”22 Unlike the “rationalists,” 
postmodernists tend to mistrust reason and an associated universalism. In Lawler’s 
opinion, “Rather than speaking in categories applicable to all human beings as human 
beings, they attend to the unique habits, ways, and cultures of particular peoples. They 
tend to believe “there is nothing ‘beneath’ socialization or prior to history which is the 
definatory of the human.”23 An “associational rhetoric” of language constituted and 
reconstituted, however, may facilitate an intuitive recognition, a turn toward the 
persuasions of assuming a natural order and a human nature in the opinions and laments 
of response to political and social crisis. White’s convictions of language, as a cultural 
artifact conducive to the possibility of self and community restoration – an invention 
from something engaging in a process of meaning and community-building – stand as an 
insightful method to understanding how a small strand of “traditionalist intellectual 
conservatives” sought to buttress and construct a metaphysics of the human person that 
would not “individualize,” and that would not dissolve family and community into a 
“morally limiting” hypothesis of individualism. In definition, identity was formed. A 
“successful” text and persuasion was a “community” among readers, one that adopted its 
terms and methods so as to achieve their purposes.24
 An essential part of this method was to “create” the objects of its persuasion. 
This was, more specifically, to structure the ways of thinking, conversing, and being by 
which value and character found definition and thus “community” in its constitution. In 
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his chapter on Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, White portrayed the 
statesman’s ambitions to be wider than the security of a “reader’s intellectual assent to 
the truth of certain propositions.” Language as shared conceptions of the world, as 
shared manners and values, and as shared resources and expectations and procedures for 
speech and thought “imagines” the created text, especially when presented to an 
audience susceptible to similar sentiments, as part of a “real world.” Burke hoped, like 
his admirers two centuries later, that a “textual community” would become an actual 
political, social community as well. The object was to imaginatively “give” an identity, a 
reality, which could become a center of its formation: “He wants his readers to see 
things in the world as he presents them in the text, to think and to feel about them as he 
does, to form a community – strenuously opposed to the French revolutions, strenuously 
supporting the British Constitution – that is grounded, in part at least, on this text and 
speaking its language.”25 The “modernity” of France’s revolutionaries, for Kirk and 
other “conservative” scholars of Burke such as Peter Stanlis and Francis Caravan, stifled 
the principles of “good constitution” which flowed from an undirected scheme of 
exchange, that which was grown by the “common experience of a people over a 
considerable length of time” and carefully maintaining of the tension between the claims 
of freedom and the claims of order.26 An intellectual skepticism toward “self-sufficient” 
reason positioned these “communities of association” in opposition to many products of 
the rationalisms of “Enlightenment,” a large, complex term that was an underpinning of 
another large, complex term, “modernism.”  
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Kirk and “imaginative” thinkers of a “postmodern sentiment” challenged not 
only certain “utopian” doctrines but also the form and manner of their intellectual 
activity. If “Enlightenment” commenced with “a conception of man that denied the 
ancient doctrine of the decay of nature, based on the Christian view of the fall of man, 
and held out limitless possibilities for the improvement of human nature and the 
temporal conditions of life on earth,” then this “gradual fusion of many strands of 
thought”27 was countered by a strand of sentiment to uphold ancient doctrine with words 
of meaning. Kirk, like Weaver, believed that humanity cannot dissociate political 
principles and the methods of persuasion. There was a “genuine connection” subsisting 
between “the order of rhetoric and the order of society; false phrases open the way for 
false measures.”28
Postmodern Imagination in Conservatism 
 An abuse of language was reciprocal to an abuse of authority. As 
Weaver famously stated, ideas “have consequences.” Communicated by words and 
actions, though, ideas do not stand alone. A text that “created” a language in reference to 
a transcendent, ancient order was not an ethically neutral activity. It was not a way of 
manipulating data or information. The imaginative text was a way of conforming, and 
perhaps transforming, a character.  
 In my view, Kirk’s “rhetoric of moral imagination” included the “postmodern 
imagination” as one measure to counter – particularly as a response to mass politics, 
government coercion, and individualism – the devolution of will into power he thought 
modernity was prone to. His rhetorical meanings were responsive to a social system in 
which individual autonomy took precedence over communal solidarity as a fundamental 
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value. This rhetorical form functioned in a “system” where those forms could be 
“commodified,”29 one reason to embrace mystery and transcendence and shy away from 
market-orientated “solutions.” If cultural rhetoric is more implicit than explicit in 
modernizing societies, governing the “nature of emotional display, rationality, and 
collective deliberation as fundamental norms and values,” then I believe the “distinctive 
characteristic of modernity” as not simply the emphasis on the autonomous self but also 
the “consistent anxiety that one is not living an authentic existence”30
What I have termed “associational rhetoric” was, in part, a method of persuasive 
communication that spoke to such “accumulated knowledge.” The various facets of 
“imagination” present in my study (including the historical, poetic, prophetic, political, 
social, and moral) refer to a foundational, supreme image in accord with Christian 
revelation and revealed over time. Yet they partake of a contingency in persuasive 
construction, derisive of efforts to join the “scientific” and “humanistic.” In contrast, 
according to Dennis Mumby, the “first stream of modernist thought” as put into recent 
 follows, in the 
conception of Kirk and Weaver, from an illusion of freedom. Humans were creatures of 
ritual, their practice of rhetoric and philosophy found. Their creations were unable to 
abstract, concretely experience, or deduce from experiment the truths of the human 
condition. Instead, these truths were to be experienced by seasons and times. The 
markers of organic, generational wisdom needed ritual, mystery, and history to make 
humanity the communal, social creatures responsible to each other they were made to be. 
When changed through coercion by large, distant entities unknowing and uncaring of 
these values, it was a painful, alienating experience. Generational wisdom was superior.   
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communication theory practice can be “roughly characterized in terms of the positivist 
appropriation of Cartesian dualism.” Orthodoxy has emerged in the social sciences in 
which knowledge and truth are equated with the scientific method: “The foundation of 
this method is the radical (Cartesian) separation of subject (researcher) and object (of 
knowledge) and the development of research tools that allow this bifurcation to remain 
as inviolable as possible.” A “Cartesian” legacy embodied in a positivist modernism 
leaves little room, he believes, for a “conception of communication that has any 
ontological substance at all.” Such a bifurcation of subject and object, and of personal 
mind from the world, suggests that communication is a vehicle for ideas already formed, 
assistance to existing power structures, a hindrance to the ability to perceive the world, 
and obstructive to the production of truth claims.31
 The persuasive conservatism of this study, apprehensive for the “permanent 
things” of truth and beauty, found much of what could be classified as “modern” as an 
obstacle to human realization. Their “postmodernism,” while a large and exhausting 
term, began, as with other versions, as dissatisfaction for modernity. There was a sense 
of lost faith in the ability of representation. The term has encompassed “vast, complex, 
and, at times, contradictory fields. Still, one organizing feature of postmodernism is 
clearly discernible: postmodernism is always understood in contrast to modernism.”
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One of the first to use the word was a “religious conservative,” the Episcopal clergyman 
Bernard Iddings Bell in 1926. In a collection of lectures, Postmodernism and Other 
Essays, this personal friend and early (friendly) reviewer of Kirk was explicitly religious 
in criticism of modernity’s crisis of faith, which he thought stemmed from too much 
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trust in reason and science. The modern age had gone astray; it believed the wrong 
things. All “religious” systems, including liberalism, must be based on assumptions of 
trust – where can the modernist turn as a basis of authority? A trust in the sufficiency of 
the individual mind, coinciding with the rise of rise of science through which the 
intellect could perceive the “infallible laws of nature and divine the form and structure of 
the universe and, eventually, principles of society and moral conduct,” operated only 
within the frame of the physical and measurable. Science and rationality cannot answer 
“why,” which Bell’s postmodernism “takes to be the basic, philosophical question for 
society.” 33
This intersection, worried for the imagery of a society, approached cultural 
tradition and history not as “objective” but as something that humans can participate in 
and change. In Burke’s phrase, there was an appreciation for the “little platoons” of 
society. Kirk recognized this, once writing in National Review that “the Post-Modern 
imagination stands ready to be captured.”
 In sum, amid the ideologies and seen by some American “conservative” 
figures as an unmoored religious dogmatism in a political context, an intersection of 
postmodernism and “traditionalist” conservatism emphasized a creative faculty for the 
end purpose of communion with other humans in the light of the transcendent.  
34 In this capturing, the “split values” of 
modernity and liberalism might recede, allowing the “facts” of human nature to be 
presented in “value-laden” terms. “The tendency within liberal thought to diminish the 
significance of virtue in descriptions of, and prescriptions for, political life is well 
known,” Peter Berkowitz has written. Leading theorists for liberalism and modernism 
have made “strong practical and theoretical reasons for, and display considerable 
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resourcefulness in, circumscribing virtue’s role.”35 Wayne Booth’s Modern Dogma and 
the Rhetoric of Assent accused modernism of “dividing man’s responses to the world 
into two unequal parts, one of hard knowing and the other of soft faith or commitment.” 
Modernism’s dogmatism hindered the development of doubt and the reasoning of 
values, harming the development of community to discuss shared concerns. The value of 
“assent” required rhetorical communication, a value not always in harmony with 
“scientismists” and modernist consequences: “Belief or thought or knowledge, action or 
will or choice, feeling or emotion or passion occur in every theory of thinking, acting, or 
feeling; and though the terms shift, each of the three domains always appears 
somewhere, even if only for long enough to be dismissed as illusory or irrelevant.”36 A 
“reduction to the physical” clouds concern, a “befouled rhetorical climate which 
prevents our meeting to discover and pursue common interests.” The “modern dogmas” 
teaching that values cannot be reasoned downplay the togetherness of human symbolic 
exchange. A genuine, obvious knowledge is that “each of us ‘takes in’ other selves to 
build a self;” all societies are composed, to a large degree, of “what other men and 
women have created through symbolic exchange.” Booth summarized the rhetorical 
construct of symbolic exchange as building association as follows: “not only do human 
beings successfully infer other human beings’ states of mind from symbolic clues; we 
know that they characteristically, in all societies, build each other’s minds.”37
Approaches of Persuasion 
  
Through persuasion, I find that a willingness to listen, exchange, and build, as a 
“replacement” to precise, “value-free” definition and action, can serve in mutual inquiry 
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as a learning experience. Considering traditionalist conservatism, there are parallels of 
Booth’s characterizations and the fights against “scientism” prevalent in the writings of 
Kirk, Weaver, and authors that argued confidence in scientific, rational reasoning as 
applied to humans was improper. A “scientific narrative” approach to the social life, to 
justify, for example, “individualism,” was presented as an arrangement of social ends 
unwrought by social means due to a discord with the lessons of experience. As an 
alternative, following historical example, humans in their moral nature and through the 
progress of associational life should become a creature of opinions, habits, and 
sentiments that form a constituted nature – as inhabitants of a particular place.38
The persuasions of a “moral imagination” were more literary and spiritual than 
political. Societal concern was, at root, cultural. Rhetoric should not be concerned with 
abstract individuals, Weaver wrote, but “men of being.” It should be “designed to move 
men’s feelings in the direction of a goal;” and a “rhetorician enters into a solidarity with 
the audience by tacitly agreeing with one of its perceptions of reality.” A society cannot 
 Products 
of the rationalisms of “Enlightenment” such as materialism were presented as a 
straightjacket to the imaginative, even if there was an appeal to the transcendent. Insofar 
as a “determinist epistemology,” a grounding in the “autonomous individual,” a split of 
values from persuasion, and other broad generalities of liberalism and modernism 
operate as a single discourse, totalizing in effect, postmodernism and associational 
rhetoric as I have characterized them by relation to the figures of this study do not. The 
attractions of equality of outcome and the primacy of “individual right” were not an 
assumption of their life and vocabulary.  
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live without rhetoric because “there are some things in which the group needs to believe 
which cannot be demonstrated to everyone rationally. Their acceptance is pressed upon 
us by a kind of moral imperative arising from the group as a whole.”39 The emotional 
and sentimental associations of language and symbol (for Weaver, the highest form of 
appeal was to base a case on definition, or the “nature of the thing”) motivating an 
audience toward shared conceptions and assumptions of language brings to mind other 
rhetorical scholars, first among them Booth, Kenneth Burke, and Chaim Perelman.40 The 
argumentative rhetorical tradition of reasoning in a context, defining the relationships 
among logic, dialectic, and rhetoric by analyzing recurring argument patterns, proposed 
that “argumentation is intended to act upon an audience, to modify an audience’s 
convictions or dispositions through discourse, and it tries to gain a meeting of the minds 
instead of imposing its will through constraint or conditioning.”41
“Associational rhetoric” as I have defined it in this dissertation values human 
agency. The term, as I understand it, seeks to “preserve” rhetoric.
 Perelman’s notion of 
an argument that presupposes a meeting of minds, which social and political institutions 
can facilitate or prevent, also acknowledged that audience was not compelled by logic or 
reasoning alone. Agreement required appealing to something “greater” than the 
individual or an abstraction.  
42 Kenneth Burke’s 
“symbolic action,” where language and human agency combine, considered figures to be 
able to express a particular line of argument and simultaneously induce an audience to 
participate.43 Literature and art change their participants. And rhetoric uses language 
symbolically to form attitudes and induce actions. “Any specialized activity participates 
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in a larger unit of action,” Burke wrote. The “principle of rhetorical identification” may 
be summed up as follows: “the fact than an activity is capable of reduction to intrinsic, 
autonomous principles does not argue that it is free from identification with other order 
of motivation extrinsic to it.” The human agent is “not motivated solely by the principles 
of a specialized activity, however strongly this specialized power, in its suggestive role 
as imagery, may affect his character.” The use of words by humans to form attitudes and 
induce actions can bring about cooperation and community, as humans by their nature 
respond to symbols.44 Mired in the social mysteries of personal relations and 
community, humans seek vocabularies that will be “faithful reflections of reality” yet 
they must develop “vocabularies that are selections of reality.”45
Surveying the life and work of Kirk, I conclude that a basic function of his 
rhetoric, both in its application of the resources of persuasion and in more difficult to 
determine effects, was the application of inventive narratives most defensible to those of 
a similar inclination of sentiment. His language and persona had impact upon the actions 
and thoughts of others at an opportune time, as liberalism, collectivism, and cultural 
decay were seen by many opposed to “statist solutions” to be ascendant. The small, 
social “communities” of “conservative” readership, varying by their very nature as they 
came from messy, conflicted, mysterious beings, reflected in the moral imagination 
relationships “outside” of the scope of rational inquiry. For Booth, what humans “create” 
 In Kirk’s rhetoric, for 
finite persons to believe the truth of symbols was essential to a society of “good order,” 
as the purpose of symbols was to convey the truths of existence. They were ever present 
in the spaces that separate God from creation.   
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through symbolic exchange, the “taking in” of other selves “to build a self” greatly 
enriched in its symbolic influence by the existence of language,46 constituted a rhetorical 
climate unconfined to scientific “proof” and the experimentations of logic. An 
“imaginative” use of persuasive language was tied to a “form of life” in that there is no 
unmediated experience. Language was a social action, not a universally-acknowledged, 
referential marker. Its employment was only an imperfect approximation of reality. 
Language involved not just linguistic parts but circumstances, as well as the time, place, 
and the relations prevailing upon them. A “symbolizing entity” became a part of what it 
symbolized: “to represent or to say a thing is already to bring it into existence.”47
Struggling Against Totality 
     
Kirk brought his conservatism into existence by constructing a defensible history 
and philosophical justification. The application of an “associational rhetoric” to the 
study of his persuasion finds that the practice of a “neutral and objective discourse” was 
not feasible. For my subject, his sympathizers, and others of similar sentiments, the use 
of scientific reason to reorganize society, the positivist currents of modernist thought, 
could never take the place of speculative, but centered and referential, wisdom. Second, 
the rhetorical method of White “binds” concepts such as rhetoric, liberalism, modernism 
and post-modernity to his literary, cultural, social, and political criticisms through a 
deliberate concern for the terms by which a social world was constituted and values 
defined. When Words Lose Their Meaning was an enterprise of imagination where actual 
and historical performances of persuasion claimed meaning through cultural inheritance 
and translation – through the vitality of constituted language. By language, he referred to 
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the identifiable ways of communication that a culture makes available to its members. 
Language was “not simply a matter of diction and grammar, but tone of voice, verbal 
gesture, a universe of expected responses, consciousness, of what need not be said, and 
so on.” The examination of how a language “works” as a set of social and cultural 
practices, as a system of meaning, was an external, descriptive, and analytic question 
about something in the world, outside of the self.48 Partaking of an “inherited language,” 
one then looked at a text or a speaker and asked a set of questions, beginning with the 
language: what was being done, and what were the assumptions and biases? How was 
the text impacting speaker and hearer? One cannot talk “objectively” about the “good,” 
or politics, or ethics; the performance of using such terms meant something as an 
extension of a linguistic and historical inheritance.49
And so an incomplete but present nexus between this approach to persuasive 
language and the “traditionalist, postmodern” conservative criticisms of modernity (the 
emergence of “individuality” being the “pre-eminent event” of modern history, 
particularly in Europe
  
50 ) was the impossibility of effectively and completely 
communicating the “rules” which influence or “govern” action. Many conservative 
writers and academics, as well as “postmodern” scholars, have written against the 
actions of “totalizing” social arrangements. Immanent with their epistemological 
assumptions was a critique of rationalism based on the “impossibility of possessing 
complete knowledge.” (In fact, one important justification for conservatism is that 
humans within an existing order usually favor its continuation, and that they should be 
attached to their already extant institutions and orders.51) This is to say that the 
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intellectual life of any order cannot be “segregated” from the rest of society. All was 
subject to analysis, question, and criticism. Concerning my subject, the actions of 
construction in imagination and invention appealed to history and a transcendent, 
foundational order. This began with his reading of those that should be emulated, 
Edmund Burke first among them. Reflections on the Revolution in France, following 
White, established a “relation” with the reader in its use of language. The audience was 
part of the historical subject to be constituted with an identity. The use of language was 
ethical52 not in a “normative sense” of “morally good or bad” but in “in an analytic 
sense: speech is always a form of social action, and as such always has ethical content, 
which can of course be either good or bad.”53
 In my generalizations, the “modernist” separation of values from context was 
addressed by a “postmodern” or “traditionalist conservative” recovery through an 
approach of questioning brought to any text. The word “associational” in this 
dissertation does not view audience as “free agents” to be persuaded; nor were they 
“outside” the rhetoric. Members of an audience were subjects continuously participating 
in discourse, shaping it and in turn being shaped by it. All experience was mediated. 
Socialization began from the moment of acquiring language and symbolisms. This 
active, participatory process of reading and hearing meant that abstraction absent 
engaging in a process of association was not possible, for the minute one starts to think 
“objectively” one conjures assumption, history, bias, performance.
    
54 Recognition of 
responsibility for language, for its ethic and possibility, is an application of this sort of 
rhetorical method to my study of American intellectual conservatism, despite the many 
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internal disagreements of that movement. Aside from Kirk, the author closest to this 
“recognition” was Weaver. He once wrote, in disputing the “tenet of modernism” that a 
“scientist qua scientist is not charged with ethical responsibility,” that readers should not 
follow those unreasonably expectant of a “scientific” solution to human problems. A 
“perspective outside the modernist assumptions” should find this tenet to be inherently 
unethical, as it allowed writers anonymity and freedom from responsibility for what is 
written or said by suggesting that texts replicate objective knowledge.55
Much of “the modern”
  
56 was envisioned as uncertain and deadly, primed for 
sophistry and manipulation in the separation of form from ethical content. An eloquence 
absent ethical responsibility (that is, “facts” not presented in value-laden terms) in a 
world where, as Booth has stated, “many claim that there are no shared values,” might 
encumber the “one clear value” shared “in full cognitive respectability: It is always good 
to maintain and improve the quality of our symbolic exchange with our fellow ‘selves’ – 
to sharpen our symbolic powers so that we can understand and be understood, ‘taking in’ 
other selves and thus expanding our own.” Similar to White and the figures of this study, 
Booth believed that “what we say matters, and it matters how we say it. Even so, the 
rules for good discourse or clear thinking can no longer be confined to logical prose – 
humans must take in the proofs of personal appeal and commitment, of art and myth and 
ritual.”57 The command of rhetoric against the manipulations and controls of 
“modernity,” by an imaginative, literary rendering of long-standing, organically 
developed historical insight, custom, tradition, prescription, wisdom, and so on, was to 
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“reclaim,” so that an audience might learn to speak and write truth. It was to once again 
value the “permanent things.”  
Such questions concerning the rhetoric of association and reconstitution were, I 
think, an invitation to a mode of thought. An anthropological, linguistic, literary, 
historical, and psychological mixture of cultural inheritance was an examining of the 
identities, relations, and communities created, recreated, molded, and dissolved in 
speech and writing.58 Weaver’s function of rhetoric (which included dialectic), to guide 
toward a high good of redemption, could not be justified, he claimed, by “logic.” 
Rhetoric does not “act” on its own accord. The ethical faculty of humanity, as well as 
their knowledge, was formed by a faculty of perception. This echoes some of the work 
of Kenneth Burke, who wrote that humans have the capacity to choose consciously, and 
that definitions indicate one’s perspective on the world.59 In my generalization, a 
modern, “individualistic” attempt of dominion, as present in the mindset of my subject, 
was essentially a “rejection” of rhetoric – and certainly of the rhetoric of “traditionalist” 
conservatives and “postmodernism” as I have conceived them. The “anti-rationalism” 
and “anti-utopianism” of his sentiments, prejudices, biases, and dispositions made use of 
the interpretative constructs of an “associational” and “communal” rhetoric. In his 
conceptions of “moral imagination” and “permanent things,” a neutral offering of 
material truths, discovered by empirical investigation, was inadequate given the realities 
and mysteries of the human condition. Such human limitations were consistently and 
awkwardly negotiated by the irrepressible social, transcendent impulse. His rhetoric, in 
sum, was a necessary vehicle against perceptions of a modern, technocratic, scientific 
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delusion. Its purpose was to call humanity toward a purpose of renewal, to a world of 
communion with its properly constituted values.          
 Kirk’s embrace of earthly uncertainty was an intersection of two large and 
confusing terms, postmodernism and conservatism. The “postmodern conservative” was 
skeptical of new models and standards of “efficiency.” There is an enduring distrust of 
an elevated rationality in the conduct of human affairs. The “hegemonic and hubristic” 
pretenses of Enlightenment, the philosophical earthquake that birthed the limitations 
(and, as Kirk might argue, the persistent inhumanity) of modernity’s individualism and 
rights were, for the “traditionalist conservatives,” a cold and flimsy moral architectural 
structure. For them, tradition and revelation (such as Thomism or Augustinian thought, 
among other Christian traditions of reason), mixed with the reflexive critique of 
modernity, meant a return to appropriate discipline rather than a mastery of means. To 
maintain a quality of life, one informed by the accumulated wisdom of generations when 
the standards of efficiency and rights (by their perspective, a hurrying to nowhere) were 
embedded in a culture and its conducts of existence, was an arduous and worthy pursuit. 
By this view, a sentiment of “postmodernism” could be a critique of the over-ambitious 
nature of Enlightenment rationalism, the over-inflated projections of the achievement of 
the human mind, and the over-confidence in supposed rational political models (such as 
the military deeds of a hegemonic modern nation-state). Kirk’s rhetoric of moral 
imagination was the expressed suspicion of attempts to describe in narrative fashion the 
history of ideas, as if it were a linear path perfectly described and analyzed by a sort of 
idea-determinism. It was a way back to “pre-modern” ideas. It was in association with  
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Lyotard’s memorable definition of postmodernism (“simplifying to the extreme”): 
incredulity toward meta-narrative.  
 Knowledge, in Kirk’s persuasions, could never be reduced to science or learning. 
For how could knowledge even “concrete,” scientific knowledge, possibly find its 
legitimacy without recourse to a totalizing, narrative method? Instead, all discourses of 
learning were taken not from their “immediate truth-value,” but by reference to the value 
acquired in what Lyotard characterized as “occupying a certain place in the itinerary of 
Spirit or Life.” As Kirk might have argued, knowledge must find its validity in the 
practical subjects of humanity.60
Kirk,
 And this would, I imagine, include knowledge of how 
to use speech and persona to seek the truth. For conservatives, especially traditionalist, 
non-utopian (libertarianism being the chief “rightist” utopianism) ones inspired by  
the “negation of ideology” and the grounding of valid truth in persons created in the 
reflection of a perfected “Good” meant that earthly totality was futile and dangerous. Its 
supposed truth was prone to the many weapons of violence wielded by the rhetorically 
attractive. In their persuasion, the contempt for those who would reconstruct society by 
their various plans should be accompanied by the appreciation of custom, convention, 
and “old prescription” – checks upon anarchic whims and an innovator’s lust for power. 
Such a view was “postmodernism rightly understood.” It was a return to “realism,” an 
understanding of limitations, an embrace of the mysteries of life, and a rejection of the 
view that language, for instance, was a historical construct with no natural foundation. 
For the “Burkean conservative” and for Kirk as a chief popularizer of this sentiment, this 
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was a firm rejection of earthly claims for totality, as totality only arrived through the full 
communion of death.  
Toward an End of Justice 
 Kirk’s conservatism, unique and for a time influential, was brought to life by the 
rhetorical flush of creativity in history. His conservatism may be defined as the negation 
of ideology, the political secularization of the doctrine of original sin, the cautious 
sentiment tempered by prudence, the product of organic, local human organization 
observing and reforming its customs, the distaste for a priori principle disassociated from 
historical experience, the partaking of the mysteries of free will, divine guidance, and 
human agency by existing in but not of the confusions of modern society, no framework 
of action, no tenet, no theory, and no article of faith. This was a distrust of the systems 
and processes of the idols of humanity and of the lusts of power and status, a cynicism 
toward conceptions of “ideology” and “metanarratives.” In Kirk rhetoric of moral 
imagination, the desire to transform traditional institutions and human nature on the 
basis of a plan was always unacceptable. “Mediating institutions” – the seedbeds of 
virtue such as family, neighborhood, church, guild, union, hobby group – should 
demonstrate that human motivation cannot be reduced to ideology, especially a 
“commoditization” of economic ideology. Humans were creatures of mystery and love. 
This was evidenced by the many grand mysteries rationality could never unlock, such as 
language and music. To revolt against that “real world” was to scorn the fulfilling 
accomplishments humans could actually achieve, children first among them, so as to 
chase false, empty ones. Kirk thought and talked in images and stories, valuing first and 
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foremost the family and the local community where charity and good citizenship was, he 
firmly believed, best learned and practiced.61
 In the final analysis, Kirk’s use of rhetoric was toward an end of justice. If a 
rhetorical tradition, at its best, is an “enacted philosophy,”
  
62 then his life and rhetoric 
deserves continued study. By the constitution of a social world, he conveyed that many 
communities had lost their meanings. Those communities, and the language, should be 
reconstructed. Kirk wished to reconstruct politics in relation to ideology, conservatism in 
relation to America, and America in relation to a more communal “home.”63 In his 
invitations to these associations, the rhetorical movement was to take readers back to the 
past so as to rediscover, in a “conservative tradition,” the lasting and fulfilling meanings 
to life, to rediscover a “lost reverence.” His “rhetoric of moral imagination” sought to 
move humanity toward a transcendent reality, the necessary alternative to the lamentable 
direction of much of modern society. From this, a placement, in terms of where most 
readers were situated, was ideally a network of associations enduring in their long and 
naturally developing customs and traditions. Yet Kirk’s limitations were in the very 
readings of history necessary for these goals. His conservatism intentionally ignored or 
minimized the many “liberal” aspects of the American founding. The case for his 
homeland as a place of “Burkean” character was rendered incomplete by the poor fit 
between many of his heroes, Burke first among them, and American political reality. 
Shortly after he popularized his views and granted American conservatives greater 
intellectual respectability, he has himself become a half-forgotten historical figure. Kirk 
had little faith in the causes of political parties and movements, but too much faith in the 
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imagination of an Anglo-American conservatism and in the willingness of readers to 
follow such an imagination. That is why he will remain notable, worthy of reading, and 
at best only partially accurate.      
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